Resumen
En la "Lógica del ser-ahí", Capítulo 2, Hegel habla de finitud, comenzando con un preámbulo en el cual profundiza en los momentos del camino de la lógica total. En una breve recapitulación metodológica, se reafirma que la primera parte del ser-ahí (ser ahí, en general, calidad y algo) tiene una estructura en la que la determinación afirmativa es dominante; mientras que la segunda parte de la finitud (el algo y el otro, el ser-en-sí mismo, el ser-para-otro, la determinación, la constitución y el límite y el algo como finito) tiene una estructura negativa, es decir, la negación de algo es en sí misma, introduciendo el tema de la alteridad desde la categoría del otro. ¿Cuál es la estructura lógica del algo como finito? El algo y el otro al momento del límite se muestran a sí mismos como finitos, ya que ambos se niegan entre sí como la negación de la negación. Entonces, el límite de algo y el otro se manifiesta a sí mismo como la negación de la negación, convirtiéndose en contradictorio y precario. Hegel, al escribir su dialéctica del algo y el otro, explica los objetos del mundo elaborando un nuevo concepto de substrato a través de la relación entre los sustratos y la idea de procesualidad, la cual disuelve los sustratos y los provee de una nueva identidad, los sustratos en el movimiento de la relación y la alteridad. Mientras que el pensamiento convencional representa el mundo como sustratos estáticos, el pensamiento dialéctico revela la dimensión de procesualidad en el mundo con sentido.

Palabras clave: Lógica Hegeliana, La finitud, Estructura procesual.

Abstract
In the "Logic of Being-there", Chapter 2, Hegel discusses Finitude, beginning with a preamble wherein he advances the moments of the whole logical path. In a brief methodological recapitulation, he reaffirms that the first part of being-there (being there in general, quality and something) has a structure in which affirmative determination is dominant; whereas the second part of finitude (something and other, being-in-itself, being-for-other, determination, constitution and limit and something as finite) has a negative structure, that is, the negation of something is within itself, introducing the theme of otherness from the category of the other. What is the logical structure of something as finite? Something and other at the moment of limit show themselves as finite, since they both negate each other as the negation of negation. Then, the limit of something and other manifests itself as negation of negation, becoming contradictory and precarious. Hegel, in writing this dialectics of something and other, explains the objects in the world elaborating a new concept of substrate through the relationship between substrates and the idea of processuality, which dissolves the substrates and provides them with a new identity, substrates in movement of relationship and otherness. Whereas conventional thinking depicts the world as static substrates, dialectic thinking reveals the dimension of processuality in the world with meaning.

Key words: Hegelian Logic, Finitude, Processual Structure.

Resumo
No "Lógica do Ser-ai", capítulo 2, Hegel discute a finitude, começando com um preâmbulo em que ele avança os momentos do todo o caminho lógico. Em uma breve recapitulação metodológica, ele reafirma que a primeira parte do ser-ai (estar lá, em geral, de qualidade e alguma coisa) tem uma estrutura em que a determinação afirmativa é dominante; enquanto que a segunda parte da finitude (alguma coisa e outra, ser-em-si, ser-para-outro, determinação, constituição e limite e algo como finito) tem uma estrutura negativa, isto é, a negação de alguma coisa reside em si mesmo, introduzindo o tema da alteridade a partir da categoria do outro. Qual é a estrutura lógica do algo tão finito? Alguma coisa e outra coisa no momento do limite de mostram-se como finitos, já que ambos negam um ao outro como a negação da negação. Em seguida, o limite de alguma coisa e outra coisa se manifesta como negação da negação, tornando-se contraditórios e precários. Hegel, ao escrever essa dialética de alguma coisa e outra coisa, explica os objetos no mundo elaborando um novo conceito de substrato através da relação entre os substratos e a ideia de processualidade, que dissolve os substratos e proporciona-lhes uma nova identidade, substratos em movimento de relacionamento e alteridade. Considerando que o pensamento convencional retrata o mundo como substratos estáticos, o pensamento dialético revela a dimensión da processualidade no mundo com significado/sentido.

