



DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri May 27 12:50:32 2022

SOURCE: Content Downloaded from [HeinOnline](https://heinonline.org)

Citations:

Bluebook 21st ed.

Felipe da Veiga Dias & Augusto Jobim do Amaral, Media Criminology in Brazil: Algorithms and New Geopolitic Control Developments, 123 Revista Brasileira Estudos Politicos 211 (2021).

ALWD 7th ed.

Felipe da Veiga Dias & Augusto Jobim do Amaral, Media Criminology in Brazil: Algorithms and New Geopolitic Control Developments, 123 Revista Brasileira Estudos Politicos 211 (2021).

APA 7th ed.

Dias, F., & do Amaral, A. (2021). Media Criminology in Brazil: Algorithms and New Geopolitic Control Developments. Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos, 123, 211-254.

Chicago 17th ed.

Felipe da Veiga Dias; Augusto Jobim do Amaral, "Media Criminology in Brazil: Algorithms and New Geopolitic Control Developments," Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos 123 (2021): 211-254

McGill Guide 9th ed.

Felipe da Veiga Dias & Augusto Jobim do Amaral, "Media Criminology in Brazil: Algorithms and New Geopolitic Control Developments" (2021) 123 Revista Brasileira Estudos Politicos 211.

AGLC 4th ed.

Felipe da Veiga Dias and Augusto Jobim do Amaral, 'Media Criminology in Brazil: Algorithms and New Geopolitic Control Developments' (2021) 123 Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos 211

MLA 9th ed.

Dias, Felipe da Veiga, and Augusto Jobim do Amaral. "Media Criminology in Brazil: Algorithms and New Geopolitic Control Developments." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos, 123, 2021, pp. 211-254. HeinOnline.

OSCOLA 4th ed.

Felipe da Veiga Dias & Augusto Jobim do Amaral, 'Media Criminology in Brazil: Algorithms and New Geopolitic Control Developments' (2021) 123 Revista Brasileira Estudos Politicos 211

-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at

<https://heinonline.org/HOL/License>

-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.

-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:

[Copyright Information](#)

Media criminology in Brazil: algorithms and new geopolitic control developments

Criminologie des medias au Bresil: algorithmes et nouveaux developpements du controle geopolitique

Felipe da Veiga Dias¹

Augusto Jobim do Amaral²

-
- 1 Post-Doctorate in Criminal Sciences from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul - PUC-RS (2019). PhD in Law from UNISC (2015) with a sandwich period at the University of Sevilla (2014). Professor of the Post-Graduate Program in Law at Faculdade Meridional (IMED) Master's Degree. Professor of Law at the Meridional College (IMED). Passo Fundo RS. He has experience in the field of Law, with emphasis on Criminology, Criminal Law, Human and Fundamental Rights, and Children and Adolescents' Law, working mainly on the following themes: critical criminology, violence, media, social damage, biopolitics, crisis of the criminal system, punitive power of the State, human and fundamental rights, social sustainability, and social minorities (women, children, and adolescents).
 - 2 Post-Doctorate in Theory and Philosophy of Law from the University of Malaga (2018) and in Political Philosophy from the Università degli Studi di Padova (2019), funded by the Coimbra Group Scholarship Programme for Young Professors and Researchers from Latin American Universities. PhD, Master's and Specialist in Criminal Sciences from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS). He is a Professor in the Graduate Program in Criminal Sciences (line of "Criminology, Crime and Public Safety") and in the Graduate Program in Philosophy (line of "Ethics and Political Philosophy"), both at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS). He leads the research group "Criminology, Punitive Culture and Philosophical Criticism" registered at CNPq, with

Abstract: The present study starts from the algorithms' thematic and media criminology, emphasizing a bio-political perspective of technological analysis focused on control in Brazil. Having as a central research problem, the current developments of the control strategies, in technological terms, that can be seen in Brazil. The main objective of the work, therefore, lies in determining the bio-political modifications of the insertion of new technological, media and economic devices in criminological terms. The methodology applied comprises a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, with a method of monographic procedure and technique of searching for indirect documentation, highlighting bibliographic sources and news about the selected theme. Therefore, it is concluded that the media criminology in practice in Brazil maintains the invisibility of massive social damage, managing information and data in a differential way, while adapting to digital media stimulates the consumption of violence related to crime, ignoring the profound problems that affect the Brazilian reality. Thus, the attention to algorithms as a fundamental part of the media definition helps to understand how the population's direction is moved away from complex issues, unprecedented, leveraged by strategies that prompt immediate reactions towards the profitability of the current model of crime consumption.

Keywords: Media Criminology; algorithms; biopolitics; control.

Résumé: La présente étude part de la criminologie thématique et médiatique des algorithmes, en insis-

emphasis on topics such as biopolitics, penal culture, punitive violence, human rights, social control and public security; criminal law and criminal procedure.

tant sur une perspective biopolitique de l'analyse technologique axée sur le contrôle au Brésil. Avec comme problème de recherche central, les développements actuels des stratégies de contrôle, en termes technologiques, que l'on peut observer au Brésil. L'objectif principal de l'œuvre consiste donc à déterminer les modifications biopolitiques de l'insertion de nouveaux dispositifs technologiques, médiatiques et économiques en termes criminologiques. La méthodologie appliquée comprend une approche phénoménologique-herméneutique, une méthode de procédure monographique et une technique de recherche de documentation indirecte, mettant en évidence des sources bibliographiques et des informations sur le thème choisi. Par conséquent, il est conclu que la criminologie des médias en pratique au Brésil maintient l'invisibilité de dommages sociaux considérables, en gérant différemment les informations et les données, tout en s'adaptant aux médias numériques pour stimuler la consommation de violence liée à la criminalité, en ignorant les problèmes profonds la réalité brésilienne. Ainsi, l'attention portée aux algorithmes en tant qu'élément fondamental de la définition des médias aide à comprendre comment la population s'éloigne de questions complexes, sans précédent, mises à profit par des stratégies qui suscitent des réactions immédiates vis-à-vis de la rentabilité du modèle actuel de consommation du crime.

Mots-clés: médias criminologie; algorithmes; biopolitique; contrôle.

Introduction

The research on display starts from the conception of what is called “media criminology”, which is distinguished from the academic approaches by ruling a specific

construction of reality by information, in other words “media misinformation and disinformation, in convergence with prejudices and beliefs, which it is based on a simplistic criminal etiology based on magical causality”³.

The conception coined by Zaffaroni is supported by the ordinary analysis of unidirectional communication models, typical of media such as television and newspapers. Nevertheless, what is intended here is to demonstrate the changes resulting from the new technological dimensions in the very understanding of social control. For this reason, the research question is what are the differentials perceived, through a bio-political reading, in media criminology, especially in Brazil? Based on this questioning, a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach is structured, having as main bases the most recent bibliographical references and at the same time news about the theme, since the approach of new digital media requires constant interaction with these devices.

1. Introducing algorithms: technological and bio-political aspects

The conjugation and handling of data by algorithm-based software (through the use of artificial intelligence) is part of contemporary reality, which does not eliminate the deep doubts about how such calculations work, whether they can be influenced, conditioned or biased. Such questions merely demonstrate how much is unknown and, in the mean while, how much trust is attributed to systems that are not understood and which often hide their misconceptions and can cause massive social harm.

3 ZAFFARONI, 2012. p. 303.

Focusing on the alluded questions, recurring insights arise about the need to regulate activities involving data or metadata, and some legislations (also in the criminal sphere) have been pointed as a solution to mathematical misunderstandings. An instance is antitrust⁴ legislation, which would have as its goal avoiding the creation of monopolies or oligopolies (which also have a constitutional seal in Brazil, despite the huge concentration of mass media by the same economic or family groups), also directed to data market practices. Although many of the activities performed by these companies are defined as monopolies, legislation on this subject is generally maintained and facilitated by business plans, rather than protecting individuals or social groups. This sort of action is not surprising, once the law often acts as a control tactic and not merely as a tool of sovereignty⁵.

