Abstract: This essay seeks to promote a philosophical-theoretical reflection on the interrelationship of the abductive reasoning of Peirce with the philosophical ideas of the counter-education project of Gur-Ze’ev. This is expressed in the question: Is abduction the most widely used type of reasoning in diasporic philosophy and counter-education? Starting from this question, we present the basic concepts of the authors, and then initiate an approximate dialogue between the central concepts. We believe it is possible, through the characteristics demanded by the principles proposed by Gur-Ze’ev, to conclude that abductive reasoning is the predominant mode of logic in diasporic philosophy and of counter-education.

Keywords: counter-education, abduction, diasporic philosophy, Gur-Ze’ev, Pierce

Introduction

Thinking about education today is a sinuous and complex issue. It is a sinuous and complex phenomenon because we live in times of struggle, especially in the face of the dismantling of the initial and continuous education of teachers, of investment in the structure of schools and of policies granting access and supporting the permanence of students in schools and universities. A prime example of this is Brazil, where there is an attempt to implement new policies curbing neutral discussions
about gender, social and political issues in classrooms, which have a direct impact on teachers, since they might be denounced by students and parents, and prosecuted if they are perceived to do so (cf. Guilherme and Picoli 2018); the newly elected government has also signalled that it is against student quotas at universities for minorities and vulnerable individuals, which can be perceived as an attempt to disassemble social policies that facilitate social mobility in the country (cf. Santos et al. 2013). This goes against the UNESCO report, *The Dakar Framework for Action—Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments*, adopted by the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, from 26 to 28 April 2000:

Adult and continuing education must be greatly expanded and diversified, and integrated into the mainstream of national education and poverty reduction strategies. The vital role literacy plays in lifelong learning, sustainable livelihoods, good health, active citizenship and the improved quality of life for individuals, communities and societies must be more widely recognized. Literacy and continuing education are essential for women’s empowerment and gender equality. Closer linkages among formal, non-formal and informal approaches to learning must be fostered to respond to the diverse needs and circumstances of adults. [Thus,] sufficient resources, well-targeted literacy programmes, better trained teachers and the innovative use of technologies are essential in promoting these activities. The scaling up of practical, participatory learning methodologies developed by non-government organizations, which link literacy with empowerment and local development, is especially important. The success of adult education efforts in the next decade will be essentially demonstrated by substantial reduction in disparities between male/female and urban/rural literacy rates. (UNESCO 2000: 16)

This was reiterated in the UNESCO report, *Incheon Declaration: Education 2030*:

On this historic occasion, we reaffirm the vision of the worldwide movement for Education for All initiated in Jomtien in 1990 and reiterated in Dakar in 2000—the most important commitment to education in recent decades and which has helped drive significant progress in education. We also reaffirm the vision and political will reflected in numerous international and regional human rights treaties that stipulate the right to education and its interrelation with other human rights. We acknowledge the efforts made; however, we recognize with great concern that we are far from having reached education for all. (UNESCO 2017: 5)

Recognizing the important nature of our role as educational thinkers, we will seek in this text to bring to light the thinking of two theorists, namely Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (1955–2012). We will explore Gur-Ze’ev’s ideas, particularly his understanding of diasporic philosophy and counter-education, which demand a pragmatic attitude towards the truth; that is, as we shall demonstrate, Gur-Ze’ev, following the Frankfurt School, denies absolute truths professing that they are conditioned by society, culture and the historical moment (Gur-Ze’ev 2005). We maintain that this
Some Critical Reflections

should lead us to an alternative way of thinking because there is a need to refute a ‘safe base’, which is directly connected to absolute truths, demanding of us the adoption of provisional ‘hypotheses’ and thus encouraging our creativity. This understanding reminds us of Peirce and his three modes of reasoning, and particularly of his concept of abductive reasoning. This is that kind of reasoning that is “…the only logical operation that introduces any new idea” (CP 5.171). Our central aim in this chapter is to reflect on the following question: Is abduction the most widely used type of reasoning used in diasporic philosophy, and by counter-education?