Palavras-chave: Lógica de Hegel, Finitude, Estrutura processual.


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In the “Logic of Being-there”, Chapter 2, Hegel discusses Finitude, beginning with a preamble wherein he advances the moments of the whole logical path. In a brief methodological recapitulation, he reaffirms that the first part of being-there (being there in general, quality and something) has a structure in which affirmative determination is dominant; whereas the second part of finitude (something and other, being-in-itself, being-for-other, determination, constitution and limit and something as finite) has a negative structure, that is, the negation of something is within itself, introducing the theme of otherness from the category of the other.

Here, new categories are introduced, such as something, other, being-in-itself, being-for-other, determination, constitution, limit, and finite. The category something is initially in a position of indifference and immediacy. Negation is something that is outside it, being-in-itself against being-for-other. Then, there is an unfolding of the category something into two moments that pass one in the other, possessing an immanent constitution in which something has a limit and thus becomes finite (cf. LS, 2013, § 1-4).1

A movement is perceived progressively advancing from the indifference of something to other, one subsisting alongside the other, still in outer form for a face-to-face in which one receives the other. Then, we have the determination of something that is immanently constituted attributing itself a limit. There is a movement of interaction in which something manifests itself, doubling itself as a being-in-itself and being-for-other, that is, a movement of internal and external negation in the limited something. Therefore, the limited something becomes a finite through its immanent negation, that is, from the affirmative something of the being-there in general one passes to the negative something of finitude. The something became other through the movement of negation, in other words, the something introduced otherness into its own self. Thus, otherness is constitutive of the very being-there as something limited and finite.

Hegel begins Part B by sketching a panorama of finitude. Afterwards, he makes a comparison between Part A and Part B, which results in rendering explicit the theory of finitude. Finitude is then subdivided into three items:

a) Something and other are face to face indifferently and immediately. Negation is still external. Therefore, the development goes from the external negativity to the immanent negativity of something. The being-in-itself and the being-for-other are the modes of relationship of something in face of the other (cf. LS, B § 1, 2013).

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b) **Determination and constitution:** The determination of something is in face of its constitution. The two concepts pass one into the other. This process introduces the concept of limit as being-for-other immanent to something and as negated, that is, the determinity is immanent to something (id. B § 2).

c) The limit is immanent to something and, due to its contradiction, finite. The development of something as finite is the explanation of immanent negativity.

In the end of the introduction, Hegel establishes the difference between Part A Being there as such – and Part B – Finitude. In the former, being develops only as “affirmative determination” (id, B § 4); in the latter, it develops as “negative determination”. Here, the negation of the negation is being spoken of, namely something in the end of Part A is only “in itself”, while in Part B it is “posited” and mediated through the other’s determination. And the other is introduced as negation of something, then, negativity and otherness presuppose each other, such that in Part B something manifests itself as negation of itself and the other, that is, the negation of negation (second negation).

**1. Something and other**

Initially a series of questions can be posed, such as: How are the categories of something and other, as predicates or expressions of the subject, to be interpreted? How to advance from the proposition “something and other are both something” to “something and other are both other”? How does the dialectics of something and other is related to the dialectics of saying “this” in the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*? How does the dialectics presented moves from something to other?

**Dialectical triad:** In item B we have a second dialectical triad from the logic of being-there: a) Something and another; b) Determination, constitution and limit; c) Finitude. In item “a”, Hegel initially describes the concept of something in general as divers being-there’s. Afterwards, something becomes other, then we have a binary relationship which runs into a dialectics between something and other.

**Three propositions:** The dialectics between something and other is expressed in three propositions:

1. “Something and other equal something”, since they are yet indeterminate and empty as far as content is concerned.

2. “Something and other are equally other”, since they are in a dual relationship, for example, if a being-there is named A, the other will be named B; however, A is equally the other of B. Hegel also develops this proposition from the way we refer to something and oth-
er, that is, the way we employ the demonstrative pronoun “this” (id. B § 2, p. 1). “This” is indicated without reference to all somethings, as they are also other. The use of the pronoun “this” expresses something determinate, but understanding does not perceive that language pronounces only the universal. This passage of the Logic corresponds to Hegel’s critique to the sense-certainty in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which the universality of language includes the affirmative something, surpasses the ambit of sensible things.