Therefore, legislative source often clouds the profound complicity between business strata, state dynamics, and their lobbies. Both publics and corporations act to their mutual

4 Antitrust legislations are meant to prevent the formation of monopolies, conglomerates, or analyzing mergers, seeking the idea of preserving competition by regulating market power. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the United States' stance on the subject fosters formations such as Amazon's, at least that is the conclusion of the North-American legislation analysis, which is based on Section 2 of the *Sherman Act*, which points the performance of cuts in a permissive and condescending manner towards the private sector. FIDELIS, 2015, p. 69 - 70. In comparison, existing EU legislation has a stricter basis and has been working harder on such issues, based on Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2019) Just by overseeing recent fines on technology-related companies such as Google, based on new regulations of 2018, so that The European antitrust bases show constantly changing with such regulations in order to adapt to the new capitalist dynamics. In this regard check the website of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2019, as well as the reference to the news of sanctions on the address O GLOBO, 2018. Zuboff explains about the ineffectiveness of regulations in the capitalist technological market. ZUBOFF, 2019, p. 132.

5 FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 132.

benefit and jointly manage the “dated” businesses towards a more “productive” path. Especially in terms of crime and security, the use of algorithms has become an excellent tool for predicting risk margins rather than solving these matters⁶.

The fact is, law enforcement agencies can detect more crime with the same resources if they investigate citizens who are at greater risk of criminal offending; and sentencing bodies can reduce crime if they incapacitate citizens who are more likely to recidivate in the future. Most people believe that the use of reliable actuarial methods in criminal justice represents progress. No one, naturally, is in favor of incorrect stereotypes and erroneous predictions; but, to most people, it makes sense to decide who to search based on reliable predictions of criminal behavior, or to impose punishment based on reliable estimates of reoffending.⁷

Thus, understanding the algorithms and risks involved from an uncritical perspective of technology as a sign of progress is a spiral that can enclose everyone in a romantic view of neutral mathematical calculations and the subjects involved with such creations, enhancing unrestricted use harmful to the penal system. On the other hand, opening up to this kind of approach makes it possible to see how strategies involved with algorithmic logic can reproduce ostensibly racist practices, sexist or steeped in twisted ideals of meritocracy, as already widely confirmed by researches in Silicon Valley⁸.

Therefore, some algorithm models only serve to technologically maximize the discrimination and inequality produced by neoliberal capitalism⁹ (or surveillance capitalism,

6 CHIGNOLA, 2018, p. 256.

7 HARCOURT, 2005. p. 3.

8 NOBLE, 2018. p. 10.

9 Remembering here the effects when neoliberal reason takes over the state. AMARAL, 2018, p. 163. “But what happens with the government of the people and for the people when the neoliberal reason shapes the soul and

according to Zuboff's conception)¹⁰. An example of this can be seen when examining, in the case of the penal system, a test usually applied in the United States (and mentioned in the works of O'neil and Harcourt) for measuring the risk of recidivism of convicts - LSI - R - "Level of Service Inventory - Revised" - where one of the central patterns of questioning is knowing when, for the first time, the person had an involvement with the police forces, concluding that there is a greater risk of recurrence when the variable appears earlier. No one ignores - or should not, but cynically - the profound selectivity of exercising punitive power that causes, especially black men, poor and belonging to the peripheries, to be stopped and searched since youth, much more often than white men (without regard to neighborhoods and other city-related criminological issues)¹¹.

Abandoning the supposed technological neutrality of algorithms supposedly intrinsic to the composition of their programs is as relevant as understanding the formulas of their calculations. It is commonly believed that searching mechanisms and other artificial intelligence-based devices (algorithms) are elaborated for personalization filters only, thus, that would be improved and enhanced for each individual, according to the results collected by the users¹² profile, in a way its creators would not have any influence on the results produced.

the State as companies and not as political entities? It is well known, but it will not be too much to remember at least 4 harmful effects generically pointed out by critics: intensified inequality; immoral mercantilism of all things; the promiscuity of the corporate and financial capital with the State and the economic chaos derived from the speculation of the financial markets".

10 ZUBOFF, 2019, p. 14 - 15.

11 O'NEIL, 2017, p. 15. This system is also addressed by HARCOURT, 2005.

12 PARISER, 2012.

This may be one of the biggest baits embedded in the so-called “intelligent systems”, which are available for future predictability and are based on discriminatory matrices, a non-neutral reflection of the power relations that guides them. Take, for example, Google’s most widespread search algorithm, which by mid-2012, referring to there search on black, Latino, and Asian women, immediately referred to sexualized stereotypes, with pornographic pages as primary results¹³.

The glitches of these search mechanisms and other tools are usually attenuated, ignoring the oppression that algorithms exert. However, how to justify that in 2015, Google’s face recognition device likewise indicated “monkeys” and “animals” as the first result for African Americans, or that the search for “nigger house” (racist meaning) nominate the White House during the Obama administration? Not surprisingly, when campaigns reveal the existence of sexist or racist search engine results, the standard response is that this would still be a mirror of users, which may even have some influence, but it shouldn’t to elude the conglomerate from its responsibilities for serving and spreading content. In short, ignored the planned algorithms, addressing the responsibility, in neoliberal style, the person himself, responsible for any and all evil cast on him¹⁴.

It is noticed that calculation “errors” are widespread by smart devices, as searching mechanisms, locators and biometric instruments work together (network mapping) in an attempt to predict behaviors and lead to the desired responses by the holders of these bio-political tools¹⁵. On the other hand, it should be noted that several times the

13 NOBLE, 2018. p. 11.

14 NOBLE, 2018. p. 11.

15 AMOORE, 2013. p. 41.

predilections or projections are based on the absence of data or metadata, so that the lack of accurate information is recorded as a systemic demerit that is also understood as a risk¹⁶.

This last element will compose a critical point of the 21st century media criminology, especially since evident and non-evident elements will be combined in the formatting of images and content under the possibility be consumed regarding violence/crime and that maintain the dynamics of population control.

It's therefore concluded that all actions taken digitally are at the mercy of registration, storage and monitoring for many different purposes. Such components can be analyzed together or separately, but generally end up composing a virtual identity (appreciated according to risk margins, especially when addressing the interests of the criminal system) or a digital version of each individual, capable of providing information ranging from which products you would like to consume even which may lead you to vote or protest against someone¹⁷.

For these reasons, the question about the criteria of algorithms currently imposed is so valuable, as Pasquale¹⁸ realizes. The author, when questioning such factors, aims to prevent the use of disciplinary or control instruments to reduce subject to the Kafkian paradigm, where it is not known what happens and yet is at the discretion of unknown sanctions/punishments.

This concern is supported by the use of data/metadata to form these virtual identity profiles, which do not have a clear legal restriction or limit to their use, neither there is

16 CHIGNOLA, 2018. p. 259.

17 HARCOURT, 2015, p. 1.

18 PASQUALE, 2015, p. 9.

any deterrent to their various application for monitoring/ applications, ranging from consumer habits all the way to security. This enhances the increase of inequalities historically developed and reinforced by the state criminal action, while being able to generate new minorities, some of them invisible due to the misunderstanding of their technological¹⁹ origin.

Highlight that such (ab) uses performed by corporations and states simply do not have any sort of seal or sanction (Not being criminal acts nor democratic disruptions), which means that the production of massive²⁰ social harm is no more than just another “error / glitch” in the name of neoliberal progress. Given the extent of the damage done, the author O’Neil²¹ named the statistical models created as the LDI-R into “mathematical weapons of destruction” (analogously to the notion of “weapons of mass destruction” - and with the same initials in English - WMDs), creating looping processes with their feedbacks, which generate vicious circles in the sense that model assumptions are only reinforced by future forecasting calculations.

And here’s one more thing about algorithms: they can leap from one field to the next, and they often do. Research in epidemiology can hold insights for box office predictions; spam filters are being retooled to identify the AIDS virus. This is true of WMDs as well. So if mathematical models in prisons appear to succeed at their job – which really boils down to efficient management of people – they could spread into the rest of the economy along with the other WMDs, leaving us as collateral damage²².

19 PASQUALE, 2015, p. 38.

20 BARAK, 2015, p. 113; Equally important to observe the study of BUDÓ, 2016.

21 O’NEIL, 2017, p. 16.

22 O’NEIL, 2017, p. 17.

It is noticed that some environments are used as laboratories for algorithms testing, and these properly tested models can be exposed to new individuals and new functions, thus increasing the efficiency of any element desired by the neoliberal model in which everything and everyone is reduced to accounting and salable data. Therefore, establishing a govern-mentality algorithmic, with the multiplication of complex tactics of exercise of power over populations²³, carried out symbiotically by states and transnational corporations.