**Gur-Ze’ev’s Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education**

Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (2016) emphasizes that his general conception of Critical Theory arises by way of the thinkers of the Frankfurt School, especially Adorno and Horkheimer. He points out that he sought from the outset a construction of Critical Theory that challenged critical hegemonic discourse, as well as bringing to light certain aspects of Critical Theory itself, such as its earlier focus on positive utopia, which later was pushed aside in favour of negative utopia. That is to say, according to Gur-Ze’ev the Frankfurt School has two phases between the 1930s and 1970s, which are characterized by: (i) “a positive optimistic utopianism” and (ii) “a negative pessimistic utopianism” (cf. Gur-Ze’ev 1998: 119). This understanding is important because it will help us make sense of Gur-Ze’ev’s philosophy of education, as he places Critical Pedagogy, the pedagogical branch of Critical Theory, as being directly related to the first phase of Critical Theory and to positive utopia, whilst positioning himself and his counter-education project as being immediately associated with the second phase, and to the notion of negative utopia—thus denying the need for a guiding truth, because it can become something that blinds the critical spirit. This means that Gur-Ze’ev sought to interpret and implement Critical Theory in the field of education in a direct re-articulation, re-conceptualization of Critical Pedagogy; and we believe that it was in the book *Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education* (2010) that the author devoted himself more fully to bringing to light his main contributions to contemporary education, to the principles which we wish to engage with in this text, namely, diasporic philosophy and counter education.

In diasporic philosophy, Gur-Ze’ev (2005) conceives of the diaspora—in the broad sense of the word—as the nomadic human in relation to being in the world, to thought and to existence itself. The aim of this as a philosophical notion, of diaspora, is to encourage the human exodus from emancipatory dogmatic conceptions that are presented as easy solutions to our
problems, and which must be implemented in our search to implement a utopia; Gur-Ze’ev seeks to release people from the normalizing ways of thinking. An example of such a way of thinking is Critical Pedagogy. This is the Critical Pedagogy that is connected to the first phase of the Frankfurt School and seeks to implement a utopia, such as Freire’s vision of the liberation of an enlightened, oppressed poor (Freire 1970: 48–49); McLaren’s through a socialist democracy (McLaren 1998: 458); Giroux’s through a democracy of differences (Giroux 1991: 60) (cf. Yaakoby 2012: 16; Guilherme and Morgan 2018). Gur-Ze’ev seeks to distance himself from this critical pedagogy. What is common to each of these narrow visions of reality is, according to Gur-Ze’ev, that one side oppresses, whilst the other is oppressed; and even when the oppressor tries to engage with its own oppression, or the oppressed manages to somehow transform the situation so that it is less oppressing, they will ultimately be unsuccessful—these events have happened again and again in history, and the oppressor–oppressed dichotomy continuous to exist. I note that Gur-Ze’ev’s reading is fundamentally based in Benjamin’s negative utopia and pessimism about history. This is a potential problem as once a positive utopian ideal is created and a goal is to be achieved, then it becomes impossible to criticize and revise the ideal because doing so puts the project in danger. Thus, utopias cease to be an end and become the foundational principle on which an entire methodology and philosophy is constructed. In this respect, Critical Pedagogy becomes crystallized, adopting an absolute truth, whilst Gur-Ze’ev’s counter-education project remains open to new possibilities, malleable in dealing with current and new issues and situations.

Gur-Ze’ev opposes any unique ‘truth’—due to the mutability of things ontological and epistemological—and sees in the distant horizon the impossibility of establishing a solid foundation for ideas and actions, factors which, were they to be established, would destroy critical and creative alternatives in human thought and action. Hence, Gur-Ze’ev maintains that “[i]t is a central dimension of ‘counter-education’ within the framework of present-day Diasporic philosophy: while refusing any dogma, it reintroduces the exiled seriousness toward that which is called ‘redemption’ in Christian theology”. As Adorno observed, “it is even part of my good fortune not to be a house-owner”, as Nietzsche had already written in the Gay Science. Today we should have to add: “it is part of morality not to be at home in one’s home” (Gur-Ze’ev 2005: 346).1 In this quote, Gur-Ze’ev is rejecting positive utopia,