Hegel reaffirms that something not only has a determination of the being other by comparison of a third one, but it is, indeed, another, since it is in relation to another. This is acknowledged both by dialectical thinking and representation. Therefore, something and other become others, such that something passed completely into other (cf. id. § 3, p. 2). Now, the other, according to the position of representation, is the same as something; however, according to dialectical thinking, it is also different from something. Thus, it has an independent status: it is “for itself outside the same,” or something (id. B § 4, p. 3). So a new meaning of the concept of other is attained.

(iii) The third proposition ascertains that “the other has to be assumed as isolated in relation to itself” (id. B, § 5, p. 3), that is, Plato’s to heteron (other), which is opposed to the one. The other is a relative concept, since it supposes that something can only be understood insofar as it is posited in relation to itself. Taken “in relation to itself”, it means that the other in itself is the other of itself. The other is self-related and self-negating, becoming another something identical to itself to a broadened extent (id. B § 6, p. 3).

To Hegel, the permanent movement of the concept of other is not as in Aristotle a simple variation of quality of an identical substrate, but the other’s pure self-motion, dissolving all the substrate and developing a positive self-relationship or identity with itself of the other, resulting in a new something, that is, a new substrate that has the identity of processual plenitude.

So, the something that passed through all this process of otherness is a new something, diverse from the first one, since it underwent the movement of self-relationship of the other, reaching a higher level of broadness. It is the dialectics of something and other into which the passage from a substrate taken affirmatively occurs, in other words, a new substrate resulting from this process of the other of itself. Thus, Hegel ascertains that “the something conserves itself in its not-being-there” (id. B § 7, p. 4).

The dialectics of something and other presents a methodological synthesis of all further development of the logic of being-there. Hegel’s thesis is that being-there, that is, the world of sensible things, consists of two principles: Something as substrate and the process of change engendered by the other. The substrate
is diluted within the process of change, becoming a new substrate. Hegel changes the concept of static substance of conventional metaphysics into a dynamic substrate, that is, a processual structure.

**Dialectics of something and other**

After the dialectics of something and other, Hegel develops the dialectics of the modes of relationship of the being-in-itself and the being-for-other that arise from something in face of the other. The basic structure is as follows: Elaboration of the categories of being-in-itself and being-for-other; summary of the evolution from something and other to being-in-itself and being-for-other. The presentation of the logic of immediate determinations for reflected determinations is developed in a retrospective of becoming and its moments (id. B, §§ 7-13, p. 4-5). Afterwards, a synthesis of the being-in-itself and the being-for-other is arrived at: the being-in-it. In the new expression “being-in-it”, the reflexive pronoun “itself” is replaced with the non reflexive “it”, wherein, in spite of this, the reflexive meaning should be assured. Being-in-it is a being-in-itself in which, according to Hegel, the “stress” falls on “in” [an], that is, “in it” (id. B, § 14, p. 5).

The two paragraphs that follow have the status of observations. They contain the following themes: 1. The identity of different determinations in the logics of being-there and essence. 2. Hegel’s critique of the Kantian concept of thing-in-itself. 3. Considerations about the methodological connection between the logics of being-there and essence (id. B §§ 15-16, pp. 5-7). Finally, we have the transition to category of determination (id B, § 17-18, pp. 7-8).

2. Determination, constitution and limit

a) **Determination and constitution** (§§ 1-6)

The description of categories of determination and constitution follow the results of the dialectics of being-in-itself and being-for-other, wherein each is placed in the other. Determination is the determinity of something that arises from its being-for-other and is received in the being-in-itself. The being-in-itself receives determinity, internalizing it in determination. The non internalizable determinity of something, which remains outside determination, is only the being-for-other. Hegel names it as constitution. Thus, determination and constitution are the predicates of the description of something.

The determination is, firstly, the affirmation and conservation of the qualitative something in face of the other. Afterwards, the something being coherent with itself contains a pretension that the being-there corresponds in its determinity to its being-in-itself. Finally, the determination of something shows itself as an
“ought” searching for completeness (id. Bb § 3, p. 9), being, however, confronted with its being-there not incorporated.