In this model, everything is reduced to the individual basis, so that social illness before battled or allegedly reducible since a welfare state are now conditioned to personal changes and transformations motivated by feedback patterns. In other words, just as a spam filter refines its mechanisms with each user, this state-corporate model aims to improve citizens as a way to increase their effectiveness and thereby reducing costs while increasingly monitoring their actions and patterns (reduced to data/metadata)²⁴. Reflecting in the disarticulation or elimination of organisms and typically state responsibilities in democratic societies, projecting the responsibility to the people of acting for their own development and public disengagement (meeting the market needs), always seeking to maximize efficiency applied to human management.

Reminding that this control management only becomes viable through the “free” contribution of users, who voluntarily expose themselves over the most varied aspects of their lives. Based on this factual context is that Harcourt, reflecting since Debord (spectacle), Foucault (discipline/surveillance) and Deleuze (control), ends up projecting the

23 FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 143; SOUZA; GLOECKNER, 2016, p. 438 – 439.

24 MOROZOV, 2018, p. 96.

idea of control linked to a model based on the exhibition and exposure of individuals who provide their data from their freedom and expose themselves from two personas - analog and digital²⁵.

2. The Brazilian technological impacts of control context

In case the reflexes of these technological, social and bio-political dynamics cannot be isolated locally because they carry a global scale, their nuances in terms of national reality gain a special color of analysis. Therefore, technologically dictated neoliberal auspices, with special attention to data/metadata management, should be examined from the Brazilian context. The Brazilian specificity goes, as Casara²⁶ points out, by the greater incidence of repressive instruments, typical marks of Post-Democratic States. Registering Dardot and Laval's²⁷ warning by saying that an undemocratic position is part of the neoliberal propositions, so that the particular action of the market overrides any political intervention, and the current radicalism is a differential that leads towards a post-democratic model.

25 HARCOURT, 2015, p. 19. In a complementary sense one might consider that in Kakutani's approach to referencing Tim Wu's studies (self-paving), he would link the idea of increasing self-exposure phenomena by social networks, so that the entrepreneur himself would need to execute the spectacle of yourself. KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 40

26 CASARA, 2018, p. 16 - 17. This does not mean that democratic society is synonymous with peace and prosperity, as MBEMBE, 2017, p. 33. "But the brutality of democracies has never been but stifled. From their origins, modern democracies have tolerated some political violence, including illegal ones. They have incorporated into their culture private forms acting as the added value of the state, whether they are Frankish bodies, militias or other paramilitary or corporatist formations".

27 DARDOT; LAVAL, 2016. p. 8.

This type of contours has a kind of formal democratic front ready to cover political decisions under another instance, often programmed by platforms of corporations, markets, risk agencies, among many other shapeless agents that manage the course of the so called neoliberal progress while reducing the relations to the marketing factor and the entrepreneurial responsibility of the subject. This reveals one of the main strategies performed by current media criminology: Publishing speeches that legitimize any and all flexibility of the legal protections supported by the current democratic order in favor of criminal intervention (see the defense of the use of collective search warrants in Rio's communities, which would be used in the name of the war against crime)²⁸, which will always be heralded as a kind of individual and collective gain or even justified by fights against enemies of the "nation" (even if some of them are only imaginary).

Such line of reasoning allows to include both punitive expansion as part of this strategy (with disciplinary increment), as well as legal flexibility that amplifies economic relations (focused on control), as in the case of obtaining and using personal information (data/metadata), for the sake of improved public safety, and the risk speech would be similar.

Even in a brief manner, it's noticed how the logic of war takes anyone as killable²⁹, reinforced by the imagery-speech used by media criminology. Such speech allows the frank expansion and investment of the armed forces no longer as external protection to the enemies, but as a reserve before a State of Exception that, as for Brazil, is fomented by the dynamics of power installed in the penal system. It only takes observing the recent military-led interventions in Rio

28 ESTADÃO, 2018.

29 MBEMBE, 2017, p. 61.

de Janeiro, jointly with the police forces, and which were captured by the national media, before the state of social “chaos” experienced there³⁰, once these actions make clear the objectives of the sovereign power state to delimit death, since it is “in the shifting ground of contiguity between violence and law that the police present themselves”³¹.

Obviously, the emphasis of the exception seeks to lead to the thought of the emergence and the latent social risk, so that actions that go beyond (or become flexible) the established social and legal limits are approved, in order to authorize the invasive exercise of life (in all its information/data) and the right to kill. At this point, the evident media role is to assist in the construction of the fictitious enemy (sustained by the parameters of race, class, and other markers of exclusion) that move the alarm and bio-power instruments over certain individuals, while maintaining their primary function of dividing who should live and die³².

Therefore, the bio-politics imposed as a management of life for the sake of state-market interests is far from being incomprehensible, yet it should be carefully considered, because it uses individual liberty, technologically enhanced, and combined with alienating processes of the basic foundations of democracy. For this reason, when talking about technological capitalism, the discursive power is mentioned, once the abandonment/destruction of rights, guarantees or even the life’s pauperization need the acceptance of the population (Being once again the media acting as essential for the administration of this bitter “remedy”), which voluntarily adopts neoliberal practices in order to naturalize the context.

30 BRAZIL, 2018.

31 AMARAL; PILAU, 2017, p. 13.

32 MBEMBE, 2018, p. 16 - 17.

As for the Brazilian case, the perspective is worsen viewing the traditional power of death that is regularly practiced against portions of the population, being part of the species of what Mbembe calls necropolitics³³. In this sense, it is important to remember Foucault's lesson on racism as a bio-power strategy that crosses the state, in order to allow the segmentation of death, functionalizing two primordial dynamics: a) delimit the cut of who should live and die, by "fragmenting , make caesuras within this biological continuum to which the bio-power is directed"; b) while justifying the destruction of the other and the "death of the other, the death of the bad race, the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal), is what will make life in general healthier, healthier and purer"³⁴.

Foucault and Mbembe's explanations help to understand the dynamics that compose a culture focused on racism, or as the African professor explains, a nano-racism "made culture and breathing, in its banality and its ability to infiltrate the pores and veins of society at a time of widespread brainwashing, mechanical de-cerebration and mass alienation"³⁵. This modality of racism is easily observed in the statements based on fear, risk and distinction with the "criminal" enemy in their existence, either in the clash against "terror" or against the "thug", what changes are simple discourse and images projected by media criminology (and which, as previously mentioned, can still count on

33 MBEMBE, 2017, p. 65. It is also possible to see the conceptual description of necropolitics in MBEMBE, 2018, p. 71. "[...] I have proposed that contemporary forms that subject life to the power of death (necropolitics) profoundly reconfigure the relationship between resistance, sacrifice and terror".

34 FOUCAULT, 2005, p. 305

35 MBEMBE, 2017, p. 97.

significant contributions from information-data technologies in the composition of inequalities).

It would not be viable to state that a Brazilian authoritarian trait well located in the little-assumed slave practices - which multiply in a neoliberal way of life - underlies the “belief in a strength, fear and distrust response [...], a tendency to attack persons away from conventional values, opposition to what is subjective/sensitive, willingness to think through rigid categories (stereotypes), identification with figures of power and widespread hostility”³⁶. This highlights that the use of data-based devices, algorithms and virtual profiles can serve as legitimation both of the repressive continuity of the criminal model, with its habitual clientele and racial outline, and for the formation of other vulnerable and minority groups based on inadequacy to the neoliberal model.

Thus, the use of data and metadata to feed security systems aimed at punitive practices needs attention. The use of bio-political devices aimed at control modalities is not new in Brazil, but has only been enhanced by technologically “neutral” innovations towards the permanence of punitive selectivity as a trademark of the national penal system³⁷.

Therefore, in case the data/metadata is accessible to the social control agencies, always supported by a selective tradition, racist, sexist, etc., any system fed by this information will be technologically directed to acting on the same standards, in other words, the algorithms or Computer systems will only reinforce the inequalities produced by the penal system, using technology as a legitimation shield that allows its exercise on a large scale. Worth to mention that this statement is not an exercise of foresight of the future, but

36 CASARA, 2018, p. 73.

37 STREVA, 2017, p. 244. Complemented with the approach of AMOORE, 2013, p. 51.

rather an allusion to systems already in operation in cities like Chicago, Berlin, Munich, London and Paris, where actions designed to avoid “risks” already occur, such as creating lists of people who are cataloged as dangerous even before any criminal act³⁸.