ideals, in favour of negative utopia, which is to be understood as a rejection of absolute truths and subscribing continuously to a critical attitude. Following the second phase of the Frankfurt School, Gur-Ze’ev (2005, 2010a, 2010b) gives up on positive utopia in favour of a negative utopia because any act that seeks to establish an absolute truth is an act inherent to instrumental reason (i.e. a practical form of reason that seeks to achieve an end), which seeks to homogenize thought, the cultural industry, to confer an air of similarity to all (Adorno and Horkheimer (2002). As Horkheimer (2002: 28) says: this search for normalization turns, for example, the so sought-after emancipation to its opposite, that is, “… a ‘magical’ entity that is accepted rather than intellectually understood”. Hence, the human being moves away from critical thinking and returns to an instrumental form of reasoning, returning to the very condition from which he tried to escape.

Gur-Ze’ev’s views serve as a motivation for us to rethink many contemporary attitudes and values, including important issues, such as ‘democracy’. We might for instance ask: is democracy a positive utopia? Aren’t we in search of an absurd project forever comprised of the oppressed and the oppressor? Evidently these questions alone would yield extensive work. However, in asking them and bringing such issues to light, our intention was simply to show that it is possible to think of alternative visions that can lead us to think of other paths, as well as to move us away from normalizing views, and in this case totalitarian regimes; it is possible to envisage wider perspectives that go beyond sharp divisions. Thus, we must sharpen our critical thinking, and this is to get out of our comfort zone, which is the sole purpose of diasporic philosophy. This means that those who follow diasporic philosophy know that their role in the world lies in the perpetual desire to maintain the ability to criticize and to self-criticize, and this is to be done without searching for a sure foundation, a ‘promised land’, that is found in objective and absolute truths. The diasporic philosopher, the diasporic teacher, aspires to help individuals to acquire critical tools that will offer, through their own action and autonomy, alternative and creative ways to understand issues. This is Gur-Ze’ev, as already mentioned, subscribing to the second phase of the Frankfurt School, defending the notion of negative utopia.

We believe it is worth noting here that diasporic philosophy seeks to unite our responsibilities to the ability to respond critically to the challenges faced by us. Moreover, it requires that this responsiveness considers the ‘alterity of the Other’; that is, consider the diversity and difference of the Other, the uniqueness of the Other’s identity that is above simple characteristics or mere cultural specifics (Yaakoby 2012). In view of this, we understand that the philosophical foundations of Gur-Ze’ev (2005, 2010a, 2010b) are important in the area of education, especially contemporary education committed to a humanistic form
of education; perhaps, even to a form of global citizenship education, if it is understood as a form of transformative education with a focus on living peacefully with the Other. That is, as the UNESCO (2015: 15) affirms:

Global citizenship education aims to be transformative, building the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes that learners need to be able to contribute to a more inclusive, just and peaceful world. Global citizenship education takes a multifaceted approach, employing concepts and methodologies already applied in other areas, including human rights education, peace education, education for sustainable development and education for international understanding and aims to advance their common objectives. Global citizenship education applies a lifelong learning perspective, beginning from early childhood and continuing through all levels of education and into adulthood, requiring both ‘formal and informal approaches, curricular and extracurricular interventions, and conventional and unconventional pathways to participation’.

According to Gur-Ze’ev (2010a), counter-education is the intellectual result of a combination of disquiet and moral concerns, as well as a unique encounter with a non-emotional intimacy, that is, critical. Gur-Ze’ev sees his education project as the result of a constant discomfort with the hegemonic and absolutizing theories. It seems to us that this understanding aims to alert and empower the human being to identify possible fallacies that lie in a normalizing ideal, and in achievements that will happen ‘automatically’—this ‘ideal’ approach avoids the necessary and ongoing angst involved in valid critical thinking. Therefore, counter-education to Gur-Ze’ev (2005) comprises educational activities that do not try to transcend the negativity embedded in the second phase of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. In other words, for Gur-Ze’ev (2010a), counter-education is present in acts that, starting from the principles of diasporic philosophy, in their core refuse any notion that seeks to standardize education; that do not encourage, or that hinder students from developing their critical capacity, with regard to their personal concerns, be this connected to the world, to their own life or to their own ‘self’.

At this point it is important that we return to the issue of instrumentalized rationality to more fully express the principles of counter-education. In accordance with Adorno and Horkheimer (1985), economic capital seeks, through cultural industry, the instrumentalization of consciousness; that is, through unrealizable promises, fanaticizes human reasoning, with a view to an impossible horizon to be achieved and to act on without ‘thinking’. This tendency ends up engulfing critical reason, denying it under the guise of a utopia of ‘freedom’—and this is whether it is through one’s way of thinking, acting or merely ‘consuming’. Adorno and Horkheimer (2002: 113) exemplify this by pointing out that:
This principle requires that while all needs should be presented to individuals as capable of fulfillment by the culture industry, they should be so set up in advance that individuals experience themselves through their needs only as eternal consumers, as the culture industry’s object. Not only does it persuade them that its fraud is satisfaction; it also gives them to understand that they must make do with what is offered, whatever it may be. The flight from the everyday world, promised by the culture industry in all its branches, is much like the abduction of the daughter in the American cartoon: the father is holding the ladder in the dark. The culture industry presents that same everyday world as paradise. Escape, like elopement, is destined from the first to lead back to its starting point. Entertainment fosters the resignation which seeks to forget itself in entertainment.

As we have already noted, Gur-Ze’ev criticizes Critical Theory and its first phase, the positive utopia phase, by connecting it to the use of instrumental reason. This is a rejection of ultimate and absolute truths because when one believes or subscribes to a final truth, by having the ‘ideal’ as an ultimate goal, one loses ability to criticize this ‘ideal’, which forces one to partake in a mechanized approach. This is so because according to Gur-Ze’ev (2005) when one asserts a positive utopia, an ‘ideal’ to be realized as a goal, one incurs the danger of turning this ‘ideal’ into the very foundation of one’s approach, of one’s philosophy. This is similar to what the economic capital and cultural industry does in society when it normalizes our way of thinking and fanaticizing certain concepts; the fashion industry imposes on us the latest trends in clothes and our desire to buy them, instrumentalizing our way of thinking, and Freireans continuously advocate the liberation of the oppressed as a mantra without much reflection. The crucial point here, being driven by Gur-Ze’ev, is not that we should not buy the latest trend in fashion or advocate the liberation of the oppressed; rather, it is that we should be critical about it to the point of ascertaining that this is what we desire or that this is a valid position to hold. Moreover, we should not just be critical of propositions (i.e. I is critical of X), we should also be self-critical. Everything must be criticized so to verify its validity, and nothing should be out of bounds to our critical attitude because to regard some as non-criticizable would be arbitrary.

Gur-Ze’ev (2010a) applies this philosophical understanding to the field of education, thus conceiving of his counter-education project. Due to its focus on a sharp critical capacity, the project aims at revealing that being validly critical cannot be characterized by naively offering simple ‘democratic consensus’ under the guise of freedom and emancipation; rather, the true critical attitude

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2 Guilherme and Morgan (2018: 792) note that: “A prime example is the Freirianism found in some academic circles in Brazil and abroad, which regard criticism of Paulo Freire’s thought and their own Freirianism as heresy (cf. Weiler 1996; Brayner 2015).”
is a conscious awakening of one’s difficulties and impossibilities that must be faced and dealt with maturely. This non-promise of ‘democratic consensus’, of ‘emancipation’, is what characterizes Gur-Ze’ev’s notion of nomadism, diaspora and love of life, which in turn serve as a foundation for the ability to criticize, to unravel weak foundations, that are incompatible with society and reality. Ultimately, and because of this foundational everlasting critical attitude, counter-education encourages the emergence of new creative and philosophical possibilities in educational environments (Gur-Ze’ev 2010a); in other words, “[d]iasporic counter-education, in this respect, is an attempt to present the possibility of thinking and of responsible improvisational co-poiesis in an era which deconstructs, ridicules or fetishizes holiness and the kind of respond-ability which conditions transcendence from ecstatic sinking toward some-thing to becoming some-one who is rich and free to the degree of refusing the temptation to return ‘home’ into the continuum of an aimless symbolic and di-rect emancipating violence or, alternatively, to the harmony of nothingness as presented by the suggestive powers of capitalist ‘success’ and other powerful drugs” (Gur-Ze’ev 2010a: 19). The idea of the ‘homelessness’ in education—of being continuously engaged in a critical attitude and not subscribing to absolute ideals—is very powerfully characterized by Gur-Ze’ev (2011: 38–39) in his analogy of the Orcha (i.e. the Caravan in Hebrew). He says:

In the Hebrew language ‘Orcha’ means a convoy of camels and humans with their belongings moving in an endless desert towards their destiny. The ‘Orcha’ is an improvised movement that is to find/create its own destiny…. The ‘Orcha’ is never totally determined by territorial sovereignty, not even by commanding knowledge and people. It is a kind of togetherness-in-movement […]

This Orcha is not a negative process. It rests on the positive notion of people constantly in communion, one with the other, with the group, constantly questioning, discussing and seeking, developing new and dynamic relationship ideas, refusing to accept the simple and ‘end in itself’. In ‘practical terms’, we might ask: what would an environment be like where counter-educational action is prioritized? As a possible answer to this question, we turn to the studies of Tova Yaakoby, who, referring to the writings of Gur-Ze’ev, indicates some principles that suggest the praxis of diasporic education. To Yaakoby (2012: 92–93), counter- education values the subject, that is, the human being must be at the centre of life, and not as an object to be manipulated for the sake of normalization in education and life. This education, therefore, aims to allow individuals to lose their bonds and define their own path; that is to say, counter-education aims at guiding individuals to seek creative alternatives and possibilities for their future whilst urging them to denounce
and renounce the deceptive consciousness of a ‘sweet home’. The diasporic subject has historical consciousness; however, she faces the future and the presence as an un-happened moment, as something full of potential (Yaakoby 2012: 92–93). This reminds us of Peirce’s warning that we should not fall into crystallization (cf. Peirce 2012)—and we shall return to this below.

Thus, counter-education encourages a creativity that refuses to give in to the commonly accepted, allowing for genuine creation in our educational settings, fertilized by sensitivity to various difficulties, imagination with regard to possibilities, hope for the future and commitment to the self-construction of the individual. Further, it must be noted that in diasporic education, creativity is coined as ‘improvisation’, manifesting itself as the doing of each diasporic subject. ‘Improvisation’, in order to conceive something new and unexpected, is the heart of this movement. That said, ‘improvisation’ should not be understood as lack of preparation or amateurism, but as creativity and criticality so sharp that it can handle the most varied situations. These aspects of diasporic life represent the aesthetic dimensions of existence, which allow for and justify rational and ethical liberation. ‘Improvisation’ and the ‘improviser’ can be associated with the arts and the artist, such as music and a professional jazz player, who so knows his field of work that he is able to ‘improvise’ beautiful ‘pieces of music’. In connection with this Guilherme and Morgan (2018: 793) comment on the action of Gur-Ze’ev’s ‘improviser-teacher’ whilst comparing to Freire’s ‘political-teacher’:

This means that Gur-Ze’ev’s improviser-teacher is critical, encourages criticism and everything can be the subject of critique, and this process brings about changes in reality; however, the improviser-teacher does not offer positive utopias, such as Freire’s liberation by enlightening the oppressed poor, and as such the improviser-teacher overcomes a crucial weakness faced by Freire’s political-teacher. That is, the political-teacher can become the propagandist of an ideological view (i.e. the liberation of the oppressed by enlightening the poor), and as a consequence of this, of using subjects as a means to an end (i.e. using the oppressed poor to achieve the goal of liberation, but constraining this within a very narrow form of liberation).

The above not only illustrates counter-education, it also provides the overview for counter-educators and counter-teachers. It seems to us that ‘improviser-teachers’ do not rely primarily on deductive and inductive logic, since both in one way or another attempt to normalize thinking. There seems to be a different kind of logic at play in counter-education and improvisation, and thus we now turn to Peirce’s abductive reasoning.
Is Abduction the Form of Reasoning in Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education?