The category of constitution (id. Bb § 4, p. 10) develops from something as change, since it is under the external influence of its involvement with the other. Thus, the concept of change is narrowly linked to the category of constitution, since something is in relation with its mean and is exposed to external impacts, from such, the possibility and necessity that something changes is given. However, the change of something that transforms itself and becomes other, it maintains and preserves, at the same time, its identity, in other words, the immanent determination. Therefore, the determination and the constitution are different one from the other.

b) Dialectics of determination and constitution (§§ 7, 8)

The dialectics between determination and constitution has the task of superseding its abstract distinction and presenting them in their passage one into the other. This passage occurs in the form of a syllogism, in which determination works as a middle term between the poles of logical mediation of determination and that of constitution.

The determination of something is apparently indifferent in face of change, since it concerns constitution. The determination is the identity of the being-in-itself and being-for-other, thus, the determination is “open to the relationship with the other” (id. Bb § 7, p. 11), so, it is open to change. Therefore, determination itself “is lowered to constitution” (id. p. 11), then, determination is dissolved in its seeming fixedness and enters into the dynamics of change through constitution and, inversely, constitution is also a determination related in itself.

Then, Hegel dialectically takes the seeming separation between constitution and determination as the other in itself. Therefore, it is the constitution of the being-there as the other of itself, that is, the constitution is in process of change, passing to another constitution, transforming itself and uniting in change with itself as a new determination of the being-there.

c) Results of the dialectics of determination and of constitution (§§ 8, 9, 10)

The result of the dialectics between determination and constitution of something is as follows: The change of something is not only abstract; it is posited in the very something, as its immanent determination. Something has begun a process of change and remains active in this moment of change, developing as being-within-itself through constitution and determination in opposition, passing one in the other.

Hegel’s project is the reconstruction of the sensible world through its logical conceptual network. The dialectics of determination and
of constitution has conceptually reconstructed the world of sensible things, just as Plato conceived of the dialectics of change between abstract and concrete.

Thus, the dialectics of determination and of constitution also changed the relationship of something and other, both being active within them and outside them as well, so that their self-affirmation is no longer immediate, but mediated by the “superseding of its other” (id. Bb § 10). Thus, each something is constituted within itself and at the same time in relation to another something.

The evidencing of how something behaves in relation to other from itself leads to the category of limit. Each something has superseded itself and is, thus, qualitatively different from the other something. There is a double relation in which each something is constituted in itself and, at the same time, is different from other something. Then, the category of limit as the structure of something is introduced. Each something is within itself as “negation of negation”, being limited one in relation to the other, that is, the limit binds and severs equally some in relation to others (cf. Bb § 10, p. 13).

**d) The contradiction in the limit**

How does the contradiction of the limit develop? How does the representation of understanding attempt to prevent the contradiction of the limit of something? Why is something not only limited, but finite?

Hegel initially compares the limit with the being-for-other. While the being-for-other is an “indeterminate community, affirmative of something with its other”, in the limit “the not being for the other, the qualitative negation of the other” is highlighted (id. Bb § 11), that is, the concept of limit implies a contradiction. This is a crucial concept to understand the concept of limit, since, previously, in the dialectics of something and other, of the being-in-itself and the being-for-other, determination and constitution, contradiction is implicit, whereas here it becomes explicit with the category of limit. The contradiction consists of the inclusion and exclusion, that is, the limit of something and the other include one another, ideally, and actually distinguish themselves.

The category of limit is developed within three moments: Firstly, a contradiction of the immediate form of something is developed, which, afterwards, experiences its dissolution in the representation, that is, according to the understanding, which attempts to sever the being-there and the limit of something and other. The being-there of something is, therefore, shown not to be separate from its limit and, thus, cannot free itself from the contradiction, which introduces the “restlessness” (id. Bb § 18) that pushes it outside, beyond itself, becoming infinitude.

