Aesthetics, ethics, and the role of Teleology in the third Critique

Estética, ética e o papel da Teleologia na terceira Critica

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To Valério Rohden, in memoriam

Abstract

Kant’s dualism in anthropology and morality is said to be bridged only by means of a teleology which seems to betray the historical constitution of its subjectivity. And yet the Kantian articulation of problems of theoretical and practical reason can be explored only insofar as they help us understand the correlated problems of the unity of reason, the relation of aesthetics and ethics in the light of the three Critiques, and the teleological conception of history. In this paper, I argue for a teleological reading of the systematic architectonic so as to make sense of the concept of purposiveness as the a priori principle of judgment in its logical, aesthetic, and teleological reflection and of the unifying, a priori principles of each faculty –namely, conformity to law, final purpose, and conformity to purpose or purposiveness (Gesetzmäßigkeit, Endzweck, Zweckmäßigkeit) – respectively dealt with in the three Critiques.

Keywords: Aesthetics. Critique of judgment. Ethics. Reason. Teleology.
**Resumo**

Diz-se do dualismo kantiano em antropologia e moralidade que pode ser apenas superado por meio de uma Teleologia que parece trair a constituição histórica de sua subjetividade. Todavia, a articulação kantiana dos problemas da razão teórica e prática só pode ser explorada enquanto estes nos ajudam a entender os problemas correlatos da unidade da razão, da relação entre estética e ética à luz das três Críticas, e da concepção teleológica da história. Neste artigo, defendo uma leitura teleológica da arquitetônica sistemática, de modo a explicitar o conceito de finalidade como princípio a priori de juízo em sua reflexão lógica, estética e teleológica e da unificação, princípios a priori de cada faculdade – a saber, da conformidade à lei, do fim terminal e da conformidade a fins (Gesetzmäßigkeit, Endzweck, Zweckmäßigkeit), respectivamente tematizados nas três Críticas.


As they have been well recognized in Brazil, Valerio Rohden’s monumental translations of Kant’s critical trilogy into Portuguese contributed to the consolidation of a genuine philosophical culture and the ongoing *Kant-Forschung* in Latin America. Of particular interest, one cannot arguably exaggerate the role of reason in the transition from theoretical to practical philosophy, and how aesthetics relate to ethics. Whether one may resort to a theoretical conception of teleology or to a rather moral view of purpose or finality in order to account for the beautiful in nature or divine creation comes down to confusing these different uses of our rational capacities and risks failing to do justice to the original intent of Kant’s critical philosophy. In effect, the problem of articulating the higher faculties\(^1\) of cognition (*Verstand, Vernunft, Urteilskraft*) and the three *Critiques* as a function of Kant’s transcendental system as a whole has been the object of different interpretations, from the various formulations of German idealism to our day. Part of

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\(^1\) Although taking into account Werner Pluhar’s English translation of the *Critique of Judgment* (hereafter, abbreviated KU, for the *Academie-Ausgabe* version of *Kritik der Urteilskraft*; ET for the English Translation: Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), I decided to maintain certain terms translated otherwise, so as to avoid confusion with their English homonyms. “Faculty” translates thus Vermögen, to be distinguished from “power” (*Macht* in German and *pouvoir* in French).
the problematic had been delineated by Kant himself, in particular, in the Introduction to the second edition of the third *Critique* (1793). Still in the Preface to the first edition of 1790, Kant defines the twofold concern of investigating whether the faculty of judgment² also has a priori principles of its own, whether these are constitutive or merely regulative, and whether this faculty gives the rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, the mediating link between the faculty of cognition (*Erkenntnisvermögen*) in general and the faculty of desire (*Begehungsvermögen*). According to Kant, the unity of the theoretical and practical uses of pure reason must be assured by “the unity of the suprasensible” (*Einheit des Übersinnlichen*), although the cognition of the latter cannot be possible either from a theoretical or from a practical standpoint. What had been delimited, in a negative sense, in the theoretical use of pure reason is manifest by the practical use of reason, now considered in light of the concept of purposiveness (*Endzweckmäßigkeit*) in nature:

The understanding, inasmuch as it can give laws to nature a priori, proves that we cognize nature only as appearance [*als Erscheinung*], and hence at the same time points to a super-sensible substrate [*ein übersinnliches Substrat*] of nature; but it leaves this substrate wholly undetermined [*unbestimmt*]. Judgment [*Beurteilung*], through its a priori principle of judging nature in terms of possible particular laws of nature, provides nature’s suprasensible substrate (within as well outside us) with determinability [*Bestimmbarkeit*] by the intellectual faculty. But reason, through its a priori practical law, gives this same substrate determination [*Bestimmung*]. Thus the faculty of judgment [*Urteilskraft*] makes possible the transition [*Übergang*] from the domain of the concept of nature to that the concept of freedom (KU LVI).

According to Gérard Lebrun and Jean-François Lyotard, the KU is to a large extent concerned with the transition (Übergang) from the mode of thinking about nature to the mode of thinking about freedom (B XX) (LEBRUN, 1970; LYOTARD, 1991). Antonio Marques’s thorough

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² I am deliberately seeking to distinguish between *Urteilskraft*, *Beurteilung*, and *Urteil*, respectively translated as “faculty of judgment”, “judging”, and “judgment.”
study on *Organism and System in Kant* (MARQUES, 1987), reexamines the problematic of systematicity in Kant’s philosophy, in terms of teleological reflective judgments. These studies are here invoked, together with texts by Gilles Deleuze (1975), Donald Crawford (1974), and Valerio Rohden (1981, 1990, 1992), with a view to providing the critical-textual background to the work of Kant as a whole, in light of which a particular problem will be developed, namely, the relation between aesthetics and ethics in the third *Critique*. In particular, I think worth reexamining Donald Crawford’s work on Kant’s aesthetics, so as to raise anew the problem of what would be an “aestheticist” solution to the problem of the unity of the three *Critiques*, and how it relates to aestheticism or the tendency to reduce ethical issues to aesthetic claims. Just as the Marburg Neo-Kantians tended to reduce Kant’s philosophy to an *Erkenntnistheorie*, his practical philosophy can be easily turned into a moralism or into an aestheticism, depending on how the conceptions of moral teleology and aesthetic judgments are articulated in relation to reality. In effect, we find in both Schopenhauer and Schiller an aestheticist critique of German idealism— that exerted a decisive influence on Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Adorno— and that would be revived by the post-modern critique of modernity and the Enlightenment (we may think of Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida). The question of aestheticism in both Nietzsche and Foucault have been dealt with elsewhere, but remains a major issue for a better understanding of non-cognitivist models in meta-ethics, as they tend to equate the normative thrust of ethical and aesthetic claims (OLIVEIRA, 2003).

In his work on Kant’s aesthetic theory, Crawford starts from the fundamental thesis that cognition is essentially judicative, so as to render possible the articulation of judgments as theoretical, practical, and aesthetic propositional formulations. Both in the first and in the second *Critiques*, understanding and reason presuppose the agreement, by judgment, of the faculties between themselves. Thus as the theoretical judgment expresses the agreement of the faculties in the determination of the object according to understanding, likewise the practical judgment presupposes the agreement of understanding with the reason that presides it, in the determination of actions that are conformed.
to the moral law. A crucial difference of the third Critique in relation to the other two consists precisely in the focus given to the faculty of reflective judgment in the KU, expressing thus the free and indeterminate agreement between the faculties. The question of the deduction of judgments is formulated in a priori terms in the KU by the universal and necessary validity of aesthetic reflective judgments. Thus, as in the Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter, KrV) it was shown how synthetic judgments are possible a priori and the Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter, KpV)\(^3\) enunciated the principle of the autonomy of the will as a synthetic a priori proposition (§ 7), the third Critique is also concerned with the question of knowing “whether and how aesthetic a priori judgments are possible” (KU § 9), that is, with the a priori grounding of judgments of taste as pure, formal aesthetic judgments:

It is true that in the Critique of Practical Reason we did actually derive a priori from universal moral concepts the feeling of respect (a special and peculiar modification of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure which does seem to differ somehow from the both the pleasure and displeasure we get from empirical objects). [...] Now the situation is similar with the pleasure in an aesthetic judgment, except that here the pleasure is merely contemplative, and does not bring about an interest in the object, whereas in a moral judgment it is practical (KU § 12/ET 67f; Cf. KpV 71-89).