In the Brazilian case, this is reflected in the constantly growing mortality data, as revealed by the information presented by the Public Safety Yearbook³⁹, or in the most recent so-called federal intervention in the State of Rio de Janeiro⁴⁰. This kind of punitive action maintains the pattern of control of dangerous subjects (risk conception, now based on mathematical algorithms in order to determine future predilections⁴¹) that are the frequent target of the criminal system, as it only verifies the identification, profile and biometric data of specific populations belonging to the black race politics spaces that allow death and exception, given that “the urban space occupied by the communities has become a metaphor, that is, an implicit code to indicate blackness”⁴².

It is worth mentioning that the construction of these death spaces at the national level had already been equated to other historical components that allowed such actions.

38 PRE-CRIME, 2017.

39 FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, 2018.

40 FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, 2019. As already argued, the splitting between one and others can be seen in Rio de Janeiro as a social, cultural, economic, political and spatial division. The role played by the police is no longer related to protection, but to repressing, raping and frightening black bodies. Such conduct is operated through the dominant discourse of order and security that justifies the performance of this repressive apparatus by codifying black bodies as per se dangerous. To illustrate such matter, the São Paulo Police School had the following engraved inscription: “A still black man is suspicious; running, it’s guilty”. STREVA, 2017, p. 251

41 AMOORE, 2013, p. 41

42 STREVA, 2017, p. 249.

That said, by following the colonial logic of sovereignty and control of space, the communities/peripheral zones could be considered as equivalent, for every dynamic of force that operates beyond the imposed sovereign right of death⁴³.

In fact, it is noticed that media criminology, in its modern role, discursively/by image assists territorial segmentation and fragmentation as strategies of what Mbembe calls black race politics, which prevents displacement and at the same time segregates part of the population⁴⁴. Consolidating thus a social model based on enmity (or even on the notion of the enemy as the media represents in its relationship with crime), which is based on the logic of war established biologically and, in the countries of the North, the The war on terror only reinforces this return to the colonial dynamics of borders and death⁴⁵, which in Brazil has as its substitute the internal enemy media, and why not say technologically, built on its racialized, class and gender segregation.

Worth concluding that, by observing the bio-political practices applied in the country, the strategies of the state and the large media conglomerates are reinforced towards a policy of death (tanatopolitics/necropolitics), which means that they not only manage life, but also perform the death. There is no contradiction in this, only the concession of life to the part of the population is presented exactly with the extermination of the other. In this case, the focus is not only on racism as an eugenic element, but at the same time all the burden of social, economic and gender class that adds to the totality of factors that affect the policies of elimination (not limited to death only, see the explanations about the new forms of technologically sustained social exclusion)

43 MBEMBE, 2018, p. 40 - 41.

44 MBEMBE, 2018, p. 43.

45 MBEMBE, 2017, p. 11.

executed by the penal system, properly authorized by the logic of risk. For this reason, the approach taken by media criminology, directing its batteries to the criminological past/future together with the exposure of supposed specialists ready to legitimize the punitive exercise, still proves to be deeply welcomed and reverberated by common sense, further reinforcing and naturalizing discriminations upon most part of the population.

Delineating the practices of a media criminology in post-democratic terms, then, is to realize that part of the speeches that chant the law and order have evident roots with fascist dynamics of extermination of the other, which in the national case is delimited by the figure of the internal enemy. Thus, the division executed over the population since, for example, the consecrated formula of “good citizen” vs. ‘Enemies of the nation’ is part of a fascist strategy in which - another example - women who oppose ‘traditional gender roles, non-white individuals, homosexuals, immigrants,’ decadent cosmopolitans’, those who do not defend the dominant religion, are, simply because they exist, violations of law and order⁴⁶.

Therefore, a post-democratic state with deep authoritarian, racist, sexist historical roots, geared to an expansive exercise of criminal power, holds in its hat another powerful weapon to break new political course, with the direct action of media criminology. Investment in government advertising⁴⁷, allied with the possible manipulation of politi-

46 STANLEY, 2018, p. 112.

47 Mass media and advertising strategies also directly contribute to the formation of a culture or *ethos* focused on the notion of free choice and neoliberal ideals. This reaches individuals in all ranges of life, which is buried in new desires and products, which promise satisfaction and the increase of each one as a subject, so why not think about the bio-political use of these instruments by government entities. DARDOT; LAVAL, 2016,

cal results, contributes to governing the over-excited “good citizens” who, out of digitally programmed outrage, distil the most fervent speeches against the Social and Democratic Rule of Law and its reasoning. In the same way, meeting emerging capital requirements, a significant portion of communication is reduced to the exclusive purpose of delivering the news as soon as possible, interrupting - or even extinguishing - the potential of assimilation for readers/viewers/users.

Thus, these new technologies arranged in a context of pure social vulnerability, as for Brazil, deepen a governance of the bodies aimed at maximizing death. The control of the indelibly connected population on digital platforms, increasingly quantified, calculated and reduced to data subject to negotiation and algorithm management, and linked to the action of state punitive power over those considered useless to economic gains or considered deviant from the propositions of this society, may well indicate the near future scenario to be experienced by all.

In this sense, it is important to recapture the critique of these tools of calculation and measurement of life - being software, artificial intelligences (AIs) - because they are the very means proposed to almost nullify dialogue in favor of one-dimensional narratives, to change the features of citizens for consumers, in a policy that is not very interested in the common and more concerned with the acts of government as a marketing product, an adverse scenario for the development of complex contemporary democracies. Technological bases that were previously camouflaged political parameters of neutrality and use their alleged objectivity to decisively influence democracies⁴⁸. Algorithms operate with the unrestricted use of devices such as fake

p. 224.

48 MOROZOV, 2018, p. 142.

news, so that behavior on the internet not only reproduces part of ideas or even images of reality, but also shapes it according to its fictional (human-technological) narrative⁴⁹.

The policy that places AI at the center of its operations promises us perfection and rationality. By doing so, however, it flattens the immense complexity of human relations by simplifying complex narratives into concise algorithmic rules and mono causal explanations. While our phenomenological experience of the world does not resign to the simplistic models behind most AI systems, we should not be surprised to see more and more people falling into the fake news conspiratorial and extremely complex narratives: the news can be completely false, but at least admitting an unrecognizable narrative complexity by Alexa or Siri⁵⁰.

As much as Morin and Le Moigne⁵¹ have long delimited the need to insert complexity in the debates of the problems faced by humanity, what is shown in the opposite way is the ode to simplification. Not only by the capitalist technological aspect that segments the thought into quantifiable (and profitable) parts, fully assimilated by each one of us “self-entrepreneurs,” but also by the pathological portrayal of a population absorbed by smartphones⁵², social networks, data, AIs, and others, algorithms, and that at simultaneously nourishes hatred of thought, because it plans and reproduces

49 KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 56.

50 MOROZOV, 2018, p. 142 – 143.

51 MORIN; LE MOIGNE, 1999, p. 26.

52 BERARDI, 2016, p. 105. “Those who carry out executive mansions, like those who carry out business functions, perceive the acute sensation of relying on an uninterrupted flow to which they cannot escape, without paying the price of marginalization: control of the work process is no longer in hands of a hierarchy of bosses and bosses, as in the Taylor’s factory, but is incorporated into the flow. The mobile phone, which most of the info workers use at all times, probably plays a decisive role in the organization of work as a formally autonomous and substantially dependent self-enterprise”.

its (lack of) reflection through the digital transparency⁵³ so well regarded in so-called fake news, the rebound effect is not far from the reinforcement of extreme punishment as a naturalized order in the everyday life of all.

A figure of this could be proved so strongly, perhaps as in a few moments of the Brazilian history, in the last election process in 2018, in which was left proved that 90% of the voters of the then presidential candidate, Jair Bolsonaro, were found to have believed in fake news⁵⁴ from social-media such as Facebook and Twitter, which demonstrates that the construction, tampering or manipulation of truth (post-truth)⁵⁵ is not considered objectionable as long as it proposes a simple narrative capable of fulfilling its desires. Properly present in the national post-democratic environment, falsification is no longer considered a relevant value, because “in post-democracy, an enemy is anyone who has no value of use within neoliberal rationality”⁵⁶ If case of opposition, the figure of the internal enemy, also technologically channeled, will always emerge.