1) *Development of immediate contradiction of the being-there of the limit* (§§ 12-14): The
limit of something is, initially, its being and non-being of the other, once the very other is a something, and the limit is also the non-being of the first something. Thenceforth results the contradiction that, in the limit something and other have both their being and its non-being, that is, from this negation it establishes the contradiction of the limit.

This contradiction is only an external emergence by the fact that the limit of something is "the simple negation or the first negation", and the other as "negation of negation" (id. § 13, p. 14), that is, the self-contradiction. Therefore, something, in negating the other, negates at the same time itself. In the limit there is not only the reciprocal negation of two moments, but the self-negation of each moment. The limit of something, as immediate being-there in face of the other, establishes a relationship of mediation, that is, the limit “is the mediation through which something and other are and are not at the same time” (id. § 14).

2) The contradiction of the limit in the representation of understanding (§§ 15, 16): The way of thinking about understanding represents the contradiction of the limit of something and other situated beyond or outside itself, something unlimited; in severing the limit of the being-there in general, Hegel gives us the example of spatial objects, grasped by understanding separately: the line appears as line outside its limit, the point.

c) Something as limit and contradiction (§§ 17-19): Hegel initially deconstructs the representation of understanding, since, if we take the being-there as something and other outside its limit, they will be a pure sameness, that is, they appear as the same. However, the determinity of the limit renders the something and the other distinct, then limited between themselves and their being-there (id. Bb § 17).

The being-there of something and other has a “double identity” (id. Bb § 17), that is, on the one hand, it has its being-there only in its limit, and, on the other, the being-there and the limit are, at the same time, “the negative of one another”. Thus, something that exists only in its limit is in contradiction with itself.

The determinations of something are firstly posited in their immanent limit (cf. § 17), that is, something is only in its limit and, thus, they have their principium individuationis. Secondly, in its limit the something also has its negation in itself and, due to this contradiction, is restless, being pushed outside itself. The contradiction arranges a movement that drives something out of its self-referentiality, beyond itself (cf. § 18). These two determinations, (i) the limit of something and (ii) the contradiction that drives the something out of itself, constitute the something as finite (cf. § 19, p. 17).

Here Hegel builds the transition of the limit to the finitude insofar as he converts the limit
conceived of in strictly spatial terms in a movement whereby a finitude that is temporally conceived of and, at the same time, historically conceptualized, results. This development, in which the spatially determined phenomenon becomes the temporal phenomenon of the finite, occurs through the contradiction of the category of the limit of something. In other words, the movement or the “restlessness” (id. Bb § 18) of the contradiction of the spatially conceptualized limit constitutes the temporally structured finitude.

Hegel’s thesis is that something is finite, because, in its change, it has no subsistence of its own. Mutability leads to the perishing of something, since it has its being in the non-being; therefore, the being in the determination of the limit is entirely relinquished to the non-being.

The transition to finitude demonstrates two conditions: (1) The limit is immanent to something, that is, that the something has, indeed, its being-there in the limit; (ii) the contradiction of the limit immanent to something leads to movement. Thus, it leads to the conclusion that the theory of finitude is understood as theory of contradiction.

The dialectics of something and other in its determination, constitution and limit was shown, wherein Hegel reconstitutes Plato’s thesis on the dialectics of sensible things. In other words, the interpretation of finite things as a being that is a non-being that the finite something as movement of contradiction leads to the perishing of the very something are two Platonic inheritances.

This Hegelian approach, following the Platonic interpretation, on the logics of the being-there shows that Jacobi’s position on the immediateness and the positivity of the being-there does not hold true, since the reconstruction of something in its finitude evidences its immanent negativity, to which the appearance of initial positivity in the process of thinking is opposed.

Hegel assumes the dialectics of the world of sensory things or the theory of finitude according to the Platonic standpoint. However, in constituting the theory of finitude he employs the strategy of thinking of understanding and reason to supersede the negativity and the contradiction of finite things. Examining how the theory of the Hegelian finite and infinite surpasses the dualism of finitude and infinitude that crosses two thousand years of history of philosophy is a challenge.

3. Finitude or the perishing of the being-there

Hegel begins the item “Bc” by reviewing the transition from limit to finitude, focusing on the category of finitude through the “being of finite things”, he affirms that they have “the germ of perishing as their being-within-itself; the hour of their birth is the hour of their death” (id. Bc, § 2, p. 18), that is, their truth is their perishing.
a) Immediateness of finitude or the contradiction of the being-there

Finitude in its immediate form appears as contradiction, that is, a negative relationship in itself that presents the non mediation, that is, finitude isolated from infinitude. Hegel begins by exposing the structure of negativity of finitude opposing the thinking of understanding and of reason on the concept of finitude.

The category of finitude is firstly understood as a contradiction, that is, the finite is constituted by contradiction. The thinking of understanding advocates the non resolution of the contradiction of the finite, but this view is untenable. Afterwards, considering that the finite is contradictory, there is the need of it finding a solution for its contradiction, that is, surpassing the fixing rigidity of the thinking of understanding. Then, the perishing of the finite, the result of its perishing does not lead to the “abstract nothing” (id. Bc, § 2, p. 19), but to the dissolution of the contradiction of finitude, that is, a broader result: the concept of infinitude according to the thinking of reason.3

3 It should be asked whether alongside these two possibilities of the conception of finite named by Hegel, a third, not mentioned by him, could not exist (cf. M. Theunissen. *Sein und Schein. Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik* [Being and Appearance. The critical function of Hegelian Logic]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978, 267ss.). Against Hegel's view it could be posited that there is a conception of the understanding of the finite that does not render perishing the last, but abstracts, partially, from the perishing of the finite. A difference between that which perishes and the perishing should be considered. In addition to its non-being and its ending, the being of finite things should not be forgotten. Hegel's idealist thesis of the dissolution of the finite is based on the matching of that which perishes, the subject of perishing, with the perishing. In face of the perishing of perishing (reason) and the last of perishing (understanding 1), it could be posited that the finite subsists as that which perishes (understanding 2).

b) The barrier and the ought

Hegel exposes the categories of barrier and ought, analyzing the contradiction of the finite something and reviewing the transition from limit to finitude. The dialectics between something and other, determination and constitution engenders the limit immanent to something. This negative relationship in something negates its immanent limit. It follows that the limit as negated negation becomes barrier, and the determination of something as negation negating becomes ought, becomes something finite (cf. §§ 1-3, pp. 20-21). Hegel posits that the negation has two sides: on the one hand, it is the negative relationship of something as limit and, on the other hand, it is the negative relationship as barrier, that is, ought.

*Dialectics of the barrier and the ought* (§§ 3-7): The barrier of something implies opposing and going beyond oneself as an ought. The understanding of barrier as something unsurpassable, according to the transcendental philosophical conception, is criticized by Hegel, showing that the barrier may be transposed as a task of the ought (§ 3).

The dialectics of the ought has a double determination: first, the ought as affirmative being in itself; second, as a negative and a non being (§ 4). The moments of barrier and ought correspond, respectively, to the limit and the determination. The status of the barrier is being finite and the ought is infinite, but Hegel shows that both categories are finite, that is,
that the ought does not go beyond finitude (§ 5).

The category of the ought is a contradiction of being and non being. “What ought to be is, and, at the same time, is not” (id. § 6). For the ought, the negative aspect is, then, constitutive in the same way as the affirmative. The ought essentially has a barrier. The appearance of its mere being in itself and, thus, its finitude, is dissolved.

The contradiction between the being and the non-being enables the opening up to the ought. Hegel evidences this contradiction through the terms of negation: the being-within-itself of something engenders the first relational unit (i) the “negation of negation”, then, the other unit, the relation negating the two moments, namely (ii) that of the negation as being-in-itself and the same relation as limit (cf. § 7, p. 21). The dialectics of the barrier and of the ought moves, therefore, between the simple negation and the negation of negation in an unsolved contradiction. This means that the affirmative sense of the result of the negation of the negation is not yet attained.

The ought moves within the dualism of the negated being-in-itself and the negated limit. However, “the barrier of the finite is not an exterior, but its own determination and also its barrier; and this is both itself and the ought; it is the common of both or that in which both are identical” (id. § 7). The common determination of the ought and the barrier is the barrier, that is, the negation as such. That in which both are identical is the barrier. The appearance of affirmative determination of the ought is dissolved.

