SEÇÃO: VARIA

The concept of freedom in Hegel's *Logic*[1]

O conceito de liberdade na Lógica de Hegel

El concepto de libertad en la lógica de Hegel

Eduardo Luft[2]
orcid.org/0000-0001-9935-9192
eduardo.luft@pucrs.br

Abstract: Although it is fully developed in *Philosophy of the Spirit*, more precisely in the *Philosophy of Right*, the concept of freedom is rooted in the *Science of Logic*, namely, in the very core of the Hegelian system. And it could be no different, since *Logic* finds its high point in the Doctrine of Concept and Concept is conceived as the "realm of subjectivity or of freedom" (GW, v.11, p.409). Disagreeing with the contemporary attempts at thematizing the concept of freedom disconnected from Hegel's metaphysics[3], as in Honneth (2001, p.12,; 2013, p.17), or in Pippin[4] (2008), the present article seeks to examine the meaning taken on in the heart of the Hegelian system, to evaluate its potentials and its limits[5].

Keywords: Hegel, freedom, dialectic, logic.

Resumo: Embora desdobrado em sua plenitude na *Filosofia do Espírito*, mais precisamente na *Filosofia do Direito*, o conceito de liberdade está enraizado na *Ciência da Lógica*, quer dizer, no cerne mesmo do sistema hegeliano. E não poderia ser de outro modo, já que a *Lógica* encontra seu ápice na Doutrina do Conceito, e o Conceito é concebido como "reino da subjetividade ou da liberdade" (GW, v.11, p.409). Destoando de tentativas contemporâneas de tematizar o conceito de liberdade desvinculado da metafísica hegeliana, como em Honneth (2001, p.12; 2013, p.17) ou em Pippin (2008), o presente artigo procura examinar o sentido que este conceito assume no coração do sistema hegeliano, para avaliar suas potencialidades e seus limites.

Palavras-chave: Hegel, liberdade, dialética, lógica.

Resumen: Aunque se desarrolla en su plenitud en la Filosofía del Espíritu, más precisamente en la Filosofía del Derecho, el concepto de libertad está arraigado en la Ciencia de la Lógica, es decir, en el núcleo mismo del sistema hegeliano. Y no podría ser de otra manera, ya que la Lógica encuentra su ápice en la Doctrina del Concepto, y el Concepto se concibe como un "reino de subjetividad o liber-tad" (GW, v.11, p. 409). Separado de los intentos contemporáneos de temaizar el concepto de libertad desvinculada de la metafísica hegeliana, como en Honneth (2001, p.12; 2013, p.17) o Pippin (2008), este artículo busca examinar el significado que este concepto asume en el corazón del sistema Hegeliano, para evaluar sus potencialidades y límites.

Palabras clave: Hegel, libertad, dialéctica, lógica.

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[1]   A first portuguese version of this paper can be found in E. Luft, 2016.

[2]   Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil.

[3]   It should be recalled that, in Hegel, metaphysics is no longer understood as "transphysics" and begins to be conceived as a reflexive theory of the objective reason that is inherent to everything that exists and can exist (an ontology), and everything that is and can be thought (a logic).

[4]   Although Pippin acknowledges the systematic character of Hegelian thought, and the necessary connection between the concept of spirit and categories developed in Logic (2008, p.7-8), his clearly deontological approach to the concept of 'reason' (id., p.22), ultimately neutralizes any connection of the theory of human action with the *stricto sensu* ontological assumptions.

[5]   The present paper will keep its focus on the crucial problem of the relationship between contingency and freedom, as a preliminary condition for the appropriate comprehension of another topic that is currently in vogue, the theory of recognition (see Honneth, 1992 and 2001; Pippin, 2008). The Hegelian comprehension of finite subjectivity as a node of social relations and the consequent critique of social atomism are a natural, and not problematic development – even taking into account the specificities of the field of human action, or of the sphere of the spirit – of the Hegelian relational ontology elaborated in the *Logic*. A lot more problematic is the understanding of the way individuality and sociability are articulated in the theory of recognition, as Hegel will see it. An adequate response to this question will inevitably pass by the treatment of the problem of contingency: "the reduction of contingency to necessity and of its difference to identity, blocks recognition" (Muller, 1993, p.133).