The influence of algorithmic platforms and other technological instruments has gained space in the exercise of control of the undesirable (Still collating dilution of these instruments into conspiracy theories, which would sound ridiculous), is repeated, with racist, sexist and discriminatory variations⁵⁷. This context affects everything from browsing content to navigation to the notorious influence on electoral processes, as seen in the recent North American situation⁵⁸,

53 HAN, 2015.

54 Survey published by the VALOR ECONÔMICO, 2018.

55 KEYES, 2004, p. 12 - 13.

56 CASARA, 2018, p. 75.

57 NOBLE, 2018.

58 HOWARD, 2017. In a complementing manner HOWARD, 2016.

recalling the undeniable contribution of Cambridge Analytica⁵⁹. The aforementioned company fixes its attention on advertising based on the analysis of the digital profiles of potential voters, leading their voting intentions to a particular candidate (using psychological aspects, fake news, among numerous manipulation strategies)⁶⁰, something that could be included in the Han's conception of micro-targeting, once it would "work to accurately approach voters with personalized messages and influence them. Micro-targeting as a practice of power is a psycho politics based"⁶¹.

The impact on the Brazilian electoral process triggered from the proliferation of fake news or obvious manipulations that shape exclusionary conceptions of the world, driving the message from pre-established standards with enormous impact power. Also adding, the use of these instruments can even simulate the existence of people through AIs (artificial intelligence), known as bots (or social bots) that are "controlled by software, algorithmically generating content and establishing, interactions"⁶², which could commonly coordinate volunteer activities, boost publications, news, publicity, but that also composes a stimulus pattern for practices such as the spread of fake news, hate speech, recruitment and mobilization of true digital militias (which according to some authors would be a weakening factor of democracies)⁶³.

59 KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 81.

60 FLORES, 2017.

61 HAN, 2014, p. 95.

62 VAROL, 2017, p. 280.

63 KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 84. "Using bots to manipulate public opinion is just one of the factors analyzed in the Omidyar Group report on the effect of social networks on public discourse. The report concluded that, in addition to increasing polarization, social networks tend to undermine trust in institutions and hinder fact-based discussions and debates that

Such tools, as mentioned, when directed at political combat, may, for instance, be backed up by sponsors, which in the case of Brazilian electoral legislation may constitute illegal donation⁶⁴. Nevertheless, in the most recent election race of 2018, algorithm bases linked to specific keywords triggered its performance. An emblematic case was the publications of the newspaper *Folha de São Paulo*, still in late 2018, when the so-called bots forged hate speeches in publications without any political or electoral ties (the publications regarded about jewelry and a famous bar owner), having been activated by keywords, in the specific case “*bolovo*” and “*bolso*” - in reference / defense to the then presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro⁶⁵. Another demonstration of such was the reactivation of mobilizations in several groups favorable to Bolsonaro against public universities, as early as 2019, in the context of public education cutbacks. As reported by The Intercept Brazil website, attacks with fake news, forged images, among other strategies, worked in an orchestrated manner, starting in groups of WhatsApp (in a kind of laboratory) and materializing at a later stage on Twitter and the others social media such as Facebook and YouTube⁶⁶.

These examples are reinforced by data obtained through the Indiana University⁶⁷ *botometer* tool, which verified in 2019, according to a survey by *NetLab*, linked to the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, the use of approximately four thousand nine hundred robots/bots acting in favor of

are essential for democracy.”

64 FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, 2019.

65 FORUM, 2019.

66 THE INTERCEPT BRAZIL, 2019a.

67 Studies of this tool are shared in articles such as: VAROL, 2017; FERRARA, 2016.

President Jair Bolsonaro willing to boost their publications, enhance their practices and confront their opponents⁶⁸.

However, despite the high incidence when observing the current Brazilian president, showing up to over 60% robots/bots followers on Twitter, this is not a Bolsonaro's prerogative, as similar studies have registered other politicians, such as Dilma Rousseff and Fernando Haddad, with numbers close to 50% in the use of these technological impulse instruments⁶⁹.

The differential in relation to the current Brazilian moment is its radicalism within a post-democratic government conjuncture, once any credibility in the official government source has been lost. There is an imminent danger when political agents adopt obvious lies as basis, because "a fascist leader can replace the truth for power, even lying inconsequentially"⁷⁰ as for the current Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, the lie/concealment of facts is commonplace, as data indicate that in less than seventy days he issued at least one misguided/false statement per day⁷¹. However, said that this form of action is not restricted to Brazil, so that "around the world, waves of populism and fundamentalism are causing people to resort to fear and anger rather than sensible debate, eroding the democratic institutions"⁷².

That said, the use of bots or the usual handling of fake news demonstrates an apparently rather unstable post-democratic picture, but that is fully effective for neoliberal

68 REVISTA FORUM, 2019.

69 UOL, 2019.

70 STANLEY, 2018, p. 66 - 67.

71 TO THE FACTS, 2019.

72 KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 9; populist discourse is also observed in the current Brazilian judicial performance by SALGADO, 2018, p. 195 - 196.

interests and the use of bio-political devices to operationalize control perfectly while maintains an apparent social and political chaos in the country (the constant, media constructed crisis propels the entrepreneur-subject to constantly reinvent himself). Note that by acting so strongly on the psychological aspects - analysis, manipulation, influence - of the subjects, there would be an understanding of the formation of a psycho-politics fostered by the neoliberal view in the era of Big Data, once it would be acting on micro actions that would be outside the standard of consciousness, including digital personalities (digital unconscious), shaping the appropriation of population behaviors based on the escape of consciousness⁷³.

Kakutani's warnings, although the author focuses her analysis on the North American context, they are fully adapted to the national scenario. Projecting a hate and fear speech on social fractures is a political strategy that aims to hide the mediocrity of its own political protagonists, something Trump or Bolsonaro are just examples⁷⁴. Such dynamics eventually become a weapon of mass destruction. Hate statements, in addition to spurring the interest of media newsmakers and consumers, currently trigger algorithmic calculations that propagate well-liked-shared-retweeted affections - in other words, propagate the annihilation of difference, with the enormous advantage for not taking direct responsibility for the practices of violence⁷⁵.

The political conflict situation or ideological debate in Brazil is a "valuable asset" to the neoliberal production scenario, with the skillful use of control technologies. However, the most important thing to note is that, in this

73 HAN, 2014, p. 98.

74 AMARAL, 2019a.

75 KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 32 - 33.

new environment, the violence of political power is fed by the exercise of the freedom of the subjects who provide their data/metadata, transformed into spectators of simplistic spectacles (appealing to primal feelings and emotions), typical in the scenario of national media criminology, often infused with authoritarianism, hatred and violence.

In the Post-Democratic State, the neoliberal project with the use of technological tools seems to have found a rather radical version, given that it receives as much of the subjects' vital-psychic energies as it imposes on others the power of death with maximum force in constant growth. They thus have extremes of a national bi-politic (and for some necropolitics) with futuristic refinements, with their algorithms, in the delimitation/manipulation of human actions while the penal system increases its power of death in a renewed manner.

It's proper to say, thus, that a criminology media in Brazil is radicalized and enhanced by new technological and bio political instruments. This statement fits in with the use of true informative frauds, manipulations or creations of illusory enemies to be hunted in the rampant search for security, with the aid of software, biometrics, cameras, etc., shaping a media criminological report from the same targets as before (and some innovations). The penal system continues its program of exclusion, discrimination and elimination of people, according to the neoliberal marketing dictates, which leads to the formation of a media criminology capable of providing considerable subsidies for the maintenance of a futuristic project of death and violence, which will be duly commercialized, amplified and profitable according to current interests in a country like Brazil.

3. Technological transformations of media criminology in Brazil

After observing the main recent elements and the previous characteristics of media criminology, it's possible to verify the radicalized obviousness of the production of content related to crime/violence as a way of legitimizing of the punitive exceptions and incursions against the population, at the same time as the current context performs true transformations in the processes of selectivity. However, this only takes shape within the general parameters of a society steeped in neoliberal ideals and in frank adoption of the bio-political control mechanisms (and discipline) that enhance the established projects.