Scheme of the dialectics of the barrier and the ought:
The being-in-itself (ought) - the limit (barrier)
The negation negating - the negation negated
“In itself” the negation (2) of negation (1) is the relation of the negation (1) negating itself.

The Double meaning of the expression “negation of negation” in Hegel:
a) The meaning of the process: the relation of the negation negating itself.
b) The meaning of the result: the positive relation of the negation to itself, in which negation as such is negated.

The result of the dialectics of the barrier and the ought (cf. §§ 8-9) is that the barrier implies the ought as going beyond itself. “As ought, something is, thus, elevated over its barrier, but, inversely, only as ought it has its barrier. Both are inseparable” (id. § 9). Despite its elevation over the barrier, the ought is limited.4

4 In the ought are implied both a moment of self-relation or self-determination and a moment of the limitation of the ought. This ambiguity of the ought is exemplified in the Kantian categorical imperative. The entity of reason, which is the human being, is, for Kant, primarily its own legislator; in other words, it determines itself in the establishment of its imperatives. But secondarily it always runs the risk of being liable to external determinations according to Kant, of its own sensibility. It is, therefore, limited.
The going beyond the barrier of the ought that leaves the limit behind itself is a finite, since it is accompanied by the limitation of the ought.

c) Observation on the ought

1. Critique of the ought as ultimate concept and bad infinitude (§§ 1-3): In the observation about the barrier and the ought, Hegel criticizes the role of the ought in transcendental philosophy, both in the theoretical and the practical aspects. The ought is valid as ultimate and absolute concept of identity, determinateness or limit (cf. Bc obs. § 1, p. 23). Hegel evidences in the concept of the ought the contradiction of the understanding that is unable to know.

These two expressions “You can, since you ought to” and “You cannot, precisely because you ought to” (id. § 2). In the ought there is the barrier of the “formalism of possibility” (“You can”) and, at the same time, the negation of possibility (“You cannot”). The ought is, then, characterized as the contradiction of the possibility and the impossibility. This impossibility will manifest itself in the shape of the bad infinitude, that is, in the progress to the infinite (id. § 3).

2. Critique of prejudices on the categories of the barrier and the ought (§§ 4-7)

a) Critique of the philosophical-transcendental prejudice of the unsurpassable barrier:

The transcendental way of thinking affirms that one cannot go beyond the barrier. This already includes an “inconsistency” (id. § 4), since, because something is determined as barrier, one has already gone beyond. Wanting to speak of the limitation of our knowledge constitutes a contradiction, since, with the knowledge about the barriers, we are already beyond them. The thinking of understanding does not recognize what is the content of the barrier and thus uses this category uncritically. Hegel presents the dialectically developed concept of this category. The effectiveness is the parameter for criticizing the ought, since it does not advance to the concept.

The objects without feeling, representation and thinking, etc. are able to go beyond their barrier, since they supersede their barrier, for instance, the stone, the acid, etc. The stone as something, or finite object, distinguishes itself in its “determination or its being-in-itself and its being-there” (id. § 4), then, in ought and barrier. In the case of living beings, they realize these determinations through the impulse, as life, sensation, representing, etc. For instance, a plant goes beyond the barrier, unfolding itself in germ, flower, fruit, leaf. The human who feels hunger, thirst, etc. goes beyond this barrier to meet these needs (id. § 5). However, Hegel warns that the fact of going beyond the barrier is not a true liberation, since a true affirmation surpasses the dualism of the ought and the barrier. In other words, “the very ought is such an imperfect going beyond” (id. § 5). Thus Hegel’s critique of the ought follows.
b) Critique of the moral ought (§ 7):

Just as the thinking of understanding does not know that in the category of the barrier the moment of the being beyond it is contained, the ought does not see that the going beyond the barrier is “only finite going beyond” (id. § 7). Therefore, the ought has its validity only in the field of finitude, since, in going beyond the barrier, it generates it again identically.