I Freedom and necessity

The Hegelian project of philosophy is summarized in the known statement of the preface of *Phenomenology of Spirit*: "As I see it, which should be justified in the course of the exposition of the system itself, everything depends on grasping and expressing what is true, not as *substance*, but rather as *subject*" (GW 9, p.18). The crucial task would thus be the conciliation of the theory of the one substance of Spinoza with Kant's theory of the free subject[6]; or, in Schelling's words, in his System of Transcendental Idealism, the resolution of the "more elevated and unsolved problem of transcendental philosophy. Freedom must be necessity, and necessity, freedom" (AS 1, p.662). The difficulty of harmonizing the necessity that emanates from the one substance with human freedom is the central issue, not only for these thinkers influenced and challenged by Spinozism, from Fichte to Hegel, but for all modern thinking. The conflict between reason and freedom is at the heart of what I elsewhere called[7] crisis of self-interpretation of modern subjectivity: if nature is conceived in its totality as a "determinate machine" according to the model of the new physics, how can the subject himself be part of it? What is the place of subjectivity in a world ruled by deterministic laws?

In the contemporaneous conceptualization of Ashby (1956, p0. 24), a machine is determinate when the process that constitutes it is a "closed and univalent transformation" - closed because its operation only presents anew data that were already available previously, and univalent because it always produces one and the same result. Given the initial conditions and the mode of operation of the machine, the result of the transformation is the one possibility available and its emergence is, therefore, considered necessary (if there were more than one possibility, it would be called contingent). Now, usually we consider free action as the exploration of a field of open possibilities. Since there cannot be freedom with the presupposition of contingency, the free

subject cannot be part of the nature-machine.

Two classical answers to this dilemma that exerted a profound influence on all German idealists were given by Spinoza and Kant. While the former sought to radically redefine our self-comprehension as free subjects, in order to readapt it to the new deterministic view of nature, the latter opted for dualism, not a dualism among substances, in the classical Cartesian distinction between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, but a dualism of descriptions, opposing the empirical description of natural phenomena to the transcendental self-description of the epistemic agent. But dualism, as we know, is an inherently unstable position, and it was precisely to overcome that non-reconcilable Kantian opposition between nature (theoretical reason) and freedom (practical reason) that Fichte, Schelling and Hegel considered it indispensable to renew a critical dialogue with Spinozism. It was necessary to defend a new monism that would be able of overcoming the dilemma that modern reason has imposed on itself.

It is in this theoretical context that the contraposition between Hegel and Schelling occurs. The citation of *Phenomenology of Spirit* with which we began this section is preceded by the known, although implicit, critique of Hegel to his former colleague in Tübingen. The neo-spinozism advocated in Schelling's freedom had raised the monist position to such an extreme, that it ultimately dissolved, according to Hegel, all differences in the absolute identity of subject and object (GW 9, p.17). But what type of rationality, or objective reason, operates behind the Identity Philosophy, and how do freedom and necessity relate in it?

Identity Philosophy saw what existed in general, including human actions, as a necessary development of a single substance, the absolute identity of subject and object. But Schelling's absolute cannot be understood properly as a "determinate machine". At least part of the solution to the problem of freedom was illustrated by the transition from the metaphor of the machine to

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[6]   See Cirne-Lima, 1993, p.70.
[7]   See Luft, 2013.

the metaphor of the organism[8]; ultimately, nature is ruled not by heterodetermination or linear causality processes, but by a global process of self-determination which is developed by stages or phases, in a continuous movement of self-unveiling of the absolute. The logic that emanates from the absolute had already been anticipated by Fichte, but the subject that is now self-constituted by a priori acts of synthesis that aim, by immanent teleology, at their own full self-uptake is no longer the transcendental subject (subjective idealism), but the absolute subject (objective idealism[9]) that is inherent both to thought and to being in general.

Now, in this context, human freedom cannot be understood, ultimately, either as an "absence of impediment" (negative freedom), nor as a choice between non-predetermined possibilities of action (the *liberum arbitrium* of Christian thinkers), but rather as autonomy or self-legislation (positive freedom).[10] Autonomy is not considered independence in the face of the logicity that emanates from the one substance, but as the self-determination of will, according to the demands of objective reason[11] – even if its fundamental requirement, the establishment of a legal order that will implement freedom[12], is infinitely projected in history [13] [14]. The key to Schelling's response to the problem of freedom, according to a strategy inaugurated by Spinoza[15] and radicalized by Fichte, is thus the reversion of the process of linear causality (heterodetermination) of the determinate machine in a process of circular causality or self-causation (self-determination) of the substance that, precisely for this reason, is also and always a subject.