We have the intuition that Peirce’s abductive reasoning is the mode of logic that most frequently emerges in diasporic philosophy. For Peirce, abduction is the inference on which creative reasoning is structured, as well as a particular form of self-organized, dynamic systems (Gonzales and Haselager 2002: 22); and he defines inference as a “[…] controlled adoption of a belief as a consequence of other knowledge” (CP 2,442). To make better sense of Peirce’s understanding of abductive reasoning, it is important to understand how it comes about. Peirce argues that a habit is consolidated through inferential relations, and this leads to the formation of rules that stabilize our actions. However, when a habit is shaken, becoming unsafe or unproductive because of changes and resistances that reality imposes on it, the permanence of such behaviour is problematic. The ‘strange’ behaviour, the ‘unsafe’ habit, generates uncertainties about the validity of our beliefs connected to it—beliefs which previously were held to be true. This forces us to establish a new belief, engaging in a dynamic movement seeking to correct and expand concepts, so as to acquire new beliefs and habits, which is done through the articulation of logical inferences (Cocchieri and Moraes 2009: 9). It is important to note that there are three kinds of inferences: (i) deduction; (ii) induction; and (iii) abduction (cf Douven 2017). Deductive inferences occur when premises lead to a conclusion and the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. For instance:

\[
\text{All } Xs \text{ are } Ys \\
\Theta \text{ is } X \\
\text{Hence, } \Theta \text{ is } Y. 
\]

The above example is the classic modus ponens (i.e. \(P \rightarrow Q; P; Q\)) and is a primary deductive rule of inference.\(^3\) In the case of inductive inference the premises do not necessarily guarantee the conclusion, and for matters of space, we could argue that they are based on previous empirical ‘statistical’ knowledge. For instance:

The majority of people in Quebec speak both French and English
Jerome is from Montreal, Quebec
Hence, Jerome speaks both French and English

\(^3\) Another classic example is modus tollens, which is expressed negatively: \(P \rightarrow Q; \neg Q; \neg P\). If it is sunny, then the sky is clear; the sky is not clear; thus, it is not sunny.
Whilst it might be true that Jerome is a typical Quebecois and speaks both French and English, which would make the above a sound argument, he may also be part of the minority of Quebecois who only speak French. Thus, in induction there is a degree of uncertainty because the validity of the premises is not necessarily carried to the conclusion. However, as Douven (2017) notes:

The mere fact that an inference is based on statistical data is not enough to classify it as an inductive one. You may have observed many gray elephants and no non-gray ones, and infer from this that all elephants are gray, because that would provide the best explanation for why you have observed so many gray elephants and no non-gray ones. This would be an instance of an abductive inference. It suggests that the best way to distinguish between induction and abduction is this: both are ampliative, meaning that the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) contained in the premises (which is why they are non-necessary inferences), but in abduction there is an implicit or explicit appeal to explanatory considerations, whereas in induction there is not; in induction, there is only an appeal to observed frequencies or statistics. (I emphasize ‘only,’ because in abduction there may also be an appeal to frequencies or statistics, as the example about the elephants exhibits.)

Thus, it is clear that abductive reasoning is connected to a particular mode of logic: Inference of the Best Explanation. In fact, Lipton (2000: 184) notes that “the model of Inference of the Best Explanation” is designed to give a partial account of many inductive inferences, both in science and in ordinary life. One version of the model was developed under the name ‘abduction’ by Charles Sanders Peirce early in this century, and the model has been considerably developed and discussed over the last twenty-five years. Its governing idea is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference, that scientists infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain the evidence. The same is done by individuals in their ordinary lives. Thus, unlike ordinary reasoning that always associates itself with a particular inference (thus inductive) or to a general and sound argument (thus deductive), abduction forces the individual to think in a singular way and for himself, making it more difficult for his way of thinking to be normalized whilst facilitating, in contrast, the idea of pursuing a unique and distinct path. Summing up: (i) in deduction the validity and truth of the conclusion are guaranteed by the premises; (ii) in induction the validity and truth of the conclusion are not guaranteed by the premises, and it is based on ‘statistics’; and (iii) in abduction the validity and truth of the conclusion are not guaranteed by the premises, but differently from induction, there is an appeal to be creative and to seek the best explanation—thus, thinking ‘outside-the-box’.

It is important to note at this point that, according to Peirce, abductive reasoning is connected to feelings and emotions, it is the sensual ingredient
of thinking (Peirce 2008), and for this reason, abduction is “[…] the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP 5.171). Further, Peirce believes that “[c]reative thinking seems to oscillate between well-established beliefs and doubts or surprises that shake them, initiating the process of forming new beliefs, which will enable the substitution of previous beliefs” (CP, 5.524, emphasis added). Peirce’s characterization makes us think of ‘a gut feeling’ or ‘intuition’ anchored on evidence. We can argue that these ideas are also central to Gur-Ze’ev’s counter-education project because for respect and appreciation of diversity and difference, of respect for the Other, an openness that is manifested as creativity and improvisation is required; and for this to happen, the individual must be immersed in the task emotionally and rationally. As Gur-Ze’ev (2005: 354) says, education requires “a manifestation of love and a concrete realization of joy and creativity, tikun olam”. We draw attention to Gur-Ze’ev’s use of the concept of Tikun Olam (i.e. עולם תיקון), which in Hebrew means ‘repair of the World’, a central tenet of Judaism. It means that we, human beings, must engage in actions that will ‘repair’, improve the world, make it more perfect. Once again, in this aspect, there is an emotional attachment to the task, an utter desire to fulfil it, whilst also a demand that reason be applied in our endeavour to excel, and ‘perfect’ reality.

Further, abductive reasoning, in its attempt to create a new belief, gives the individual new ways of creating and self-organizing thought, which consequently create new habits and understandings that are consistent with actual experience. The constant self-creation, self-organization, refuses to allow our minds to crystallize, that is, they do not end up as ‘immutable thought material’ (Peirce 1974). In addition, it is noteworthy that abductive thinking is the mode of argument that is most closely related to the Peircean concept of fallibilism, banishing the idea of absolute certainty (Ibri 1992). This means that both fallibilism and abduction serve as impetuses to the idea of a constant ‘renewal’ through creativity, and this is closely related to understanding that everything must be criticized, something so strongly defended by Gur-Ze’ev. When we criticize something, when we self-criticize, we have the opportunity to ascertain that things are correct (or incorrect) and to reach new conclusions on the basis of the evidence we have at hand—the close affinity of Peirce’s abductive reasoning and of Gur-Ze’ev’s critical attitude is clear. Both require a letting go of the moorings, an opening to present and future experiences, a release from foundations; both require a nomadic existence. Therefore, it becomes very evident to us that Gur-Ze’ev’s diasporic philosophy and Peirce’s philosophy have strong approximations, particularly in connection to their notions of critical attitude and improvisation, and abductive reasoning.
In developing their ideas they exhaust the need for a utopia, for ‘a promised land’, in favour of a dynamic and ever creative ‘homelessness’.

**Conclusion**

Gur-Ze’ev’s (2005, 2010a, 2010b) philosophical and educational concepts encourage us to (re)think education today, from mundane daily issues that might happen in classrooms throughout the world, to the very idea that the educational system is instrumental in the normalization of individuals. Gur-Ze’ev invites us, through his discussions on diasporic philosophy and counter-education, to incorporate and develop a new state of thinking and acting, a critical and creative way of thinking, which refuses the comfort of positive utopias, of ideals. This rejection of positive utopias encourages us to live a nomadic life so that everything must be criticized, and self-reflection and criticism are very much part and parcel of this process, so to ascertain its validity, which in accordance with Frankfurt School’s dictums is always related to socio-political and historical contexts. In education, the image of the *Orcha*, the caravan encapsulates our journey through knowledge, feeling comfortable and momentarily at a safe-stop, and then soon after pursuing new pastures and unknown destinations.

Those who are well acquainted with Gur-Ze’ev’s writings will agree that he is not always quite clear in his arguments due to his constant insistence in using poetic language, and by reference to our imaginary—and in this respect, we have to keep some of his allusions in this chapter to be faithful to him. However, sometimes there is also a lack of clarity in defining some concepts, such as, what it means to be critical and improvising. There is no evidence in Gur-Ze’ev’s writings that he personally refers to abductive reasoning; however, here, Charles Sanders Peirce’s three reasoning modalities help to clarify his concepts: deduction, induction and abduction, of which abduction clearly offers the greatest assistance. This abductive modality of reasoning is responsible for creativity, and requires that the individual develop new habits through new ways of thinking, whilst also avoiding the crystallization of thought—as we argued, this is also encouraged by diasporic philosophy and counter-education as they encourage individuals to avoid normalization, to be creative and to seek new ways of thinking. Moreover, because the mode of reasoning is prone to identify fallibility, stimulating creativity and an intellectual richness in its search for new solutions, it has proved to be the only kind of inferential judgement that does not require a priori foundations, a departure point, guaranteeing in this way a permanent capacity to criticize. This is something crucial to understanding diasporic education, to the non-instrumentalization
of reason and to the action of the improviser-teacher. In summation, the answer to our original question is that whether Gur-Ze’ev himself explicitly refers to abductive reasoning or not, we have demonstrated that there is clear and strong evidence that abduction is the mode of reasoning in diasporic philosophy and counter-education.

It is also important to note that this theoretical discussion provides us with the foundations for an enquiry of a more practical nature. That is to say, in practical terms, what does this mean for education, particularly Higher Education? We started this chapter by stating that education is a sinuous and complex phenomenon because we live in times of struggle, especially in the face of the dismantling of the initial and continuous education of teachers, of investment in the structure of schools, and of policies granting access and supporting the permanence of students in schools and universities. We mentioned the case of Brazil, where there is an attempt to implement new policies curbing neutral discussions about gender, social and political issues in classrooms, which have a direct impact on teachers, since they might be denounced by students and parents, and prosecuted if they are perceived to do so. The attempt to implement these policies is being spearheaded by the Movimento Escola Sem Partido (i.e. School Without Party Movement), which now finds parallels in other countries—for instance, in Germany the AfD (i.e. Alternative für Deutschland) far-right party called for an Aktion Neutrale Schulen (i.e. Action Neutral Schools). Fundamentally, these endeavours represent an attempt to curb the actions of teachers, and the scope of education. This is so because teachers would become unable to put to discussion a whole range of important subjects, confining education to the mere instruction of a certain kind of knowledge that has been previously vetted by families (i.e. so that this knowledge does not go against family values). Our discussion on Gur-Ze’ev’s improvisation and Peirce’s abduction is very pertinent here. If these movements are successful in implementing their respective projects, there would be an impediment to critique, and creativity. As we have already argued, when we criticize something, when we self-criticize, we have the opportunity to ascertain that things are correct (or incorrect) and to reach new conclusions on the basis of the evidence we have at hand—and the close affinity of Peirce’s abductive reasoning and of Gur-Ze’ev’s critical attitude is very evident with regard to this. Further, the understanding that everything must be criticized enables us to develop our creativity by finding alternatives, thinking outside the box and, thus, to seek a constant ‘renewal’, transforming and improving ourselves and society. This means that opportunities for critique, and the consequent development of creativity, must be offered by teachers, schools and the educational system. However, movements such as Escola Sem Par-
tido (i.e. School Without Party) and Aktion Neutrale Schulen (i.e. Action Neutral Schools) would have important and negative implications insofar as the offering of opportunities to engage in critique in educational contexts is concerned. This is so because if we curb the scope of what can be discussed in the classroom, something that these movements could do aleatorily and arbitrarily, then we also curb opportunities to develop critique and creativity. In fact, as Peirce would argue, this would represent a crystallization of thought. Consequently, if these movements are successful, then a poorer conception of education would be implemented. Finally, we believe that their refusal to allow everything to undergo a process of critique might demonstrate a fear that their own beliefs and values do not stand on solid foundations as well as an endeavour to implement a process of normalization of individuals within the confines of a particular worldview.

**References**