In Kantian and Fichtean moral philosophy, the ought is aimed “against particular will, against egoist eagerness and arbitrary interest” (id. § 7). The “ought of morals” has its legitimacy in the critique of the deviation of the will in relation to the ethical norm. Morality cannot stop in the ought, since, for Hegel, the ought cannot be the absolute groundwork for morals. This would be an abstract subjectivism reduced to interiority. On the contrary, Hegel, in his *Philosophy of Right*, opposes the ought of morality to the lived being or substantial ethicity. The moral will of the individual is articulated in the social (corporations, civil society) and institutional (State) mediations, becoming infinite, that is, the moral norms cannot be a mere ought or mandatory prejudice, but have to be effectuated in the structures of liberty and the ethical and moral acting.

Hegel points out the contradiction of finitude, ascertaining that “Kantian and Fichtean philosophy indicate as supreme point of dissolution of contradictions of reason the ought, which, however, is only a standpoint of the persisting in finitude and, thus, in contradiction” (id. § 7). Kant and Fichte understand that reason remains in the ineffective idea, whereas Hegel believes that the idea of reason is evidenced as the realization of effectiveness. That is, the ought is without objectivity, whereas reason is the effective reality that begins with the logic of being-there, passing to finitude, and concludes itself in infinitude. Hegel’s idealism of reason is the effectuation of reason, that is, the starting point is that effectiveness is already rational.

d) Transition from finite to infinite

In this transition, Hegel presents the dissolution of the contradiction of the finite, that is, the perishing of the finite; the negation of itself of the finite has not only the negative result of the nothing, but an affirmative result: the infinite. There are two ways of understanding the dissolution of the contradiction of the finite: 1) As negative in general, that is, the finite perishes, but it becomes only another finite, passing in other finite and so on, forming an infinite series of perishing finites (cf. § 1, p. 27).

2) The second way is that the perishing is finite, “in this negation of itself, it reached the being-in-itself, it is united with itself”, that is, it is “the identity with itself, the negation of the negation is [the] affirmative being, then, the other of the finite: that other is the infinite” (id. § 1, p. 28). Therefore, the figure of the being with itself in the other is the infinite as other of the finite, that is, the identity with itself in the other, superseding the general structure of regression to infinite.
Conclusion

The dialectics of something and other, explains the objects in the world. Hegel elaborates a new concept of substrate through the relationship between substrates and the idea of processuality, which dissolves the substrates and provides them with a new identity, substrates in movement of relationship and otherness.

The permanent movement of the concept of other is not a simple variation of quality of an identical substrate, but the other’s pure self-movement, dissolving all the substrate and developing a positive self-relationship or identity with itself of the other, resulting in a new something, that is, a new substrate that has the identity of processual plenitude. It is the dialectics of something and other into which the passage from a substrate taken affirmatively occurs, in other words, a new substrate resulting from this process of the other of itself.

Hegel’s thesis is that being-there, that is, the world of sensible things, consists of two principles: Something as substrate and the process of change engendered by the other. The substrate is diluted within the process of change, becoming a new substrate. Hegel changes the concept of static substance of conventional metaphysics into a dynamic substrate, that is, a processual structure.

Hegel’s thesis is that something is finite, because, in its change, it has no subsistence of its own. Mutability leads to the perishing of something, since it has its being in the non-being; therefore, the being in the determination of the limit is entirely relinquished to the non-being.

The transition to finitude demonstrates that, the limit is immanent to something, that is, that the something has, indeed, its being-there in the limit. The contradiction of the limit immanent to something leads to movement. Thus, it leads to the conclusion that the theory of finitude is understood as theory of contradiction.

The category of finitude is firstly understood as a contradiction, that is, the finite is constituted by contradiction. The thinking of understanding advocates the non resolution of the contradiction of the finite, but this view is untenable. Afterwards, considering that the finite is contradictory, there is the need of it finding a solution for its contradiction, that is, surpassing the fixing rigidity of the thinking of understanding. Then, the perishing of the finite, the result of its perishing does not lead to the abstract nothing, but to the dissolution of the contradiction of finitude, that is, a broader result: the concept of infinitude according to the thinking of reason.

References