II Freedom: from contingency to necessity

In Schelling's eyes, the criticism directed at him by Hegel in *Phenomenology* appeared arbitrary and unfair. Even many years later, the late Schelling will continue to consider the entire Hegelian philosophy as a deployment of the central ideas developed in the Identity Philosophy[16], exposed in its more elaborate form in the *Presentation of my system of philosophy* (1801), namely, as a new variant of Spinozism. However, in this respect Schelling was wrong. Although critically incorporating the reconstruction of the concept of absolute presented by Spinoza and reproblematized by Fichte and Schelling, the Hegelian proposal of elevating the substance to a subject has something truly innovative, which can only be understood by a meticulous analysis of the approach to the problem of contingency developed in the *Science of Logic*.

The *locus classicus* for the treatment of the relationship between the categories of necessity and contingency, as well as for the transition from the (relative) necessity to freedom (or absolute necessity) is the dialectic of the modalities at the end of the Doctrine of Essence. In the whole of the *Science of Logic*, the dialect of modalities occupies an important position, and is a decisive step in the transition from the Doctrine of Essence to the Doctrine of Concept. If the doctrines of Being and of

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[8]   For a contemporary reading of the importance of Schelling to overcome the nature-machine paradigm, raised to fullness in the New-tonian thought, see Gare, 2013.

[9]   The structural identity between being and thought is a constitutive feature of objective idealism: see Hösle, 1997, p. 207-8.

[10]   "Through the act of self-determination, I must emerge as I, that is, as subject-object. Besides, that act must be free; for me to deter-mine myself, the foundation [EL: reason] must repose only and alone on myself" (Schelling, AS 1, 609). To distinguish between negative and positive freedom, see the classic work of I. Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", in: Four Essays on Liberty (1969).

[11]   "For the pantheist, God is not free, that is, He does not act by free choice (Willkür), but necessarily, that is, He can only act as He acts, that is, rationally or according to the law; because any action by free will would be moving away from rationality and from legality. Howe-ver, one can interpret the statement of the pantheist as the defense that truly absolute freedom is necessity itself and vice-versa. What we usually call freedom (Freiheit) is only arbitrariness (Willkür)" (SCHWARZ, 1844, p. 155-156.)

[12]   "Freedom must be guaranteed by means of an order that is as open and immutable as the order of nature" (SCHELLING, AS 1, p. 661).

[13]   "What pertains most to history is that in it, freedom and necessity coincide, that is, that although individuals believe that they are acting freely, ie, consciously, in favor of their subjective aims, ultimately they act only for the universal, to fulfill that ideal (ie, in an uncons-cious and necessary manner), which is only possible if a concealed need pervades history as a red thread, which is described partly as fate, partly as providence" (SCHWARZ, 1844, p. 140-1).

[14]   As in the case of Fichtianism still present in the position taken by Schelling in the *System of transcendental idealism* (1800): "History as a whole is a continuous and gradual self-revelation of the absolute" (AS 1, p.671).

[15]   According to def. 7 of Ethics, "free is what exists only by the need of its own nature and is determined to act only by itself" (SPINOZA, Et., p.2).

[16]   "In all and in essence, he [Hegel] wanted to present the same system" (SCHELLING, AS 4, p.547).

Essence have a more specifically negative character, contributing to the critique of central categories of classical ontology (THEUNISSEN, 1994), the Doctrine of Concept exposes the logical structure of the system of Hegelian philosophy in its fullness. The third and last section of the Doctrine of Essence, called actuality, begins with the presentation of the concept of Spinozian absolute, goes on to critique it in the sphere of the theory of contingency advocated in the dialectic of modalities, and concludes by an exposition of the concept of relational and dynamic absolute proposed by Hegel.

Let us recall that the Hegelian Logic is a theory of thought by thought itself. According to a dynamic process of self-thematization, thought at the same time seeks to render explicit and found reflexively and ultimately the 'thought determinations' or categories that constitute their intimate structure, thus fulfilling the Fichtean ideal of an a priori deduction of the categories, a project left open by Kant. Each act of thought aims at its own complete or finished thematization, having as a goal the full self-uptake of the Concept, the logical structure of thought that is also a logical structure of the being in general; but what actually occurs at every moment is only its partial and insufficient expression. The incompatibility between what is intended and what is performed is the pragmatic contradiction (see Wieland, 1989) which, once overcome, leads to new acts of thought and new contradictions[17], until the entire process flows into the ultimate foundation[18] of the Hegelian Logic.