Therefore, thinking about the direction of media criminology presupposes the understanding that control is takes place through a flow of technologies put at the service of the state-market interests⁷⁶. What leads to the observation that nowadays, in addition to users browsing, searches or even the mining their data / metadata, including the massive use of social media (forming an ecosystem of communicative media)⁷⁷, which come to compose an element in media strategies, because by making the sociality a technical component through algorithms, "people's activities are converted into a formal, manageable and workable phenomena, which enables platforms to direct the sociality of the users everyday routines"⁷⁸. In short, understanding the media's position for the years to come is also understanding that its role is not restricted to printed publications, television

76 BERARDI, 2016, p. 105.

77 DIJCK, 2016, p. 43.

78 DIJCK, 2016, p. 30.

broadcasts, and news portals, but also its interaction within sharing vehicles, social media, and the transformations in modes of life in a neoliberal society.

Therefore, there is no mediation between the proliferated information-opinions and the viewer (“demediatization”), everything is absorbed to the surface in digital media and every being inserted is also a producer. “The demediatization of communication, journalists – elite “opinion makers,” indeed, the erstwhile priests of opinion – now seem increasingly anachronistic and superfluous [...]. General demediatization is putting an end to the era of representation”⁷⁹.

The acknowledgment of this joint reasoning is demonstrated by reading how interests and actions are quantified in the online universe, and thereby become guiding bases to influence users (remotely algorithmic). Dijck introduces that activities set up by social media, such as “giving a like”, favor “instant, visceral, emotional and positive ratings,” turning popularity and other human aspects into something quantifiable / calculable⁸⁰. This intelligent power stimulates positive and non-negative feelings, once it is not an obligation to silence up, but on the contrary, an impulse to share all your opinions, thoughts and aspects of your lives; Leading to the realization that this technique of power exploits freedom rather than denies it⁸¹.

Like wisely, by considering that the media use these same “popularity” meters to articulate online publications and, of course, their personal view on crimes and their authors, a feedback mechanism is perpetuated to elect specific targets, based on the already uneven performance of the technological capitalist society. Therefore, the penal system

79 HAN, 2017, p. 16.

80 DIJCK, 2016, p. 32.

81 HAN, 2014, p. 29.

is only a consequence of something broader, but that uses automated technological reinforcement to satisfy the punitive longings established and nourished by such instruments, managing to keep the usual clientele and expanding its business model to new social unwanted who are in formation.

Presenting one of the main points of change in media criminology, since from the present context converge human elements (which already have an inherent complexity⁸²) and technological elements in the definition of media interests, thus, news-making is dictated by individuals and algorithms together, which seek the transmission of communications capable of arousing emotional and visceral relationships. This change is essential to design the paths taken by speeches/images aimed at punitive reinforcement, the vulnerability of digital minorities or the increase of the penal system, because even if unrealistic sensations of insecurity fed (technologically) by hate, fear or risk can be seen as valid as long as they meet the demand, enhancing profitable accesses.

The behavior of the users and of the media exploration (as many other activities already performed) of their characteristics is evident, since their reaction to emotional stimulus produces the ephemeral instability of a digital examination. "Furthermore, these groupings commonly seem carnivalesque - ludic and nonbinding. Herein lies the difference between the digital swarm and the classic crowd, which - as in the case of workers assembled in a mass", because "is not volatile but voluntative. Organized labor is not a matter of fleeting patterns; it consists of enduring

82 GREER, 2005, p. 162. "Crime news is not simply plucked out of the air. Nor does it exist in a vacuum. It is the end result of a complex process of selection, processing and prioritization, and is shaped by interactions between journalists, editors, their working conditions, the wider environment and, crucially, news sources".

formations”⁸³. This means that there is no group vision but a fleeting inconstancy that widens in emotion and decays in speed, such is its misunderstanding of the self-exploitative process in the contemporary capitalism.

Based on this, the incidences based on post-truth or on fake news cannot come as any surprise once they appeal to the visceral, showing that the confusion between fiction and reality (media-scape)⁸⁴ is in place. Thus, the post-truth era is more than the creation of news, bots or analysis of digital profiles, it is the construction of an imaginary fiction that goes from science to history in which it seeks to project something non-existent as a way of attenuating an irreconcilable and unequal reality, while nothing changes in the form of human and nonhuman exploitation on the planet⁸⁵.

Therefore, it's seen that the media, from a criminological radical reading, is a political problem, or better saying bio-political, since it acts on the promotion of life and the permission of death. It means that thinking about the media problem is to realize that this is not in a neutral or empty space and that, beyond the contextual variables of each part of the planet, the choices are influenced, if not anticipated, by a “political economic structure,” cultural traditions, and the assessment of technology communication. [...] The communication medias are at the center of the power and control battles in any society, and this is undoubtedly even more frequent in democratic countries where the issue is more in dispute”⁸⁶.

83 HAN, 2017, p. 12.

84 APPADURAI, 2004, p. 53 - 54. Equally worth mentioning the work of KANG, 2014, p. 111. “Reality becomes an artificially reconfigured object and all experiences, in a sense, become technological, as the term technology itself signifies the artificial organization of perception”.

85 KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 9.

86 MCCHESENEY, 2013, p. 65.

However, the changes in the criminological media field are not only related to the insertion of technological components linked to communications and news or their discursive forms, but also having a different composition of the image itself, in its ability to be produced, to enhance spectacles and sensations (something already delimited as focus of people and algorithms) in a single frame⁸⁷.

Speaking of images, especially in criminological terms, initially is perceive them as “milestones of war”, especially as a testimony to violence perpetrated by the exercise of punitive power. [...] being “framed” is an object of an art, like the name of a guide implicitly an interpretation. Every image is therefore always framed, cropped, focused. However, the challenge, faced with the image, may realize that there is always movement beyond this confinement, a kind of perpetual breakout evasion⁸⁸.

Thinking of the image understanding it as a living element is a must and not merely as something static (although they use functionalizing instruments to reduce them to mere reproductions of the facts) in time-space, always capable of “making a certain moment sensitive”⁸⁹. Nevertheless, it will be fundamental to perceive the image not only as a representative illusion, but through its profound role in the construction of social reality itself, “providing the modern mass-consumption society with the reified form of social reality”⁹⁰.

Therefore, to think of digital media in its criminological connections is to realize that through images it’s noticed “an iconic reversal that is making images seem more alive, more beautiful, and better than reality itself”, thus, an optimized

87 HAYWARD; PRESDEE, 2010, p. 16.

88 AMARAL, 2019b, p. 7 - 8.

89 DIDI-HUBERMAN, 2018, p. 11.

90 KANG, 2014, p. 111.

reality is exposed that removes the potential of the image so that “the real takes them hostage. That is why, despite – or precisely because of - their massive influx, images now are iconoclastic”⁹¹.

Following the idea of an “info-production” of technological capitalism, in which all productive cycles are involved, “digitization has created a simulacrum of the world, operationally integrated to the physical world”⁹², composed of data, speeches and images capable of fomenting reactions, feelings and simplifications of reality. “If the image is the reality, this also means that reality is inconstant and, like the image, it appears and disappears, flickers discontinuous, so that even absent it is present in its remains and ruins”; Moreover, “if the attributes of the writing match those of the image, it means that there is no story without the interruption of history, just as there is no image without the interruption of the image”⁹³.

Therefore, any material you want to work with a media criminology approach, be it news, digital communications or any visual data, must clearly have that the images are not just a set of what is exposed at the same time, they represent a series of excluded or ignored aspects, so that the exposed media data also always represent something absent in themselves⁹⁴. Note that misunderstanding, as mentioned earlier, is part of the algorithm-technology strategy (black box)⁹⁵, likewise what is not seen also composes the framing and shaping of reality projected by the media digitally.

91 HAN, 2017, p. 27.

92 BERARDI, 2016, p. 112.

93 DIDI-HUBERMAN, 2018, p. 16.

94 DIDI-HUBERMAN, 2018, p. 16.

95 PASQUALE, 2015, p. 10.

Impossible, therefore, not to reflect the criminology media since its punitive high operation carried out by the constant invisibility of certain debates (classically exposed by studies linked to racial issues, selectivity, police violence, environmental damage etc.). This indicates that the concealment of massive social harm will continue to be the focus of its productions, which will delimit the frame adequate to imagery-discursive simplicity, but still aligned to satisfy the capitalist demands of consumption and control, as well as its own interest in crime/violence, while denying the reality of the harmful consequences produced by a model that produces death and the elimination of the unwanted from neoliberalism.

This goes back to the idea that there is a wide misunderstanding in the images reading (image illiteracy). In order to produce the experience and the teaching, it is imperative the interpretation of these images (their trajectory, traces), something that contrasts with the superficial idea caused by the reports, which often rely on mere visual and linguistic *clichés* to meet a viewer/user. This perspective of distinction enunciates the form of recent technological adoption in which images are available only as reports (unable to disconcert those who observe them), without any appreciation for their reading, letting digital speed blur the necessary signs for their comprehension⁹⁶.

Still worth mentioning that, by combining the two emphasized points as distinctive for criminological media directions, the possibility of producing what would be an over illusion of the penal system is not disregarded. For beyond a mere illusion of security, fake videos and images are reproduced exponentially with the adoption of machine learning and virtual reality, and these fictitious constructs

96 DIDI-HUBERMAN, 2018, p. 49.

cannot be distinguished from reality⁹⁷ - which brings criminal control to instances never seen before.

All this greatly impacts when realizing that in addition to the initial difficulties of transposing the visible in images and speeches, or the problematic invisibility caused by the criminological media approach, there is also the technologically managed possibility of fictional construction, ready to fulfill people's desires or algorithms toward a greater profitability and better body management. This allows us to consider that the media criminology changes (in the use of images, speeches, etc.) currently due to the transformations made in society itself, so that its fulfillment of emotional, technological, algorithmic and own users wishes is only the reflex of a neoliberal model that broadens the control by managing freedom as a bio-political ingredient of management.

Conclusion

Before the above, taking into account the bio-political practices of discipline and control combined with the parameters of the current neoliberal-technological capitalism in the Brazilian post-democratic state, media criminology presents itself as part of the central strategy in the task of maintaining the illusion of the penal system. Thus, in addition to the original features carved by Zaffaroni and the differentiated context associated here, it can be concluded as more recent features of this approach that: (a) from specific cuts/frames, current communication will perpetuate the invisibility of certain contents (social damages), relegating data, pages or specific searches to access certain texts or

97 KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 85.

research (as was shown in the recent case in 2019, in which FioCruz's research was abandoned for not endorsing the drug war policy of government based on the epidemic of dependents)⁹⁸ that are put to conflict with prevailing beliefs⁹⁹; (b) The mass media are being adapted to digital business models (emotional/visceral collecting) do not tend to critically discuss the functioning of life in society, which includes the penal system, or even the inquiry into endemic problems or the consequences of the power of death/elimination, either because of the complexity of the themes, or for purely marketing reasons.

Furthermore, (c) it should be remembered that the selectivity typically associated with criminological studies would not only be reinforced by already stereotyped individuals, once the current technology allows the expansion and creation of new minorities, which would be eliminated by their inability to the neoliberal model, even if they do not understand the criteria used (the black boxes would keep the processes incomprehensible and invisible);

98 THE INTERCEPT BRAZIL, 2019b. "For the survey, Fiocruz used the same methodology as the National Household Sample Survey, IBGE's Pnad, to hear 16,273 people in 351 cities. The sample is twice the national penultimate survey, conducted by the Brazilian Center for Psychotropic Drug Information in 2005. The new survey showed, for the first time, the consumption patterns of rural municipalities and the border line of the country. And it investigated the use of licit drugs - tobacco and cigarettes - and illicit drugs in ten types or categories: cannabis, hashish or skank, cocaine powder, crack and also solvents, ecstasy/MDMA, ayahuasca, LSD, ketamine and heroin, and stimulants and anabolic".

99 KAKUTANI, 2018, p. 73. Several theories have been developed to explain why people quickly accept information that supports their beliefs and rejects those that challenge them. Simple. First impressions are hard to dismiss, because there is a primitive instinct to defend one's territory, because people tend to produce emotional rather than intellectual responses when questioned and are averse to carefully examining the evidence.

(d) Finally, technological control devices (as in the case of data management and algorithms linked to searching, browsing, or other online activities) of the population tend to push away complex results, making them likely to promote reactive feelings about neoliberal logic contemporary, which denotes a picture of easy manipulation in post-democracy, which reiterates the role of media criminology as a significant actor in the constructions necessary to conduct the digital herd.

References

AMARAL, Augusto Jobim do. Criminologia como crítica do visível: tomando posição quando as imagens queimam – a propósito das lições de José Calvo González (Prefácio). In: GONZÁLEZ, José Calvo. *Criminologia visual: selos postais como artefatos imagéticos de aculturação ideológico-jurídica*. Florianópolis: Tirant lo Blanch, 2019 (a).

AMARAL, Augusto Jobim do. Neoliberalismo y democracia sobrante: un análisis desde el caso brasileño. In: FÁVERI, José Ernesto de; CANI, Luiz Eduardo; BAZZANELLA, Sandro Luiz (Org.). *Realidade nacional e crise atual: entre a cultura e a barbárie*. São Paulo: Liber Ars, 2018.

AMARAL, Augusto Jobim do; PILAU, Lucas e Silva Batista. A polícia moderna: degenerescência democrática e guerra civil. *Revista direito e práxis*. Rio de Janeiro, 2017.

AMARAL, Augusto Jobim do. A “mediocracia brasileira” e o Brasil que não hesita em resistir. *Revista IHU On-Line* (Instituto Humanitas – Unisinos), São Leopoldo, 20 de fevereiro de 2019. Available at: <http://www.ihu.unisinos.br/78-noticias/586765-a-mediocracia-brasileira-e-o-brasil-que-nao-hesita-em-resistir>. Accessed on: August 26, 2019 (b).

AMOOORE, Louise. *The politics of possibility: risk and Security beyond probability*. London: Duke University Presse, 2013.

APPADURAI, Arjun. *Dimensões culturais da globalização: a modernidade sem peias*. Lisboa: Teorema, 2004.

BARAK, Greg. The crimes of the powerful and the globalization of crime. *Revista Brasileira de Direito*. v. 11, n. 2, p. 104-114, jul./dez. 2015.

BERARDI, Franco “Bifo”. *Almas al trabajo*. Alienación, extrañamiento, autonomía. Madrid: Enclave de libros, 2016.

BRAZIL. Decree No. 9,288. 2018. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2018/decreto/D9288.htm. Accessed on: June 27, 2019.

BUDÓ, Marília De Nardin. Danos silenciados: a banalidade do mal no discurso científico sobre o amianto. *Revista Brasileira de Direito*. v. 12, n. 1, p. 127 – 140, jan-jun. 2016.

CASARA, Rubens R. R. *Estado pós-democrático: neo-obscuranismo e gestão dos indesejáveis*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2018.

CHIGNOLA, Sandro. A toupeira e a serpente. *Revista de Direitos e Garantias Fundamentais*. v. 19, n. 3, 2018.

DARDOT, Pierre; LAVAL, Christian. *A nova razão do mundo: ensaio sobre a sociedade neoliberal*. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2016.

DIDI-HUBERMAN, Georges. *A imagem queima*. Curitiba: Medusa, 2018.

DIJCK, José Van. *La cultura de la conectividad: una historia crítica de las redes sociales*. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2016.

FERRARA, Emilio et al. The rise of social bots. *Communications of the ACM*, v. 59, no. 7, p. 96-104, 2016; SUBRAHMANIAN, V. S. et al. The DARPA Twitter bot challenge. *Computer*, v. 49, no. 6, p. 38-46, 2016.

ESTADÃO. *Army requests use of collective warrant; experts and production fear for abuse*. 2018 (a). Available: <https://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/rio-de-janeiro,defesa-pede-autorizacao-judicial-para-aplicar-mandados-coletivos-de-busca-e-apreensao-no-rio,70002195172>. Accessed on: June 30, 2019.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION. *Competition - Antitrust*. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html. Accessed on: May 4, 2019.

FIDELIS, Andressa Lin. Between American “laissez-faire” and European “interventionism”: To which direction CADE’s investigation into Google’s search engine points. *Revista de Defesa Da Concorrência*. v. 3, no. 2, 2015.