It is thus a problem of relating the question “how are possible the judgments of the beautiful?” (first book of the Analytic of Aesthetic Urteilskraft) to the question of the subjective universality to be established a priori by the transcendental deduction. It must then be assumed that the judgments of taste be analyzed in terms of the four moments of the table of categories (quality, quantity, relation, and modality), –by analogy with the table of the categories in the Analytic of the Pure Concepts of Understanding (KrV § 10)\(^4\) and the table of categories of freedom in the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason (KpV A 101). In the first moment, we see

\(^3\) KpV: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Academie-Ausgabe).

\(^4\) KrV: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Academie-Ausgabe).
that judgments of taste – contrary to the judgments of cognition – do not subsume representation to a concept but establish the relation between representation and a disinterested liking (Wohlgefallen), i.e., regardless of desire and interest (§§ 1-5). In the second place, although expressed by a particular formulation (“This rose is beautiful”) the judgment of taste is object of a universal liking, without demanding the universal agreement at the level of sensible pleasure. It would not be the case, paradoxically, of arguing in order to constrain someone by reason to agree with the judgment of taste (§§ 6-9, cf. § 33). “The beautiful” as is inferred from the second moment, “is what, without a concept, is liked universally” (KU 32). In the third moment, it is concluded that, despite its purposiveness according to the form, the object of the judgment of taste does not present any finality or purpose – Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck (§ 10-17; cf. § 65 and Introduction). Beauty is deduced as being “the form of the object’s form of purposiveness insofar as it is perceived in the object without the presentation of a purpose” (KU 61). Finally, in the fourth moment, the beautiful must be a necessary reference to the aesthetic liking (§ 18); not only when we are led to say that such and such object is beautiful, but when we assert that every other person must have the same liking in such an object. Thus we arrive at the question of the legitimation of the necessity of a subjective universality. What is at work here is a transition from the constative expression “it is beautiful”, asserted by all, to the transcendental necessity of being thus judged by every rational being. “Beautiful is what without a concept is cognized as the object of a necessary liking” (KU § 22). It is therefore a question of recognizing the transcendental deduction – as it was formulated in relation to nature and freedom by pure reason, both theoretical and practical (LVIII). As Kant put it in succinct and explicit terms, “this problem of the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment is part of the general problem of transcendental philosophy: how are synthetic judgments possible a priori?” (KU § 36/ ET 153). Without falling into a structuralist systematization of the Kantian architectonic, Crawford tries to rescue the properly transcendental sense of the deduction, through an articulation between aesthetics and ethics. His thesis differs from other interpretations not only as for the role of the KU in relation to the KrV and to the KpV, but also insofar as the harmony of the faculties is concerned,
whether it is based on a rational, epistemological requirement, as argues Paul Guyer (see GUYER, 1979, in particular, chapter 11: “Aesthetics and Morality) or on the universal communicability of representations (sensible, rational or aesthetic), i.e., not so much in the intersubjectivity that prevails over the individual interests, but as it refers us to the transcendental deduction – such turns out to be the main thesis defended by Crawford. Accordingly, the transcendental deduction in the KU can be understood through the five distinct stages that culminate with the articulation between aesthetics and morality, as the essential moment in the argumentation of the Kantian thesis that judgments of taste do not relate a representation to a concept (KU § 8) but, as sub-species of aesthetic judgments, refer a particular intuition to the feeling of pleasure in the subject that judges at the same time as it presents universal validity (disinterest). Hence the correlation to be established between the solution of the antinomy and the fifth stage. According to Crawford,

The complete deduction of the judgments of taste must thus show the basis for having interest in the beautiful and in its judging. This basis must be found precisely in the link between beauty and morality. Since beauty is the symbol of the basis of morality, there is a basis for demanding the agreement with the judgments of taste, for the demand of the moral sensibility on the part of all human beings is justifiable (AT 28).

Crawford divides the central argument of the KU in 5 stages, each one constituting a fundamental aspect of the transcendental deduction so that it will be valid for every rational being, requiring its agreement, and not only as an expression of a personal liking of the object. As the judgment of taste is regarded as an aesthetic judgment and not only as an expression of sensible pleasure (“this song is agreeable to my ears” in opposition to “this song is beautiful”), it is a matter of clarifying how the foundation of pleasure in the beautiful takes place. According to Crawford, we could thus summarily review the five stages.

At Stage I, the transcendental deduction appears as the positive exposition of what had been negatively exposed in the Analytic of the Beautiful (pleasure in the beautiful cannot be based on interest, on the good, or on whatever is merely agreeable to the senses, emotions or
perfections). The deduction envisages therefore explain how, by taking pleasure in the beautiful, it attains the legitimation of the Kantian distinction between judgments of taste and other judgments. The conclusion of the first stage is that pleasure in the beautiful must be based on a universally communicable state of mind (*die allgemeine Mitteilungsfähigkeit des Gemütszustandes*). It would not be the case of giving content to such state of mind before arguing that there is such a state. This must be presupposed, necessarily, so that judgments of taste be made possible. What is at stake is not the discussion whether it is legitimate or even reasonable (§ 9).

At Stage II, we conclude that such a universally communicable state of mind must be based upon the cognitive faculties – imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) and understanding (*Verstand*) – which are related in a “free play” that makes it knowable – since, for Kant, only cognition and representations can be said to be “universally communicable” (AT 67). If the judgments of taste must be legitimate, pleasure as the consciousness of the harmony of cognitive faculties must be presented as “the universal communicability of the mental state in the given presentation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence” (KU § 9/ ET 61). In other words, the cognitive faculties must be in harmony, in a free play, however without being determined by concepts so that the merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object or of the representation precedes the pleasure in the object and founds it in the harmony of the faculties of cognition.

At Stage III, the focus is the question of the conformity to formal purposiveness. It is then asserted that the harmony of cognitive faculties must be based on the mere conformity to the formal purposiveness of the object, to be differentiated from the fact that such an object has a definite purpose (in the case of conceptual judgment). In the experience of the beautiful, we reflect on the purposiveness (design, regularity that can be regulated) of the internal characteristics and of the relations of the object as it is experienced. It is at this stage that the subjective experience of the one who judges (*beurteilen*) is linked to the formal qualities of the appreciated object. The aesthetic judgment,
contrary to logical judgments, “refers the representing [Vorstellen], by which an object is given, solely to the subject; it brings to our notice no characteristic of the object, but only the purposive form in the [way] the faculties of representation are determined in their engagement with the object” (KU § 15, ET 75). That is indeed the very reason why it is called an “aesthetic” judgment, as the basis determining it is “not a concept but a feeling of that accordance in the play on the mental faculties [Gemütsvermögen] insofar as it can be only sensed”.

Stage IV is dedicated to common sense (Gemeinsinn). The procedure of the faculty of reflective judgment in the reflection on the beautiful --the harmonious interrelation of the cognitive faculties in a general reflection on the formal purposiveness of the experienced object-- is the procedure that must be exercised in the commonest experience, i.e., whatever be the experience. Pleasure in the beautiful is therefore based on the subjective element that we can presuppose in all human beings, since they are necessary for all possible cognition. Such an element or common principle is the sensus communis, not in the vulgar sense of a concept-ruled set of beliefs, but as “ideal norm” that cannot be grounded in experience, but requires the universal assent (allgemeine Beistimmung) --”it does not say that everyone will agree with my judgment, but that he ought to”. (KU § 22) Kant is thus very careful to distinguish sensus communis from the “common human understanding”, which is not relevant to the KU:

...we must take sensus communis to mean the idea of a sense shared [by all of us], i.e., a power to judge that in reflecting takes account (a priori), in our thought, of everyone’s way of presenting [something], in order as it were to compare our own judgment with human reason in general and thus escape the illusion that arises from the ease of mistaking subjective and private conditions for objective ones, an illusion that would have a prejudicial influence on the judgment (KU § 40).

Crawford concludes that the subjective principle subjacent to the judgments of taste is analogous to the subjective principle subjacent to all the other judgments, and this must be seen as a necessary assumption for all possible experience. Finally, at Stage V, Crawford proposes
the fundamental articulation between aesthetics and morality as a decisive moment in the transcendental deduction, for only here the mere universal communicability of the feeling of pleasure can be imputed to any other person as a duty. The *sensus communis* as a principle that underlies the faculty of judgment is a condition for every experience but does not constitute an argument that completes the deduction of the judgments of taste for it neither explains nor legitimizes the fact that we require pleasure in the beautiful from other persons as necessary. The pleasure that we feel in the judgment of taste is required from everyone, on the contrary, as a duty (*Pflicht*) (KU § 40), as we require universal agreement (KU § 8) and blame others if they deny the taste (§ 7). It is necessary that the deduction be thus “completed” with the question of the interest, which in its turn, establishes the link between beauty and morality. Since the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good (“das Schöne ist das Symbol des Sittlichguten”, KU § 59) it is thus required the agreement in the judgments of taste, for the demand of moral sensibility in all human beings is justifiable (AT 143-5). According to Crawford, the stages I through IV of the deduction constitute the deduction of universal communicability, while the stage V constitutes the transitory moment for the realm of morality.

If Kant’s quest for a post-critical, philosophical anthropology finds no response in the system of transcendental idealism and its subsequent criticisms, it will indeed depart from the ideal of personality (second formulation of the categorical imperative, if we equate *Menschheit* and *Persönlichkeit*) towards the embodiment of freedom (*Freiheit*) in the historical experiences of national identity. Neither Hegel nor the Young Hegelians – including Marx himself – addressed the challenge posed by Kant’s anthropology, insofar as the self-creation of a human *Gattungswesen* out of the interstices of social, political existence ultimately fails to refer to a level of subjectivity (be it the absolute *Geist* or the proletariat) without resort to another subtle form of metaphysical teleology. Such was the inevitable predicament of Hegelian-Marxian versions of a necessitarian historicism inseparable from their teleological conceptions of history. On the one hand, humans as self-conscious beings only come of age in the exercise of their ethical, political intersubjectivity as
members of the modern State. On the other hand, as we find in Hegel’s critique of Kant, even as individual citizens interact to be constituted themselves as such and constitute the State, human nature seems to fall short of a broader teleology that accounts for its destiny, through the very negation of an alien nature and its transformation. It is at this very limit-point, that the question of teleology in Kant’s critique seems to prepare the soil for both Hegel’s spiritual rupture and Nietzsche’s self-overcoming of human nature. I must conclude this essay with an alternative reading of the problem of the unity of the three Critiques, invoked by Paul Guyer as over against Donald Crawford.

Starting from the traditional interpretation of Kantian formalism in § 10, Crawford seems to believe that there are certain phenomenal forms that are characteristic of designed objects – hence the postulate of a formal purposiveness – which would imply that such forms were adequate objects of taste. It is precisely in this point that Guyer criticizes Crawford when the latter affirms that “we can call an object purposive on the basis of its formal organization (structure) even when we do not or cannot actually place the cause of this form in a will”. (AT 93) In this case, the object’s purposiveness is what can be perceived (its form or organization), that which leads us to say that it resulted from a concept. According to Guyer, there is simply nothing about the pure form of the objects involved in Kant’s examples (§§ 10, 15, 64) that requires the idea of purposiveness. It would be impossible to deduce the idea of a will, for instance, that had created the hexagonal form in the cells of a beehive or in a crystal. Starting from chapter 7 (“The Task of the Deduction”), Guyer guides us through a reflection on the universal validity of pleasure. To say that an object would be considered beautiful by all who observe it does not mean that everyone will actually like such an object but only that all must agree with such a judgment and call it beautiful, in harmonious accordance of understanding and imagination. The Kantian argument is that the harmony of the faculties occurs in different people under the same conditions, and that leads us to the deduction of the pure aesthetic judgment. The intersubjective validity of the foundation of the aesthetic judgment is not yet established in § 30, as he introduces the deduction, but only in paragraphs 31 through 37, being
formally presented in § 38. Here we find the main point of divergence between Guyer’s and Crawford’s interpretations as the latter upholds that according to Kant, the presupposition of taste is not limited to an epistemological imputing of pleasure to others, but it also assigns a certain kind of duty or obligation to feel pleasure in certain objects. Besides the demonstration of the harmony of faculties, argues Crawford, it is necessary to prove that there is a moral signification of taste. Guyer criticizes Crawford for confusing the two realms (epistemological and moral), that is, the deduction is essentially epistemological as morality can be regarded in an analogous manner albeit independent of the first.

As he opens the last chapter on “aesthetics and morality” with the question “Completing the Deduction?”, Guyer (1979, p. 351) explicitly places his study of the KU in an epistemological perspective. The universal validation of the aesthetic judgment is thus justified in epistemological terms. On the other hand, in light of § 22 and other passages, we can infer that Kant proposes that the justification be completed with an allusion to practical reason. This is a plausible way to account for formulations in the Third Critique such as the assertion that “we require from everyone as a duty, as it were, the feeling [contained] in a judgment of taste” (KU § 40/ ET 162). Guyer concedes that it would be impossible to confine the allusion to duty in merely epistemological terms or to the reflective judgment. Hence the procedure adopted by Crawford, as he seeks the foundations in morality. According to Guyer, Crawford would have seen there a transition from the justification by universal intersubjectivity to the moral feeling as the decisive moment required by the transcendental deduction of the judgments of taste. I think that the great merit of Guyer’s critique of Crawford lies precisely in having detected the teleological interest that guides the articulation between aesthetics and ethics proposed by the latter. After all, Crawford starts from the problematic that opposes disinterest in the judgment of taste related to pleasure occasioned by the object that is declared beautiful to the interest that can be linked to pleasure in the beautiful (§ 41). As he concludes Stage IV with the postulate of the common sense, Crawford resorts thus to Stage V so as to raise the question “Why should we require, after all, the agreement of others when judging the beautiful?”, “why do we say, with Kant, that everyone must find
such an object beautiful?” (AT 143). To simply assume the communicable universality does not seem for him to be a sufficient argument to have completed the deduction. It is necessary to relate the judgment of taste to interest, in an indirect manner, just as interest in the good in itself, the morally good, is linked to intellectual interest (KU § 42). According to Kant, the sociability peculiar to human beings is what moves one to cultivate and communicate to others his or her taste. But the empirical interest in the beautiful would not be, in this case, relevant to our discussion. We must examine therefore if there is an actual transition from the pleasure of aesthetic experience to the moral feeling. There must be a connection, however indirect it might be, between the moral virtue and the contemplation of the beautiful and the sublime. Pleasure in the beautiful, contrary to the pleasure in the good (including moral good) and pleasure in sensation, is not the interested pleasure. Kant asserts that “a judgment of taste, by which we declare something to be beautiful must not have an interest as its determining basis” (§ 41/ET 163). Already in the title of § 2, we find the formulation of a central thesis, namely, “The liking that determines a judgment of taste is devoid of all interest”. As we saw above, Kant establishes an analogy between the KpV and the KU (KU § 12), as for the transcendental foundations of the critique of both faculties. In order to corroborate his thesis, Crawford resorts to a teleological analogy: the intellect would have an interest in any indication or natural vestige of a correspondence (harmony, fairness) displayed between what was naturally produced and our faculties, insofar as morality – as a human legislation of universal laws – presupposes the possibility of exerting causal influence over the natural, phenomenal world (AT 148). According to Kant,

[R]eason must take an interest in any manifestation in nature of a harmony that resembles the mentioned [kind of] harmony, and hence the mind [Gemüt] cannot meditate about the beauty of nature without at the same time finding its interest aroused. But in terms of its kinship this interest is moral, and whoever takes such an interest in the beautiful in nature can do so only to the extent that he has beforehand already solidly established an interest in the morally good. Hence if someone is directly interested in the beauty of nature, we have cause to suppose that he has at least a predisposition to a good moral attitude (KU § 42 / ET 167).
For Crawford, the analogy between our moral destination (final purpose of our existence) and the “purposiveness without purpose” that grounds the judgment of taste, that is, the analogy between the moral judgment and the judgment of pure taste, would converge thus to establish “the foundation of the unity of the supra-sensible”, announced in the Introduction to the Second Edition (KU II, B XX). According to Crawford, this foundation, which is the basis for morality, is symbolized by the beautiful and by the sublime (AT 157). Beauty is therefore the symbol of the basis for morality, argues Crawford, insofar as the experience of the beautiful results from ourselves suprasensibly legislating the principle that determines the world as we know it by experience.

The articulation between aesthetics and ethics in the Third Critique problematizes the transcendental grounding of the System as a whole, as Crawford has shown, but can be approached only by analogy, even as one starts from the notion of purposiveness. In effect, it is the concept of purposiveness in nature that allows for the link between the sensible and the intelligible, according to the articulation between the three Critiques, delineated by Kant himself. More precisely, it is in the Kantian conception of an anthropology from a pragmatic point of view that we find an entire articulation of the three faculties within the “human nature”, simultaneously conceived as noumenal and phenomenal. Through a conception of man as ultimate purpose of nature (lezter Zweck) and final purpose (Endzweck) of creation under moral laws, thus teleologically conceived, we may reformulate the Kantian problem of understanding freedom as the suprasensible intervenes in the phenomenal course of the natural world. We see also that we may draw an analogy between the regulative use of the reason in the KrV and the teleological argument in the KU: far from concluding in favor of the existence of a transcendent causality, above the course of nature, it has simply reaffirmed the autonomy of practical reason. Now, does this mean that morality is implied in a teleological reflection, or that ethics is presupposed in a formulation of the deduction of aesthetic judgments? All we conclude is that there is indeed an agreement between the faculties and their a priori principles (Gesetzmäßigkeit, Zweckmäßigkeit, Endzweck). As Lebrun remarks,
Agreement [Zusammenstimmung] is one of the key words of the Critique [of the Faculty] of Judgment. While the first Critique makes intelligible the agreement between the form of nature and our understanding, the faculty of judgment places us in the presence of contingent agreements, and yet, too marvelous to be assigned to chance... It is this formal purposiveness that the judgment of taste allows to analyze: when I say that one thing is beautiful, I mean that its representation seems destined to place my imagination in unison with my understanding; I appreciate the spontaneous agreement between the representation of a natural thing and my faculties of knowledge, and the feeling of pleasure that then I experience is nothing else than the recognition of such an agreement. But the faculty of judgment, by itself, cannot go beyond this recognition. That final forms have been actually laid with a view to their exercise and that this is the end of nature, the faculty of judgment cannot affirm (LEBRUN, 1993, p. 103-104).

By way of conclusion, as Lebrun shows in the same essay, we must recall that the agreement between the aesthetic Urteilskraft and the practical Vernunft reveals the propaedeutic function of teleology for a moral theology and for a philosophy of history. But this is not exactly a subtle return to metaphysical finalism, for Kant keeps the distinction between the theoretical and practical uses of reason in a systematic manner, throughout the three Critiques, as Rohden has convincingly upheld. It was in the light of this particular point, that Nietzsche – following Schopenhauer – would later develop a misreading of Kant so as to attack the latter’s teleology of human nature. This was never intended by Kant as a metaphysical device, let alone to betray his systematic critique of metaphysics. Therefore, resorting to aesthetic, reflective judgments so as to unveil the historical constitution of intersubjectivity and empirical subjectivity ultimately misses the non-essentialist thrust of Kant’s dualism and its teleological implications. Even though art and history refer us back to human subjectivity and to our free choice to intervene in the natural course of events we judge and act upon, normative claims are not revised in the same manner that one generation or culture can always review their aesthetic judgments, precisely because of the different status of their ontological commitments.
Referências


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