Let us now see in which type of contradiction thought becomes entangled when it tries to fully grasp its own logical structure under the category of actuality, as expressed in the formal round of the dialectic of modalities. A thought, while it in fact exists, must be possible. But the minimal condition of the possibility of everything there is, is the self-identity, namely the adequation to the principle of non-contradiction. All thought (or being), while it in fact exists, has to be identical to itself, or non-contradictory. However, under the mere presupposition of the principle of identity,

we do not yet have the determination of thought or of a being as something actual. Self-identity is a necessary condition, but not sufficient to determine thought as this specific thought and not any other. The mere requirement of self-identity does not determine anything else than the empty repetition of itself, which could be deployed effectively in any determination, that is, in any other possible thought: "Everything that does not contradict itself is possible; the realm of possibility is, thus, unlimited multiplicity" (GW 11, p. 382). The reaffirmation of the principle of identity in all actual thought (or being) is its necessary aspect; the fact that the actual can be something entirely other, even respecting the principle of identity, is its contingent aspect. Finally, the grasp of the actual only under the presupposition of the principle of identity is self-contradictory, since it does not result in the conceptualization of something determinate as actual, but in the redundant iteration of the merely possible.

If we want to grasp the actual conceptually, we need to go beyond the mere redundancy of identity, discovering what imposes restrictions (contemporary science would say 'constraints'), beyond this "unlimited field of possibilities", explaining why this specific thought (or this being) is rendered effective or realized, and not any other. Implementing this demand, we leave the formal round of modalities to the real round. In the real round, Hegel renders explicit the typical relational ontology of the dialectical thinkers: every determination assumes a relationship. If there is a determinate thought A it is because there is another determinate thought B that renders it really and not only formally possible. If A prevails it is because the presence of B imposes it as its real conditioning: "If all conditions of a thing are fully given, then it emerges in actuality" (GW 11, p. 387). The space is given for the emergence of networks of heterodetermination and, thus, of the determinate machine of the moderns. But the heterodetermination networks cannot still be the full manifestation of actualness.

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[17] For a detailed exposition of the dialectic method, see E. Luft, 2001, p. 123ss.
[18] See Hösle, 1988.

Thought A can only emerge in its process of semantic differentiation in the face of B. But why is B given as an actual thought? Why, because it is conditioned by C. And why is C given? Because D conditions it... Ultimately, the entire heterodetermination chain, in thought or in being, flows into an indefinite series[19] of conditionings. When it emerges from a real conditioning, this specific actuality is necessary; when it emerges from an indefinite chain of conditionings it is contingent. Every need, in the context of a chain of heterodetermination, is always and only a relative necessity. Now, if the determination of the actual depends on its insertion into networks of heterodetermination which are lost in the indefinite, then no determination is possible, and once again we fall into contradiction; intending to conceptually grasp the actual, we encounter a chain of conditionings that cannot be consolidated in any actual network of determinations.

In order to grasp the actuality in its fullness and overcome yet this contradiction, we need to take a step further, and so we go on to the last round of the dialectic of modalities, the absolute round. In this third and last round, Hegel affirms the category of 'absolute necessity', as the synthesis of 'contingency', and 'relative necessity' as the true thematization of the category of actuality. The answer to the challenge of returning to the indefinite in the heterodeterminations chain had already been anticipated by Plato in the Sophist: relational ontology presupposes holism. As in Plato, there are no isolated ideas, only ideas that are different from other ideas in intelligible networks that, ultimately, configure the very world of ideas as a self-referential totality; in Hegel's Logic there are no isolated thoughts, just thoughts that are determined only in the context of semantic differentiation in relation to other thoughts, configuring complex conceptual networks that, in the end, are deployed in the entire categorial system presented by the Idea. There is no being-in-itself without the co-presence of a being- for-other, and there cannot be any

being-for-other without the co-presence of being-for-itself. Finally, the heterodetermination chains need to flow into self-determination chains so that they can prevail and not be lost in incoherence.