FLORES, Paulo. *NEXO*. What Cambridge Analytica, which helped to elect Trump, wants to do in Brazil. December 08, 2017. Available at: <https://www.nexojournal.com.br/expresso/2017/12/08/O-que-a-Cambridge-Analytica-que-ajudou-a-eleger-Trump-quer-fazer-no-Brasil>. Access on: August 26, 2019.

FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO. *Businessmen sponsor campaign against PT through WhatsApp. With contracts of \$ 12 million, practice violates the law for being undeclared donation*. Available at: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-campanha-contra-o-pt-pelo-whatsapp.shtml>. Accessed on: July 2, 2019.

FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. *12º Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública*. São Paulo: Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2018.

FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. *Rio sob intervenção 2*. 2019. Available: <http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Rio-sob-Interven%C3%A7%C3%A3o-2-v2.pdf>. Accessed on: July 28, 2019.

FORUM. *Folha's tweets about "bolso" and "bolovo" trigger robot action, which comes out in defense of Bolsonaro*. With no regard to politics, publications activated so-called bots - or robots - that came out in defense of the candidate in the comments. Available at: <https://www.revistaforum.com.br/tuites-da-folha-sobre-bolso-e-bolovo-ativam-acao-de-robos-que-saem-em-defesa-de-bolsonaro/?fbclid=IwAR3uwtrIjs1nCcjdjhTc8EW9lO3lm1Re0dAGsgBkQ1zFWgno-Ch4CMfzr6aY>. Accessed on: March 4, 2019.

FOUCAULT, Michel. *Em defesa da sociedade*. São Paulo: Martin Fontes, 2005.

FOUCAULT, Michel. *Segurança, Território, População*. Curso do Collège de France (1977-1978). São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008.

GREER, Chris. Crime and media: understanding the connections. In: HALE, Chris; Hayward, Keith; WAHIDIN, Azrini; WINCUP, Emma. *Criminology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

HAN, Byung-Chul. *In the swarm: digital prospects*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2017.

HAN, Byung-Chul. *Psicopolítica*. Neoliberalismo y nuevas técnicas de poder. Barcelona: Herder, 2014.

HAN, Byung-Chul. *The Transparency Society*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015.

HARCOURT, Bernard E. *Exposed: Desire and disobedience in the digital age*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015.

HARCOURT, Bernard E. Against prediction: Sentencing, policing, and punishing in an actuarial age. *University of Chicago Law School, Public Law Working Paper*. n. 94, 2005.

HAYWARD, Keith J.; PRESDEE, Mike. *Framing crime: cultural criminology and the image*. New York: Routledge, 2010.

HOWARD, Philip N. et al. Junk news and bots during the US election: What were Michigan voters sharing over Twitter. *Computational Propaganda Research Project*, Oxford Internet Institute, Data Memo, n. 2017.1, 2017.

HOWARD, Philip N; KOLLANYI, Bence; WOOLLEY, Samuel. Bots and Automation over Twitter during the US Election. *Computational Propaganda Project: Working Paper Series*, 2016.

KAKUTANI, Michiko. *A morte da verdade: notas sobre a mentira na Era Trump*. Rio de Janeiro: Intrínseca, 2018.

KANG, Jaeho. *Walter Benjamin and the media: the spectacle of modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

KEYES, Ralph. *The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life*. New York: St. Martin Press, 2004.

MBEMBE, Achile. *Necropolítica*. Biopoder, soberania, estado de exceção, política de morte. 2 ed. São Paulo: N1 edições, 2018.

MBEMBE, Achile. *Políticas da inimizade*. Lisboa: Antígona, 2017.

MCCHESENEY, Robert M. *Digital disconnect*. New York/London: The new press, 2013.

MORIN, Edgar; LE MOIGNE, Jean-Louis. *L'intelligence de la complexité*. L'Harmattan: Montreal, 1999.

MOROZOV, Evgeny. *Big tech: a ascensão dos dados e a morte da política*. São Paulo: Ubu Editora, 2018.

NOBLE, Safiya Umoja. *Algorithms of oppression: how search engines reinforce racism*. NYU Press, 2018.

O GLOBO. *Google was fined \$ 6.8 million for violating the law of data protection in Europe - Penalty was imposed by the French government, the first under the new regulation, which came into force in the EU in May 2018*. Posted: January 21, 2019. Available at: <https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/tech/google-multado-em-us-568-milhoes-por-violar-lei-de-protecao-de-dados-na-Europe-23389682>. Accessed on: May 4, 2019.

O'NEIL, Cathy. *Weapons of math destruction: how big data increases inequality and threatens democracy*. Broadway Books, 2017.

PARISER, Eli. *O filtro invisível: o que a Internet está escondendo de você*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012.

PASQUALE, Frank. *The black box society: the secret algorithms that control money and information*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015.

PRE-CRIME. Direction: Matthias Heeder e Monika Hielscher. Berlin: Kloos & Co. Medien GmbH, 2017 (88min).

REVISTA FORUM. *Researchers identify 4,900 pro-Bolsonaro robots working on social medias*. Available at: <https://www.revistaforum.com.br/pesquisadores-identificar-49-mil-robos-pro-bolsonaro-atuando-nas-redes-sociais/>. Access on: April 7, 2019. SEE. *Bolsonaro's virtual - and camouflaged - army*. Available at: <https://www.revistaforum.com.br/pesquisadores-identificar-49-mil-robos-pro-bolsonaro-atuando-nas-redes-sociais/>. Accessed on: April 7, 2019.

SALGADO, Eneida Desiree. Populismo judicial, moralismo e o desprezo à Constituição: a democracia entre velhos e novos inimigos. *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, n. 117, jul-dez, 2018.

SOUZA, Lucas Melo Borges de; GLOECKNER, Ricardo Jacobsen. Biopolítica e Governamentalidade na Belle Époque Carioca: alguns apontamentos iniciais sobre o controle médico da população e do espaço urbano. *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, n. 113, jul-dez, 2016.

STANLEY, Jason. *Como funciona o fascismo*. A política do “nós” e “eles”. Porto Alegre: L&PM, 2018.

STREVA, Juliana Moreira. Auto de resistência, biopolítica e colonialidade: racismo como mecanismo de poder. *Revista brasileira de ciências criminais*. n. 138, 2017.

THE INTERCEPT BRAZIL. *As the Pro-Bolsonaro digital militia rescued its fake news machine to attack college students*. Available at: <https://theintercept.com/2019/05/14/milicia-digital-bolsonarista-ubra-universidades/>. Accessed on: July 2, 2019 (a).

THE INTERCEPT BRAZIL. *Guerra à pesquisa*. May 31, 2019. Available at: <https://theintercept.com/2019/03/31/estudo-drogas-censura/>. Accessed on: June 16, 2019 (b).

TO THE FACTS. In ten weeks as president, Bolsonaro made one wrong statement a day. Available at: <https://aosfatos.org/noticias/em-dez-semanas-como-presidente-bolsonaro-deu-uma-afirmacao-errada-por-dia/>. Accessed on: July 1, 2019.

UOL Are most of Bolsonaro’s followers fake? Understand. Available at: https://noticias.uol.com.br/tecnologia/noticias/redacao/2019/05/11/fake-followers-audit-aplicativo-mostra-a-porcentagem-de-perfis-fake.htm?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social-media&utm_

campaign=uol&utm_content=geral&fbclid=IwAR2-dxs-NHqBaydbymIzvULhhcoOhoz1sG0hUcq7gkc-1p_gOfk-BBfj3c8g. Accessed on: May 10, 2019.

VALOR ECONÔMICO. IDEA Big Data. October 26 to 29, 2018. Available at: <https://www.valor.com.br/politica/5965577/estudo-diz-que-90-dos-eleitores-de-bolsonaro-acreditaram-em-fake-news>. Accessed on: March 4, 2019.

VAROL, Onur et al. Online human-bot interactions: Detection, estimation, and characterization. In: *Eleventh international AAAI conference on web and social media*. 2017.

ZUBOFF, Shoshana. *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of Power*. New York: PublicAffair, 2019.

Recebido em 09/10/2019

Aprovado em 08/04/2021

Felipe da Veiga Dias

E-mail: felipevdias@gmail.com

Augusto Jobim do Amaral

E-mail: augusto.amaral@puccrs.br