"Well", the reader may object with reason, "and what is the difference between this Hegelian procedure and the one already anticipated in the concept of the Spinozian *causa sui* or in the transition from the metaphor of the machine to the metaphor of the organisms promoted by Schelling? What is really new in Hegel?" This is the crucial point: Hegel intuited correctly that processes of self-determination cannot be consistently generalized, avoiding vicious circularity, without presupposing contingency; objective reason cannot generalize, establish itself as the very universal law of the system of philosophy without the respective internalization of contingency: "The determination of necessity consists in the fact that it contains in itself (an ihr) [my italics] its denial, contingency" (GW 11, p. 389). Now, this thesis is clearly incompatible with the defense of a concept of absolute that would imply exclusion by principle of what is contingent in the thought and in the being, as was the case in the philosophies of Spinoza and of young Schelling.

In order to explain how Hegel intends to conciliate 'contingency' and 'relative necessity' in the synthetic concept of 'absolute necessity', and just as absolute reason could internalize contingency, it is crucial to adequately understand the dialectic method itself as conceived by Hegel, that is, of the mode of operation of the Concept, rendered explicit in a rather terse and obscure manner at the end of *Logic*. As highlighted by D. Henrich in a classical text (1971, p. 117 ss), the Hegelian dialectic operates with a logic of presupposition and (re)position. Contingency is not a factor external to the Concept itself, but a result of its act of self-presupposing: "negative positing of those moments [by actuality] is in itself the presupposition or positing itself as surpassed or [the positing] of immediacy" (GW 11, p.390). Now, the immediacy of 'being' is the result of the act of self-liberation of the Idea that

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[19]   Causing a return *in indefinitum*, and not only *in infinitum*, since a total series of heterodeterminations is never given to thought, as shown by Kant (KrV, B539).

on presupposing itself as the externality of the point of departure engenders the contingency to be surpassed in the course of the subsequent dialectic process. Contingency is, therefore, at the same time the mark of the point of departure self-imposed by the dialectic process and the factor to be gradually annulled or eliminated (and here I purposely use strong words) during the course of its deployment. At the end of Logic we discover that the 'being' of the beginning is not a "mere presupposition" of the act of thought, but the point of departure engendered retroactively by the thought itself, so that the movement of thought can begin. In this circular process of presupposing and reposition Logic and all of the system of philosophy are deployed.

And now we also discover that 'freedom' is a bifacial concept in Hegel: on the one hand, he refers to the act of self-liberation of the Idea in relation to its own immanent needy strength, inaugurating the sphere of the contingency that marks the point of departure of the dialectic process[20]; on the other hand, freedom is the "truth of necessity" (GW 12, p.12), the very apex of the process of reinternalization of absolute reason that implies the elevation of the only relative necessity from the chains of heterodetermination to the absolute necessity of the movement of full self-determination of the Concept. It remains to know whether these two conflicting sides of freedom, which mirror the ambiguity of the very term 'autonomy', which, in its negative sense may mean "independence in relation to", independence of the Idea in relation to itself as a result of the act of self-liberation and, in its positive sense, the "self-legislation" or the unconditional self-determination of the Idea, may even be part of an integrated and consistent conception of the free act. I believe that the answer will be negative.

III Freedom and contingency

A first objection to Hegel would underscore the radical asymmetry between the two faces of freedom. The freedom that feeds on contingency, that operates precisely in the context of a field of open possibilities, the autonomy by independence that marks the self-liberation of the Idea is reduced to a poorer, less determinate manifestation of the Concept, in contrast to the full or true freedom that is expressed in the self-grasping of the Concept in the outcome of Logic, just as free will will be described in Philosophy of Right (GW 14.1, §22) as a still precarious realization of freedom in contrast to the true or infinite freedom of self-legislation, the freedom of will, as adapted to the demands of objective reason.

However, I do not believe this is the most decisive problem. The insurmountable difficulties that ultimately undermine the Hegelian concept of freedom are actually rooted in the impasses of its comprehension of the dialectic method itself. What Hegel understands as the process of reinternalization of what had been presupposed as contingent at the beginning of the dialectic process will only become clear in the Doctrine of Concept. In Subjective Logic, Hegel seeks to render explicit the necessary moments of that process of reinternalization of logic, as well as the target of the entire dialectic process. The necessary moments of Concept deployment should be encoded in the dialectic of the universal, particular and singular, rendered explicit in the theories of concept, judgment and syllogism; in turn, the end of the dialectic process is no more than the completion of the Concept itself: "Progress [of the absolute] is not superabundance; it would be if the beginning were actually already the absolute; progressing consists much rather of the fact that the universal determines itself and is universal for itself, namely, it is also the singular and the subject. Only in its completion [*Vollendung*] is it the absolute" (GW 12, p.241). The Concept is thus endowed with what I call a teleology of the unconditioned, that predefines both the moments and the ultimate end of the dialectic progress. Now, if the ultimate end of the dialectic process is precisely the completion of the Concept, how can one not recognize, not only an asymmetry,

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[20] What gives meaning to the enigmatic expression that marks the outcome of the Doctrine of Concept: the Idea "liberates itself" ("die Idee sich selbst frei entlässt" (GW 12, p.253)) in and as the real sphere, making up the transition from *Logic* to the *Philosophy of the Real*.

but an incompatibility among the two faces of freedom[21] previously described? If the process of reinternalization of the Concept is concluded, the contingency of the point of departure is eliminated and the Hegelian response to the problem of introjection of contingency in the core of the absolute cancels itself.

This is just another way of presenting what I consider to be the central objection to the Hegelian dialectic[22]; oriented towards the end of its own consumation, the dialectic process refutes itself. The defense of the teleology of the unconditioned has at least two consequences: a) with the completion of the concept, there cannot be new contradictions, nor, therefore, the process of overcoming them; b) flowing into the pure self-referential structure of the completed Concept, dialectic circularity falls into a vicious circle (precisely the type of bad circularity that Hegel had denounced in young Schelling's concept of absolute).

An adequate response to this critique requires the refusal of the teleology of the unconditioned that characterizes the mode of operation of the Idea in the Hegelian system. The first consequence of the refusal of the teleology of the unconditioned is the exposition of the Doctrine of Concept to the same negativity that had dissolved the categories of the classical ontology in the Doctrine of Being and of Essence. Now the logic of development itself, that predefines the moments of reinternalization of the Concept and also the end of its own completion, is dissolved by the force of doubt. And we are invited to rethink the objective reason, namely the Idea, without the presupposition of the teleology of the unconditioned.

The introjection of contingency into the core of the absolute, if taken to its logical consequences, leads to a redefinition of the very concept of objective reason[23] or to a reconstruction of what we consider an Idea[24]. The Idea is reread as Idea of Coherence, the very universal law expressed in the sentence: "Only what is coherent remains determinate". As in Hegel, all determination assumes a relationship (relational ontology), everything that exists and may exist occurs in configurations, but there are multiple, potentially infinite modes of manifestation of coherence in this or that possible configuration. The dialectical movement is no longer conceived as the process of self-presupposition and reinternalization of the Concept, going through the moments predefined by its own internal logic towards its consumation, but as the free exploration of the potentially infinite field of possibilities inaugurated by opening the Idea to its multiple possible realizations.

The Idea is the first expression of freedom precisely because it conciliates in itself both the orientation toward coherence (the positive face of freedom, the 'acting according to reason', or the 'self-determination') and the free exploration of that unexhaustible field of possibilities (the dynamic logical space[25]) that marks the presence of contingency in the core of reason (the negative face of freedom, the 'independence in the face of' or the 'opening to non-predetermined possibilities').

Thus rethinking it, reason becomes freedom and freedom, reason.

Authorized translation by Hedy Lorraine Hofmann

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[21]   For a different reading of the problem of freedom in Hegel, see Jarczyk/Labarrière (1986, p.75 ss); see also Rosenfield (1983) and Weber (1993).

[22]   The result of the unification of three classical objections, the accusation of a deficit in treating contingency (late Schelling), and individual freedom (late Schelling and Kierkegaard), as well as the accusation of dogmatism (Feuerbach), in one and the same immanent critique to the Hegelian system (see E. Luft, 2001, p.27ss)

[23]   This, in my opinion, is the correct intuition of Cirne-Lima (2006), on demanding a reconceptualization of the dialectic logic as a logic of the oughtness.

[24]   This new comprehension of dialectic ontology has already been developed elsewhere (E.Luft, 2014).

[25]   See Luft, 2014, p. 965.

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Mailing address:

Eduardo Luft

Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul

Av. Ipiranga, 6681

Partenon, 90619-900

Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil