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**THE INFERENTIAL ARCHITECTURE
UNDERLYING MEANING
IN WOODY ALLEN'S *MATCH POINT***

Porto Alegre
2007

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Organic life, we are told, has developed gradually from the protozoon to the philosopher, and this development, we are assured, is indubitably an advance. Unfortunately it is the philosopher, not the protozoon, who gives us this assurance.

Bertrand Russell – *Mysticism and Logic*

ABSTRACT

A semantics/pragmatics interface may resolve problems of indeterminacy of meaning. The current study attempts to suggest models of inferential architecture based on Grice's Amplified Model, as proposed by Costa (1984, 2004), and on the Relevance Theoretic Framework, as envisaged by Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995), for analyzing and interpreting Woody Allen's *Match Point* (2005). Concomitantly, an empirical investigation takes place. Findings seem to suggest that meaning is inferentially processed on the basis of non-trivial logical deduction, and that the more viewers are able to predict and relate, the higher their understanding of a cinematic text will be.

Key words: semantics/pragmatics interface, inference, implicature, Woody Allen's *Match Point*

RESUMO

Uma interface entre a semântica e a pragmática pode resolver problemas de indeterminação de significado. O presente estudo almeja sugerir modelos de arquiteturas inferenciais com base no Modelo Ampliado de Grice, proposto por Costa (1984, 2004) e no Arcabouço Teórico da Relevância, como vislumbrado por Sperber e Wilson (1986, 1995), para analisar e interpretar *Match Point* (2005) de Woody Allen. Concomitantemente uma investigação empírica se desenvolve. Os resultados parecem sugerir que o significado é processado inferencialmente, com base na lógica dedutiva não-trivial e que quanto mais um expectador for capaz de fazer relações e previsões, maior será o seu entendimento sobre o texto cinematográfico.

Palavras-chave: interface semântica/pragmática, inferência, implicatura, *Match Point* de Woody Allen

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1 INTRODUCTION

First and foremost, the current study characterizes Linguistic Theory as being essentially interdisciplinary. Consequently, the present research will foment the idea that interfaces, both internal and external, are necessary to attain its main objective; that is resolving problems of indeterminacies of meaning.

As a matter of fact, the quest for the nature of meaning in natural language has been an inexhaustible source of studies since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers to present days. More recently, a little over a century ago, logicians, philosophers and linguists have promoted significant contributions to the aforementioned search by investigating grounds that had never been fronted before. Such grounds, initially seen as unstable and slippery, gradually started to become more accurately demarcated and solidified, inciting a few bold ones to venture into them and explore natural language through a more powerful magnifying glass, which enabled the semantic sub-theory to get a complementary ally in its search for signification – the pragmatic sub-theory.

The present theoretical study aims at analyzing the way in which implicit meaning underlying Woody Allen's *Match Point*¹ is obtained. For carrying out this intent, it is divided into three chapters: the first one begins to delineate a panorama on the evolution of the pragmatic theory from its classical period, when pragmatics appeared sort of uncommitted with any scientific methodology until the 1950's, when it began to undergo some degree of systematization by being characterized as the study of language in use. From then on, the modern period took its course, allowing pragmatics to evolve considerably. Contributions promoted by Austin (1962), who envisaged language in use as a form of action and not a mere way to describe reality, Searle (1969), who prompted the reformulation of Austin's Speech Acts theory, the theory of implicatures conceived by the philosopher Paul Grice (1975), and the Relevance theoretic framework as proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986), cast new light onto the matter of signification advertising that an interface between semantics and pragmatics was the means by which the quest for meaning should be achieved. From then on, newer contributions have appeared such as the ones fostered by Bach (1994), who devised the concepts of implicature in juxtaposition to explicature and the ones offered by Levinson

¹ *Match Point*. Written and directed by Woody Allen. PlayArte Home Video, Brasil, 2006.

(2000) with his notion of presumptive meanings. Although these latest contributions have fostered additional advances to pragmatics, they will not take part in this study, which is solely based upon the fundamental cornerstones of the sub-theory; i.e., inferences and implicatures.

The chapter advances and Grice's theory comes into the foreground, establishing an external interface between semantics/pragmatics (the former accounts for logical entailments and the latter is in charge of pragmatic implicatures) and formal sciences. Grice's essential notion of the implicatures of natural language such as speakers' meaning and implicatures are developed along with communicative conventions outlined by his cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation. A sub-section to explore the properties of implicatures comprising calculability, cancelability, non-detachability, among others is elaborated as well.

The chapter gets to its closure with the introduction of Sperber and Wilson's RT (Relevance Theory), which enables the semantic/pragmatic sub-theories to undergo interface with natural sciences. RT accounts for a cognitive approach to pragmatics, where meaning is inferentially processed. The underlying concepts of its theoretic framework, including the notion of relevance, ostensive stimulus, cognitive environment, contextual effects and ostensive inferential communication are outlined, nurturing the qualitative idea that relevance is a low cost/higher benefit property and that comprehension is non-demonstratively determined. Both Grice's and S&W's RT will enable a further connection, namely an interface between semantics/pragmatics and social sciences (encompassing communication).

The second chapter presents and contrasts architectural designs for modeling inferential calculation that will serve as basic tools for analyzing Woody Allen's film. Initially, Grice's Classical Model for inferential calculation is introduced and exemplified, followed by its reformulation, as envisaged by Costa (1984, 2004), being entitled Grice's Amplified Model. Finally, the RT model is also proposed and illustrated. After such models are presented, an additional interface between cinema and literature is incited, disclosing an account of the quintessential factors that promote inference generation in both types of communicative mediums.

The third chapter handles Woody Allen's *Match Point*. The instigation for approaching the inferential architecture underlying meaning in this cinematic text lies behind the phenomenon that its author, nominated 'the most European of the American filmmakers', is not usually appreciated by audiences who are neither in tune with his modus operandi of presenting his views on the role and pursuits of man in the world, nor totally acquainted with his fancy contextual models that, in this particular film, may presuppose the viewers to

establish connections with a diversified range of specific background knowledge such as: tennis, Fiodor Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, opera arias and extracts, London locations, not to mention an array of polemic themes ranging from luck versus determinism, to ethics and morality. As a consequence, his movies are commonly referred to as 'box office poison', influencing the American and Latin American moviegoing audience to have a negative appraisal on them, or even avoid watching them at all, possibly because of the higher effort demanded for processing the interpretation of many of the utterances that corroborate to yield positive cognitive effects.

Before the analysis of *Match Point* takes its due course, extra linguistic components are gathered into a database that will include facts about Woody Allen's life and his films, information about this particular cinematic text such as the setting, characters' insights, themes and the sort of intertextuality that this movie entails. Such a database will be partially accountable for modeling the film context and guide the possible readers of the current research to draw further considerations as to the communicative intentness comprised within it.

Concomitantly with the film analysis, an empirical investigation involving ten subjects (five male and five female) who had never been exposed to *Match Point* before is going to be described, aiming at evincing the sort of calculations these subjects were more likely to undertake for attaining comprehension.

The present study apparently seems to contribute to the line of research that it is inserted into (Logic and Natural Language) for introducing the incipient notion of 'convergent implicatures' – attributable to correlated objects (animate or inanimate) that are prone to lead someone to make use of exactly the same set of implicated premises for deriving distinct implicated conclusions.

Finally, the findings of the current research are reported and considerations are drawn about the hypotheses it intended to validate, namely that meaning is inferentially processed, that indeterminacies of meaning can be resolved by means of an interface between semantics and pragmatics and that the more viewers are likely to predict and relate, the more recovery of the director/writer's intentions there is, and the more positive cognitive effects.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 THE ORIGINS OF PRAGMATICS

According to Yule (2003), pragmatics is a branch of the linguistic theory that is concerned with the study of meaning by a speaker/writer and its interpretation by a listener/reader.

Since its beginnings, pragmatics has appeared with an interdisciplinary character, for linguists, logicians, mathematicians and philosophers showed a tendency to push to the edges any phenomena that had to do with everyday language use, thus generating a sort of wastebasket that comprised all sorts of evidence that could not be dealt within the formal systems of language analysis.

Therefore, the initial *mise-en-scène* for the appearance of the pragmatic sub theory was characterized by the presence of unwanted material that could neither be investigated by means of purely structural (syntactical) processes nor merely determined by the truth-conditions (semantics) of its propositional content. Let's exemplify this situation a little further. Consider the sentence underneath.

[1] The piano played Chopin and silence reigned supreme.

From a syntactic standpoint, this sentence is correct since it abides by all the rules that establish its proper structure and rules out any inappropriate ordering such as 'Played the Chopin piano'.

On the other hand, as far as semantics is concerned, there are a few setbacks. First, both the verbs 'played' and 'reigned' require an animate entity as their subjects; a condition that can not be satisfied by either 'the piano' or by 'silence', not to mention that the verb 'play', in the sense utilized, does also require an inanimate entity as its internal argument, condition which is not contended by the animate noun 'Chopin'. Second, the verb 'play' in the sense of 'playing a musical instrument' entails a non-silent action that goes against the second proposition 'silence reigned', even though, while considering the truth-conditions of

the propositions (p & q) expressed by the sentences ‘The piano played Chopin’ and ‘silence reigned supreme’, it could be asserted by all means whatsoever that if p is true and q is also true, so will p & q.

As one may see, sentence [1] exemplifies a case of more being communicated than actually is said. This simple case, as well as many others dealing with the everyday world of language use, can illustrate the sort of left over material that was unlikely to be investigated just by formal approaches to language analysis.

In accordance with Costa (1984, 2004), Gottlob Frege (1892) was apparently one of the first scholars to detect that presupposition should be connected to context use. According to Penco (2006), Frege posited that logic, as a science that deals with the rules and tests of sound thinking as well as proof by reasoning, should bear the purpose of serving as an instrument for analyzing both scientific and natural language. From this onset, Frege contemplated that every sort of linguistic expression comprised in logical language should have a sense and a reference. Thus, every linguistic expression (singular term or ‘proper name’ as used by Frege) must refer to a single object, expressing that the use of a ‘proper name’ (singular term) must necessarily presuppose the existence of the individual (object) denoted by its name and that every linguistic predicate must refer as well to the conceptual relations and properties specified by such a name. Such a notion of context provided grounds for a semantic distinction between the truth-conditions expressed by the terms in logical language and by the terms (names) in natural language. While truth in the former is warranted by the signification of the variables, in the latter is assumed based upon a certain degree of extra linguistic intuition.

These Fregean postulates for logical theory are based on the principle of compositionality, which states that both the sense and reference of the parts determine the sense and reference of the whole statement. From these premises, Frege asserted that if a sentence contains a term with no reference, the whole sentence is devoid of reference as well, since it has no truth-value, being neither true nor false.

Taking into account the abovementioned consideration, Penco (2006) also states that Bertrand Russell (1905) rebelled against such an idea, insisting that Frege’s mistake lay in holding that names have both a sense and a reference.

Penco (2006) also states that Russell conceived a theory where the meaning of a proper name should be exclusively restricted to its reference to an object. Such a point of view advocated that proper names, in natural language, are abbreviations of defined descriptions lacking any kind of property. In his 1905 article entitled *On Denoting*, Russell came up with

his ‘Theory of Descriptions’, which attempted to uncover the real logical forms that lie behind the accidental and irrelevant linguistic forms present in natural language. In accordance with Monk (1997), Russell expressed that ‘denotation’ is a notion quite different from ‘reference’. By referring Russell meant the sort of linguistic relation between a word or a string of words and one object, for example between a name and a person. On the other hand, according to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, proper names do not possess a denoting capability as such ability can only be attributed to concepts. Therefore, denoting in natural language is never obtained by means of a name, but only by a conceptual description. His theory asserts that every and each denotative sentence is in its nature devoid of meaning. In other words, denotative sentences are ‘incomplete symbols’ which may just acquire meaning within a propositional context.

Goldstein et alii (2007) assert that Russell’s reasoning appeared to be more epistemological than semantic, since to truly nominate a thing seems to suggest a very close epistemological relationship to such a thing, an intimate acquaintance, as said by Russell, with this thing. From such assertions, Russell derived that things which one is not especially acquainted with can never be nominated. At the same time, Russell also affirmed that only ‘sense data’ (sprung from perception or sensation) may indeed provide such a familiar relationship with objects. Thereupon, Russell concluded that since most things labeled by a name are not sense data in their essence, they are not really names but a plethora of defined descriptions in disguise.

Levinson (1983: 172) professes that “Russell’s analysis remained largely unchallenged until Strawson (1950) proposed a quite different approach”. But for chronological purposes, Strawson’s approach will be dealt with later on when the 1950’s come into the foreground.

Costa (1984, 2004) as well as Marcondes (2005) state that Morris was actually the first philosopher to officially come up with the term pragmatics. Most likely influenced by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce’s work on semiotics (1897), Morris (1938) devised a semiotic triangle to explain the function of signs in language analysis. In accordance with Morris’ model, the three vertices of such a semiotic triangle would be accountable for differing processes in relation to the use of signs. In terms of this view, signs in language should take into account the type of relation between one another (an area accountable to syntax), the relation between signs with the objects they refer to (a domain pertaining to semantics) and the relation between signs and their users (a branch covered by pragmatics). So, as stipulated by Morris, ‘pragmatics’, as opposed to semantics and syntax, is a branch of

semiotics that deals with the relation between signs or linguistic expressions and their users, as well as the way such signs are interpreted and made use of by their users.

Marcondes (2005) also adds that traditionally, both syntax and semantics were paid higher attention to. On one hand, syntax studies the relations among the several signs and how these basic linguistic unities are connected to each other to form complete propositions. Therefore, syntactic theory is characterized as a formal science that defines the rules for forming propositions, as abstract entities, from the set of possible combinations among the different signs. Closely related to syntax is semantics that is concerned with the relation between the signs and the objects they refer to, aiming at attaining the meaning of those linguistic signs. As such, semantic theory is concerned with the meaningful content of the signs and the truth-conditions of the propositions in which these signs are inserted into. On the other hand, pragmatics had appeared in this context sort of uncommitted with a specific scientific methodology to study language in use, being utterly dependable upon differing contexts.

As attested by Marcondes (2005), The German philosopher Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) resumed Morris' studies and started developing a little further the distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics as fields of study for language analysis. In 1942 he brought into the light the consideration that a pragmatic study of language would seem misleading since the heterogeneity and multiplicity of possible uses of linguistic expressions would plausibly compromise a more systematic and theoretical approach to language. For Carnap, every pragmatic attempt to analyze language would presuppose an abstraction and generalization of such an array of multiple uses, striving to obtain common elements to address language more methodically. According to Carnap, syntax and semantics should really deserve higher homage as scientific theories for being able to convert concrete language in use into more abstract levels of generalization. Thus, Carnap stated that semantics could de facto have autonomy for abstracting specific variations of usage and drawing considerations about the meaning of the terms, apart from their uses. And as for syntax, Carnap believed that its task consisted in abstracting meaning so that linguistic expressions could be handled as mere classes of signs for deriving the formal rules by which such categories interrelate.

It was not until the early 1950's that such a pessimistic view about a pragmatic approach to language analysis began to change.

As previously mentioned, Peter Strawson (1950) came up with a different interpretation for analyzing language with no disregard or sign of contempt for its possible

uses. Levinson (1983) sheds light into his proposal by highlighting the most significant conclusions that Strawson got to while scrutinizing Russell's aphorisms.

In 1905, Russell tried to provide an explanation for the fact that sentences that lacked proper referents, like for example [1], could be meaningful.

[1] The high priestess of Delphi is sick

According to Russell, sentence [1] can indeed be meaningful if just taken to be a false assertion, since the 'the high priestess of Delphi' professes the existence of such an individual (despite the fact there are no such high priestesses in Delphi in present-day terms). Succeeding Russell's view, Strawson (1950) rejected it holding that Russell failed in distinguishing sentences from the uses of sentences to make statements. Following this view, he asserted that what can be taken as true or false are not sentences but utterances. Therefore, the statement uttered in [1] could very well be true in 2000 B.C. and false by A.D. 1640. What actually mattered, Strawson argued, is that there is a noteworthy relationship between [1] and [2]:

[1] The high priestess of Delphi is sick

[2] There is a present-day high priestess of Delphi

That is to say, "that [2] is a precondition for [1] being judged as either true or false" (LEVINSON, 1983:172). Such a particular relationship, as advocated by Strawson, is different in nature from logical implications or entailments, deriving solely from complex conventions about the utilization of referring expressions in day-by-day language. Hence, Strawson (1950) started denominating such sort of presuppositional relationship between [1] and [2] as pragmatic inferences, expressing that linguistic expressions in ordinary language do not abide by the same Russellian rules, applicable to logical language.

From then on, in conformity with Marcondes (2005), the pragmatic theory started unfolding into two lines of development within philosophy of language parameters: one dealing specifically with deixis or indexical expressions and the other considering semantic meaning as determined by language in use.

Following the first line, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1954) asserted that indexical expressions (comprising both personal and demonstrative pronouns as well as time and place adverbs) are

dependable upon the context so that their meaningful content may have their reference figured. For instance:

[1] They are coming here tomorrow

The understanding of such a sentence may not be entirely attainable if the reference of the indexical expressions ‘they’, ‘here’ and ‘tomorrow’ are not taken into account. Therefore, one may comprehend how vital it is to specify the context in which the sentence was uttered.

Pragmatics, according to this view, should contemplate both the contribution of such indexical expressions as well as the need for interpreting them within the context of use, so that the semantic meaning of the sentences in which they are applied may be thoroughly attended to.

The second line also considers the notion of context and conceives the idea that language is a form of action and not a way of describing reality.

In tune with this line, Marcondes (2005) declares that the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1899-1951) developed predominantly in his ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (1953) what may be fancied as a pragmatic conception. He contended the meaning of a word as an indication of its use within a certain context and introduced the notion of ‘language game’. From this standpoint, Wittgenstein envisaged that meaning should not be construed as something stable and settled, inherently derived from word properties, but as a function that linguistic expressions exert upon a particular context with definite goals. Taking his assertions into account, the meaning of words may vary to a great extent depending on the context in which a certain expression is used as well as the intentness comprised in such use. Bearing such considerations in mind, Wittgenstein concluded that the traditional semantic view was incorrect, namely that words are not used for describing reality but for achieving a well-established purpose such as making a request, greeting, thanking, *inter alia*.

Penco (2006) sates that Wittgenstein, in full agreement with the Fregean postulate expressing that a name can just refer inside the context in which it is utilized, stressed the belief that natural language is indissolubly tied with a context of actions, uses and social conventions. From such a close link with Frege’s ideas, Wittgenstein came up with the notion of his ‘language game’ – “a language game is a context of actions and words in which an expression may be meaningful” (PENCO, 2006:135).

Just like in any sort of game such as chess, tennis or poker, the use of the term ‘game’ may imply different rules or even different characterizations, still it is possible to hold that all of these games may possess some trivial features that enable one to get closer (to a higher or smaller degree) to the other. Similarly, in language games words or expressions must be used in accordance with the rules that define the dos and do nots as to the proposed objectives. Hence, such usage rules (as a matter of fact pragmatic rules) make possible to ascribe the sort of actions carried out by the players (speakers, writers). Analyzing the meaning of words consists in situating them within the context of the game in which they appear and drawing considerations about what the players intend to do with them.

The language games proposed by Wittgenstein have decisively contributed to the development of philosophy of language by casting broader light into the idea that what is apposite to language analysis are the functions that words may exert upon the language games. Pursuing this view, rules of usage may define the purpose and the way in which words can be utilized, at the same time they may attribute the circumstances under which such usages may be employed.

Costa (1984, 2004) argues that Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ furnished one of the epistemological grounds for the appearance of the contemporary theories about the meaning of words. In fact, Costa also asserts that up to Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ the pragmatic theory was in its classical period, characterized by incipient signs of its existence but without being properly approached. From the 1960’s on, the modern period takes its course and pragmatic phenomena starts to be more fully developed, hurrying theoreticians to define the scope and specific object of study appropriately ascribed to a pragmatic theory.

The first modern theory that attempted to explain pragmatic phenomena in a systematic manner was ‘The Speech Acts Theory’, proposed by the British philosopher John Langshaw Austin (1911-1960), and published posthumously in 1962.

According to Marcondes (2005), Austin tried to demonstrate that language in use could truly be regarded as the object of study for a systematic approach to pragmatics as long as suitably developed conceptual gears were applied.

Following this line, Austin (1962) held that speech acts are the basic constituents for using and interpreting natural language. He professed that speech acts are not mere sentences endowed with truth-conditions as conceived by the traditional semantic theories of meaning. Contrarily, he assumes that sentences are either used to describe facts and events as well as to perform something. The examples underneath provide an illustration of that.

[1] Jordan was smooching Debbie in the living room.

[2] I promise I will pay you as soon as I get the money.

While sentence [1] describes a fact and event that may be true or false in relation with the reality that it represents, sentence [2] performs the act of promising something without taking into account whether it is true or false, for not describing a mere fact. Depending on the circumstances in which it was uttered and the consequences of the realization of the act, one may regard sentence [2] as successful or unsuccessful.

Later on, Austin realized that such a dichotomy between representative and performative acts was rather inappropriate. He perceived that representative acts also possess a performative dimension, i.e., describing is also a speech act that may be successfully or unsuccessfully carried out. Simultaneously he noticed that performative acts also share a representative function, since they keep a closer connection with the fact that is likely to take place. From such evidences, Austin conceived a performative function of language that should be applicable to all natural language analysis. From this general assumption, Austin proposed that speech acts should be considered as the essential unities of signification, consisting of three articulated dimensions: the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act.

A. The Locutionary Act

All utterances comprise some sort of sense and reference. Such a feature is constituted by three distinct acts: the phonetic act, evincing what sounds are pronounced; the phatic act, comprising lexical and syntactical parameters which will determine the order in which words are pronounced, and the rhetic act, expressing that the words uttered will convey a sense and refer to something else.

B. The Illocutionary Act

An utterance is formed with some sort of function in mind such as offering, ordering or promising. The illocutionary act expresses the force of an utterance, so that the intentness comprised in it may be revealed.

C. The Perlocutionary Act

It is responsible for generating the effect intended by the illocutionary act, based on the assumption that the addressee will recognize the effect intended by the speaker.

One of the main objectives of Austin's theory is to define, in the sense of making explicit, the illocutionary force that is comprised within the intended speech act that was carried out, so that the identification of its typology may be attained.

Such a process relies on an array of presupposed conditions and circumstances for the successful realization of speech acts, consisting predominantly of a combination of speaker's intentions and social conventions. Speaker's intentions are thought to be subjective as well as socially determined, whereas social conventions come up with diversified degrees of formality, depending on the social event in which they are applied to. Such social conventions make up the explicit and/or implicit rules that determine the customary pattern of behavior that characterizes the speaker's successful way of socially interacting. Austin has technically denominated 'felicity conditions' such expected or appropriate circumstances for the performance of a speech act as intended by the speakers.

One of Austin's latest contributions to his 'Speech Acts Theory' was proposing the classification of the illocutionary forces comprised in utterances into five general types: declarations, representatives, expressives, directives, and commissives.

- A. Declarations – speech acts that change the world via their utterance.
Example: a. Priest: By the power invested in me I now pronounce you husband and wife.

- B. Representatives – speech acts that reflect the speaker's beliefs about the case or event. Representatives consist of statements, assertions, conclusions and descriptions, as illustrated below.
Example: a. The sun rises in the east and sets in the west.
 b. Nazis hate Jews.
 c. That was the hottest summer in my recollection.

- C. Expressives – speech acts expressing psychological states, determining the way the speakers feel.
Example: a. I'm really sorry to have disturbed you.
 b. Congratulations, honey!

- D. Directives – speech acts designed to get someone else to do something, expressing what the speakers want.

Example: a. Would you please close the damn door?
 b. Keep your mouth shut, little rascal.

E. Commissives – speech acts that express what the speakers intend to do in terms of future action.

Example: a. I'll crush your face just like a rotten potato.

As one may see, Austin was primarily concerned with devising a methodology that enabled implicit elements to be brought into the surface, so that philosophical problems could be dealt with by means of language in use. For him, language was a form of action that provided the means for the realization of acts through the use of words.

Some years later, the American philosopher John R. Searle resumed Austin's ideas, and as stated by Costa (1984,2004), predicated that meaning and illocutionary act should never be dealt with as synonyms. Bearing these assumptions in mind, Searle reformulated Austin's speech acts typology, coming up with:

- A. Utterance Acts – articulation of phonemes.
- B. Propositional Acts – speakers refers to an object, predicating something about it.
- C. Illocutionary Acts – assertions, promises, requests, inter alia.
- D. Perlocutionary Acts – the effect intended by an illocutionary act.

The reformulation of such components, as mentioned by Marcondes (2005), derives from the development of an initial idea proposed by Searle in *Speech Acts* (1969). In accordance with this idea, Searle attests that a speech act results from the combination of a proposition p , endowed with a specific semantic content, establishing its relation with world facts, thus likely to be either true or false, and an illocutionary force f that is added to the proposition, so that the performance of a speech act may be carried out. Consider the ensuing statements.

[1] The company is shut down.

[2] Shut down the company.

[3] If the company were shut down....

Statement [1] contains exactly the same propositional content of statement [2] (imperative) and statement [3] (conditional). The difference among such utterances lies in the sort of illocutionary force that is incremented to the same propositional content.

For analyzing the dissimilarities found among the different types of speech acts, one must take into consideration not only the utterance itself and the semantic meaning of the terms and expressions employed. It is also essential to proceed the identification of contextual elements such as the role of the speaker, the set of situational rules and procedures that are demanded under a specific circumstance, whether the participants of the social interaction are abiding by such rules, and the intentions and objectives of both the speakers and the listeners.

Following this vein, it is possible to assert that the Speech Acts Theory encompasses extra linguistic components that are fundamental for the realization of such acts. Thus, from this pragmatic outlook on the theory that envisages language as a communicative act, one may assert the need for allying the context in use with linguistic components in a manner that the analysis of meaning may be more thoroughly grasped. In other words, The Speech Acts Theory promotes the understanding that a pragmatic approach to the analysis of language must be inserted along the semantic and syntactic pathway in order to enable that implicit meaning be inferred conjoined with the explicit meaning of words, their syntactic alignment and the truth-conditions of the propositions in which they appear.

Along with the Speech Acts Theory, Grice's Theory of Implicatures and the Relevance Theoretical Framework, proposed by Sperber and Wilson (both specified in the ensuing sections), have constituted the essential cornerstones for the modern developments of a pragmatic sub theory, attempting to attribute to it the status of an interdisciplinary science with a well-defined object of study, and aiming at helping uncovering indeterminacies of meaning.

Levinson (1983) observes that semantic content seems likely to be the solid basis over which other displays of meaning strike. From this assertion as well as from verified linguistic phenomena that indicate the need of conjoined efforts between semantics and pragmatics, Costa (1984, 2004) also endorses the view that the pragmatic theory is meant to complement the semantic pathway. Such an interface between a semantic theory that considers the logical truth-conditions of propositions, and a pragmatic theory anchored on Grice's Theory of Implicatures as well as Sperber and Wilson's inferential/cognitive model delimitates the scope in which the current study is going to be based on. Thereupon, the present theoretical study aims at demonstrating as well that while entailments should be handled by semantic means, implicatures should be dealt with via pragmatics.

2.2 GRICE'S THEORY OF IMPLICATURES

The British philosopher Henry Paul Grice (1913-1988) came up in the late 1950's with a semantic theory that established the distinction between speaker's meaning and the literal one. Bearing such considerations in mind, in 1967 he launched an article entitled *On Logic and Conversation* (published in 1975) that has impacted admirably the development of the pragmatic theory, for introducing a highly efficient conceptual system to handle signification in natural language and distinguishing when to make use of strictly logical procedures for language analysis.

In that article, Grice introduces a new approach to deal with implicit meanings that are commonly found in the utterances of people engaged in conversation. He points out that implicit meaning should be understood as the amount of extra linguistic elements that are beyond the literal meaning expressed by the words and sentences uttered by the speakers. Still, it is the sort of meaning that in most cases the addressee is able to uncover naturally, but within the realm of linguistic studies, only a pragmatic sub theory would be able to properly deal with, since it is the type of meaning that is dependable upon the conversational context in which words and sentences are attached to.

From this line of reasoning, one might consider that 'literal meaning' is what is said explicitly by the chain of words articulated by the speakers, while 'speaker's meaning' or 'meaning-*nn*', as proposed by Grice, could possibly be defined as what is 'not said', being prone to be inferred by the addressee on the basis of contextual evidences. From this onset, Grice comes up with a technical nomenclature, instituting the terms 'implicate', 'implicatum' and 'implicature' in order to compile around them an explanatory system of signification for handling the meaning of what is 'not said'.

In accordance with Grice's postulates, such an additional meaning does not alter in conformity with the listener's interpretation of what is said; unlikely, meaning-*nn* can undergo calculation by taking into account the set of sentences that were actually said as the dialogue unfolded. Paraphrasing Faria (1999), it is the context promoted by the conversational piece that provides sufficient and necessary grounds for the addressee's understanding that the speaker intended to say $p + q$, when actually they said just p .

For Grice, there are two fundamental kinds of implicatures: conventional and conversational. The ensuing examples illustrate them.

[1] Angus is Scotch. Therefore, he is closefisted.

[2] He is rich but not stuffy.

‘Conventional Implicatures’ are those that are not necessarily dependent on the conversational context, and their signification is imparted on the basis of explicit presuppositions derived from the use of certain lexical items.

Thence, statement [1] explicitly says that Angus is Scotch and also that he is closefisted. The connective ‘therefore’ generates such a conventional implicature because it imparts the presupposition or stereotyped notion that Scottish people are closefisted by nature, something that was evidently not literally said but conventionally implied.

Example [2] also implies that the rich are stuffy, although not said literally but inferred from the use of the connective ‘but’.

As Costa (1984,2004) asserts, conventional implicatures result from the illocutionary force imparted on certain lexical items, being therefore easily inferred by the participants of a speech act.

[3] (Student) What do you really think about my master’s paper?

(Professor) You presented your ideas so well that I think you should seriously consider a career outside academic life.

The above example illustrates a conversational implicature, which is dependant on the conversational context and determined by general principles of the communicative exchange, as proposed by Grice. Before defining it in a more accurate manner, let’s just say for the moment that in example [3] the professor’s reply to the student’s question is ironic. In accordance with the context, it implies that the student’s written production was so poor that he or she should entirely reconsider the options at hand and direct his/her efforts to another area of expertise; one which preferably does not involve academic research. Such signification is by no means literally comprised in the professor’s utterance, but easily inferred by the addressee on the grounds of logical reasoning and contextual evidences.

Before contemplating the conceptual idea of conversational implicature, it is mandatory to address what Grice denominated the ‘Cooperative Principle’ and the ‘maxims of conversation’.

Taking into account that data exchange is the utmost purpose of conversation, Grice (1975) proposes a theoretical rational scheme that accounts for cooperative ends in conversation. Such a theoretical model states that in conversation, people do not merely utter sentences in a haphazard fashion; rather, they abide by certain conventional as well as conversational principles. These principles seem to be subconsciously accepted and followed by speakers/writers. The definition of Grice's cooperative principle may be stated as follows: contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of the verbal exchange.

Grice (1989) claims that the cooperative principle stands for the set of specific logical assumptions about the cooperative nature of ordinary verbal interaction, and such a cooperative nature intrinsically implies that speakers should use language sincerely (maxim of quality), perspicuously (maxim of manner) and relevantly (maxim of relevance), while providing sufficient information (maxim of quantity) in order to converse in an efficient, rational, cooperative way.

The scheme that follows underneath reports the maxims of conversation in a more suitable form.

- A. Maxim of Quantity – refers to the quantity of information that must be provided in a message, being divisible into two sub maxims: (I) Make your contribution as informative as it is required for the purposes of the exchange. (II) Do not make your contribution more informative than it is required.
- B. Maxim of Quality – refers specifically to making a contribution that is true, being related with two sub maxims: (I) Do not say what you believe to be false. (II) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
- C. Maxim of Relation – be relevant.
- D. Maxim of Manner – refers to being clear enough so that the message may be effectively conveyed. It is connected with the following sub maxims: (I) Avoid obscurity of expression. (II) Avoid ambiguity. (III) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). (IV) Be orderly.

Although Grice attests that there may be other maxims such as the maxim of politeness, he professes that in communication the four above-quoted maxims are enough to guarantee and deal with the phenomenon designated as conversational implicature.

Levinson (1983) revisits Grice's theory asserting that in communicating, people utilize a set of specific logical assumptions originated from basic rational considerations that guide

the conduct of conversation. Such rational assumptions, or conversation maxims, can be treated as sub principles of the cooperative principle, serving as general guidelines for an effective use of language in conversation to improve cooperative exchanges.

In accordance with Grice (1975), while communicating people may handle the cooperative principle in at least two different ways, depending on how speakers relate themselves to the conversation maxims: (1) If speakers are observing the maxims in a direct way, they may rely on the addressee to amplify what they say by means of unequivocal inferences denominated 'generalized conversational implicatures' and 'conventional implicatures', which are not necessarily dependent on the conversational context, and while the former are thought to take into account the logical standard meaning presented by speakers' utterances, the latter are assumed to be explicit presuppositions derived from the use of certain lexical items. (2) If speakers deliberately and ostensibly flout some of the maxims in order to explore them for communicative purposes, they make use of inductive inferences within the context, being thus entitled 'particularized conversational implicatures' or simply 'implicatures'. GRICE (1989:30) predicates that "when people flout the maxims, we have implicatures". Such floutings of the maxims may generate many figures of speech such as irony and metaphor, which in turn will lead listeners on to a broader range of distinctive deductive inferences.

In *Studies in the Way of Words* (1989), Grice claims that for figuring out the additional conveyed meaning of a certain implicature, the listener will rely on the following evidences:

- (1) The conventional meaning of the words uttered;
- (2) The cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation;
- (3) The linguistic context of the utterance;
- (4) One's background knowledge (culturally pre-existing knowledge structures that are used to interpret new experiences);
- (5) The fact that all these previous relevant items are part of both the speaker and addressee's mutual knowledge.

Following Costa's trail (1984, 2004), there appears to be three distinct situations that may yield implicatures, depending on how the speakers relate themselves to the cooperation principle.

I. No maxim is flouted

[1] (A) – I surely could use a drink.

(B) – There's a pub two blocks away.

[2] (A) – I can't find one of my shoes.

(B) – Come on Cinderella, let's go!

In both examples (B) seems liable to be respecting the cooperation principle, despite the fact the maxim of relevance appears to be breached. As a matter of fact, (A) is able to figure out the conversational implicature just because he/she unconsciously believes that (B) is abiding by the rules of the conversation.

In [1], (A) figures out that (B) is saying that there is a pub close by because (A) believes that (B) is implying the pub must be open and selling beverages that may provide a good solution for the satisfaction of the desire stated by (A). Example [2] is a little more refined in the sense that (A) perceives that (B) is being cooperative, and by providing a cultural context mutually known by (A) and (B) that comprises the knowledge that Cinderella, as a fairy tale character who loses one of her crystal shoes, is being comparable to (A) for the reason of not being able to find one of his/her shoes. At the same time, (A) can infer that (B) is being ironic and conveying the explicit message that there is no more time to spare, simultaneously with the implicit one that (A) must find a fast solution for the shoe matter.

II. A maxim is flouted so that another one may be not

[1] (A) How can I say 'thank you' in Czech?

(B) I'm not a walking encyclopedia.

[2] (A) Don't you think my girlfriend is hot?

(B) For me, my buddies' girlfriends are just like one of the guys.

Both examples illustrate that the replies provided by (B) flout the maxim of quantity, since they are not as informative as demanded by the conversation piece. What seems to be

most likely is that speakers (B) are replying in this manner to imply that they are unable or unwilling to provide a more satisfactory answer to (A)'s requests. In case [1], instead of providing an accurate answer, (B) decided to respect the maxim of quality by offering a vague answer that conveys an implicit yet clear message that he/she is unable to come up with the desired answer, for not possessing the necessary information required. In case [2], a simple yes/no reply to (A)'s question would suffice. Instead, (B) opts for flouting the maxim of quantity as well as the maxim of relevance in an attempt to keep himself uncommitted with the possible unfoldings of (A)'s request. It seems that, by providing a neutral answer to (A), speaker (B) is unwilling to express what he really thinks about (A)'s girlfriend. His reply may not be regarded as an insult; one as if it asserted that his buddy's girlfriend looks like a man or lacks the degree of femininity, commonly attributable to women. On the contrary, speaker (A) may infer among several other possibilities that his friend (B) is refusing to provide the requested answer just because he does not wish to offend him by saying something inappropriate such as 'your girlfriend is a dog; really ugly' or 'she's so delicious I could eat her with a spoon'.

III. A maxim is flouted in order to generate a conversational implicature

Figures of speech as attested by Costa (1984, 2004) generally fall under this case.

A. Maxim of quantity is flouted due to lack of information

[1] (A) In your opinion, who is better George Bush or Hugo Chaves?

(B) A nazi is a nazi.

The tautology expressed by (B)'s statement violates the maxim of quantity by being utterly redundant. Yet, (B) is being cooperative and saying more than actually he/she did. As a matter of fact, (B) is implying that both Bush and Chaves are as catastrophic to their countries as nazis were for Germany along the period of World War II. By making use of such tautology, speaker (A) may infer that speaker (B) is expressing that both presidents are fascist dictators who aim the autocratic centralization of government for attaining personal objectives of their own. Such a tautological reply may also imply that speaker (B) thinks that Bush is just as bad as Chaves.

B. Maxim of quantity is flouted due to excess of information

[2] (A) How are you doing?

(B) I lost my job, my husband left me, I was evicted and I've just found out I got leukemia.

Such an excessive amount of information comprised in (B)'s reply is possibly meant to imply that her life is going really badly. By emphasizing all the misfortunes that have befallen upon (B), speaker (A) may also gauge the level of stress, anxiety and desperation that (B) is undergoing.

C. Maxim of quality is flouted due to false assumptions

[3] (A) Does she really love you?

(B) Yeah. As much as an ulcer.

This example characterizes what is known as irony. (B)'s reply expresses something that he does not believe to be true; namely that the woman mentioned in (A)'s question really loves him. Nobody loves an ulcer, apart from masochists. Therefore, by stating something that is held to be contrary to the truth, speaker (B) is actually implying the opposite, i.e. she does not love him.

[4] (A) Are you cold?

(B) My feet are like blocks of ice.

Example [4] characterizes a metaphor. Both (A) and (B) bear in mind that a foot can not be a block of ice, except for sculpting purposes in very stern climates. Therefore, (B)'s reply implies the assumption that he/she is feeling his/her feet extremely cold.

[5] (A) You look awful! Have you been crying?

(B) I cried a river of tears.

This example illustrates what is known as hyperbole; an extravagant exaggeration used as a figure of speech. Speaker (A) clearly understands that speaker (B) has implied that he/she cried a great deal, in spite of holding that it is not humanly possible to cry as much as required by the water volume of a river.

D. Maxim of quality is flouted due to lack of appropriate evidence

[6] (A) What is Angelina Jolie doing these days?

(B) She must be after some hot chick for fun.

Despite the fact there is lack of evidence to corroborate what (B) is saying, speaker (A) understands that (B) means to imply that the famous celebrity is a lesbian with a grand appetite for other beautiful women. Such implicatures may be derived from assumptions that come about by means of rumors, overgeneralizations based upon observation as well as other mediums.

E. Maxim of relation is flouted

[7] (A) How much do you earn in your current position?

(B) I must see the dentist.

(A) Hey, How much?

(B) I think I've got a cavity in one my molars.

It may be assumed in the abovementioned context that speaker (B) is deliberately flouting the maxim of relevance to imply that he is unwilling to answer (A)'s question. As the dialogue unfolds, (B) keeps on beating round the bushes as if (A) were interested about (B)'s dental problems so that (A) may figure that wild horses will not drag the answer out of him/her.

F. Maxim of manner is flouted due to ambiguity

[8] (A) Did you enjoy the food at the new Russian restaurant?

(B) The restaurant is lavishly decorated.

This case illustrates that (B)'s reply to (A)'s question is ambiguous. By stating that the decoration at the new Russian restaurant is lavish, (A) may infer that is the only good feature worth mentioning about the place. In other words, by saying nothing about the food, that is clearly the main topic of conversation, (B) may be implying that he did not enjoy the food he/she ate there.

G. Maxim of manner is flouted due to vagueness

[9] (Lloyd) Let's do that thing?

(Debbie) What thing are you talking about?

(Lloyd) That thing we like so much to do for relaxing.

(Debbie) Oh, that thing! Are you in the mood, naughty boy?

(Lloyd) I surely am.

Such a dialogue illustrates an intimate exchange between Debbie and Lloyd. Lloyd purposefully avoids saying what exactly 'that thing' is for a diversified number of possible reasons. Perhaps there may be some other people listening to what they are saying, or maybe 'that thing' is not supposed to be uttered because Lloyd does not want to sound blunt, or still Lloyd believes that by being subtle Debbie will acquiesce more easily to his desire. Despite the vagueness involved in 'that thing', Debbie infers what he is talking about and by hinting clues such as 'are you in the mood' and 'naughty boy', one may infer that perchance they are talking about sexual intercourse.

H. Maxim of manner is flouted due to lack of conciseness

[10] (A) What is a platypus?

(B) Platypus, plural form platypuses or platypi, is a small aquatic egg-laying mammal of Australia, also known as the 'land down under', with webbed feet and a fleshy bill like a duck's. The etymology of the word is New Latin, from Greek platypous meaning "flat-footed", from platys "broad, flat" plus pous "foot".

By answering in such a prolix manner, (B) may be implying that he /she is a true savant and parade around his/her level of specialization. At the same time, (A) might possibly infer that speaker (B) is conceited and loves showing off, among other possibilities.

I. Maxim of manner is flouted due to lack of order

[11] (A) Do you speak English very well?

(B) Me speak well very English.

Speaker (B) deliberately breaks the order to imply that he/she is not a fluent English speaker, or perhaps to imply that he/she speaks well but is teasing speaker (A).

2.2.1 Implicatures and Their Properties

Before systematizing the properties of the implicatures, it seems advisable to distinguish conventional implicatures from conversational implicatures. While the former are attached to the conventional force derived from the meaning of the linguistic expressions, and recognized by the listeners on the basis of their linguistic intuition, the latter are dependant on deductible calculation from the listener, so that their meaning may be attained. Grice (1989) attributes five properties to conversational implicatures: cancelability, calculability, non-detachability, non-determinability and non-conventionality, not to mention the fact that they may be carried by virtue of the manner of expression.

1. Cancelability

A conversational implicature is always susceptible to being cancelled since the due respect to the cooperative principle may be breached under a particular context or by the addition of an extra phrase. Examples [1] and [2] illustrate the respective cases.

[1] (A) John, can I borrow some aspirin?

(B) Don't do that!

Speaker (A) might have understood that (B) refused her request of borrowing aspirin. But (B) may be violating the cooperative principle just because (A) has messed up his work papers and, consequently, he utters a protest of indignation.

[2] (A) How many pets have you got?

(B) Two... two dogs and an iguana.

Initially (A) infers that (B) has got two pets and no more. But by adding the phrase ‘two dogs and an iguana’, (B) implies something else; namely that he/she has got three pets altogether. Thus, (A)’s initial inference is cancelled.

2. Calculability

Grice (1975) claims that every conversational implicature must be derived from logical calculation; i.e. from assumptions based on what is said by the speaker, the listener will get to deductible conclusions. For effectively attaining the desired conclusions, Grice provides a classical model of inferential calculation (dealt with in the next chapter) that supposedly follows a series of steps common to logical reasoning. For the moment, let’s consider the following example, somewhat plagiarized from Costa (1984, 2004).

[1] (A) My head is throbbing with pain.

(B) There’s a drugstore round the corner.

Believing that (B) is abiding by the cooperative principle, (A) reckons that if (B) said that there is a drugstore round the corner, it is because (B) intends to imply that: (A) had better go to the drugstore, the drugstore must be open, the drugstore must have headache medicine, (A) should acquire it, and that all these steps will help solving (A)’s problem.

3. Non-detachability

As mentioned before, conversational implicatures are not dependant upon the meaning of the words uttered. Non-detachability is a property that states the implicit content of a given utterance may be preserved if the expression(s) triggering it is (are) replaced by synonym expressions. Though largely disputable by Grice’s critics, who affirm the implicatures derived from floutings of the maxim of manner are immune to this property, let’s consider the examples underneath.

[1] (A) I’m so hungry I could eat a horse.

(B) Dinner will be ready soon.

[2] (A) I’m starving.

(B) The food is almost on the table.

Both exchanges warrant the same implied meaning; that is, the solution for (A)'s problem lies on waiting a little while until the food is ready to be served. Therefore, independently of the mode of expression utilized in [1] or [2], the same conversational implicature is attained.

4. Non-determinability

Metaphors epitomize the undeterminable character of conversational implicatures.

Example: (A) Jealousy - a green-eyed monster!

Such an utterance violates the maxim of manner, allowing the listeners to infer an open set of possible implied meanings. (A) could be implying that green as a color symbolizes envy, and that envy comes from the Latin expression *invidere*, closely connected with *videre* meaning to see, thus alluding to the green eyes. Still monster could be a symbol for an extremely wicked or cruel person. Therefore, one could claim that jealousy, in the sense of envy, turns a person into a wicked creature. Independently of the intended meaning, one may notice that the sort of calculation involved in this inference may lead listeners on to contemplate (A)'s utterance in a myriad of alternative ways, characterizing its indeterminacy. Only the context in which utterance (A) appeared may limit the choices of which inferences are more likely to take their course.

5. Non-conventionality

Such a property establishes the distinction between what Grice denominates conventional and conversational implicatures. As a matter of fact, Grice (1989) asserts that a conversational implicature is liable to become a conventional one, although the conventional force of the words attached to the utterance; namely, their semantic content should not interfere with it. Otherwise, if the semantic meaning were determinant in instantiating a conversational implicature, such implicature would necessarily need to forsake its cancelability property, since a true semantic proposition could never yield a false implicature.

Example

[1] (A) Do you enjoy Woody Allen?

(B) As much as my mother-in-law.

(B)'s reply triggers a conversational implicature, as (A) figures out that (B) is breaching the maxim of relevance for implying that he/she does not appreciate Woody Allen's films, and possibly that they could be as disagreeable as the presence of his/her mother-in-law. Such implied meaning is not determined by the literal meaning expressed in (B)'s utterance.

Conversational implicatures are not conveyed by what is said

As mentioned before the truth-conditions of a proposition cannot establish what is implied. From this assertion, it follows that what is said may be true while what is implied may be untrue. Consider the example below.

[1] (A) Kate, may I have your telephone number?

(B) Johnny, if you may, you may.

(B)'s reply depicts a tautology. Since all tautologies are true; i.e., $p = p$, the implied meaning proposed by (B) may be understood by (A) as a true one, suggesting something like this: since may, as a modal verb, implies contingency, (A)'s wishes may be granted. Nevertheless, it could be untrue if (B) had implied that although the possibility exists, she will not give (A) her telephone number. Therefore, even though what is said by (B) is true, the implication may be false, hinting that (A) will not get what he is after.

Grice (1989) also attests that conversational implicatures may be classified into two distinct groups: generalized conversational implicatures and particularized conversational implicatures.

A. Generalized Conversational Implicatures

Yule (2003:41) asserts that "when no special knowledge is required in the context to calculate the additional meaning," a generalized conversational implicature is generated. Consider the following example.

[1] (A) Did you talk to Sarah and Sam?

(B) I talked to Sam.

Independently from the context in which the exchange took place, (B)'s utterance implies that he/she only talked to Sam and not to Sarah.

A considerable number of other generalized conversational implicatures may be conveyed on the basis of a scale of values, being hence known as 'scalar implicatures'. Such implicatures promote the understanding that "when any form in a scale is asserted, the negative of all forms higher on the scale is implicated" (YULE, 2003:41). The example below illustrates the case.

[1] (A) I've been to most of the Scandinavian countries.

Such an utterance implies that (A) has not been to 'all' the Scandinavian countries.

B. Particularized conversational implicatures

Particularized conversational implicatures, usually referred to as just implicatures, are those dependent upon a particular context, so that the additional meaning comprised by them may be attained by means of inferential calculation. Example.

[1] (A) Evita is a saint!

(B) So is Madonna!

(B)'s reply may be understood as an ironic one, totally dependable upon the context. By comparing Madonna with Evita, speaker (B) presupposes the knowledge of a particular context, comprising a diversified number of possible assumptions such as: Evita refers to Eva Peron, wife of Juan Peron, former president and dictator of Argentina; she was formerly known as Eva Duarte, coming from obscure backgrounds and landing at disputable films and radio soap operas in Buenos Aires, she was supposedly known to get convenient favors in return for sex, while as the wife of the president, she helped leading Argentine's public finances to the doldrums, she got engaged in questionable enterprises such as the Eva Peron Foundation to raise funds for the people (and for herself), middle low classes in Argentina loved her for identifying her as one of them, after her death in her early thirties she fell under a spell of devotion and mysticism from the lower stratum of Argentine's society, getting the status of a saint. Simultaneously, such a context also comprises assumptions about Madonna such as: she is an American pop singer and movie star, in the 1980's and 1990's she was specially known for her extremely liberal ideas about sex, in a Central American country

where she performed a show, she was declared *persona non grata* for saying she loved the country as she erotically rubbed the nation's flag between her legs, she portrayed Evita in an American musical that portrayed an unflattering version of her life, among several other contextual data.

As one may notice, (B)'s utterance seems to imply that Evita is no saint, in the sense of a holy or godly person, due to the several possible contextual clues.

2.3 THE RELEVANCE THEORETIC FRAMEWORK

Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest in their Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) a model for information processing that is essentially inferential and non-demonstrative, and spontaneously ignited by all human beings. In such a model, communication is a cognitive process in which "a communicator provides evidence of (their) intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by (their) audience on the basis of the evidence provided" (WILSON and SPERBER, 2004:1).

One of the central goals in RT is developing one of Grice's main objectives: "that the expression and recognition of intentions is an essential feature of most human communication, both verbal and non-verbal" (GRICE 1989: Essays 1-7,14,18; Retrospective Epilogue). Unlike Grice, Sperber and Wilson (henceforth S&W) appear to look questionably at the need of the cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation for guiding the hearer's expectations towards the speaker's meaning. Instead they profess the preponderance of relevance as a super maxim, though in a quite different acceptance from the one proposed by Grice, dismissing all of his maxims as being somewhat immaterial for explaining the meaning intended by the speakers. Another aspect that the authors claim to be highly debatable in regard to Grice's axioms is the attributable magnitude of mutual knowledge in interpreting a speaker's utterance. For S&W (1995), misunderstandings occur because the mechanisms of verbal communication at best make prosperous communication probable, but do not warrant it. In spite of the fact that one can perfectly suppose that any two people must share a great deal of assumptions about the world, no one may gauge what is the degree of shared knowledge that would supposedly guarantee successful communication. Therefore,

unlike the code model that envisages mutual knowledge as a necessity, the inferential model suggested by S&W considers such a hypothesis as unjustifiable, leaving out the matter unanswered until a satisfactory alternative comes into the foreground.

In accordance with S&W (1995), their RT provides an elementary assumption about human communication: that each and every one of us will ultimately pay attention to what seems most relevant to us at a certain moment. Lamb (2004), paraphrasing S&W (1987), says that “every act of communication is a claim for other’s attention, generating an expectation of relevance”.

RT starts from a detailed account of relevance and its role in cognition. Relevance is defined as a property of inputs (whether external stimuli, which can be perceived and attended to, or internal representations, which can be stored, recalled, or used as premises in inference). An input is relevant to an individual when it connects with available contextual assumptions to yield Positive Cognitive Effects: for example, true contextual implications, or warranted strengthenings or revisions of existing assumptions.

(S&W, 2005:8)

According to RT, any internal representation or external stimulus, which renders an input to cognitive processes may be relevant to an individual somewhere in time. In their theory, S&W say that the search for relevance is a primal characteristic of human cognition, thus being considered as highly applicable by people engaged in communicative interactions.

Therefore, to better understand the role of relevance in RT, it seems important to delineate the fundamental elements comprised in its theoretic scope: ostensive stimuli, cognitive environment, and contextual effects.

Ostensive stimuli are external inputs such as sight, sound and utterances originated from physical acts, being able to attract the attention of the addressee as for the communicative intention of the agent who produced them. In this sense, an ostensive stimulus is a physical phenomenon that can provoke disturbance in a certain environment. Souza (2005) asserts that such environmental disturbances aim at attracting the listener’s attention as to the intentness comprised within the stimulus. Following this vein, relevance may be perceived intuitively as a matter of degree. Because people cannot give attendance to the innumerable potential inputs that they are exposed to, “RT claims that what makes an input worth picking out from the mass of competing stimuli is not just that it is relevant, but that it

is more relevant than any alternative input available to us at the time” (WILSON and SPERBER, 2004:3). Following this line, the theory postulates that the greater the effort to process a stimulus, the less relevant it will be, thus being the less deserving of one’s attention.

An individual’s cognitive environment consists of an open list of internal representations taken to be factual or plausible suppositions such as thoughts, memories, assumptions, or conclusions of inferences, which can be stored, recalled, or used as premises in new inferences. Consequently, an individual’s cognitive environment is composed of a context, which includes per se all the set of information that is accessible to someone such as socio cultural, historical and situational data, beliefs, desires, intuitions et al., constituting an individual’s world knowledge (comprising all sorts of declarative knowledge; i.e., knowledge such as background, lexical and grammatical to describe the state of things as well as episodic knowledge to narrate sequences of events). In addition to that, the cognitive environment also includes universal procedural knowledge such as the cognitive abilities of inferring and deducing by means of cognitive processing devices and particular procedural knowledge originated from experience and/or ability that demonstrates how actions are carried out.

In accordance with Carston (2002), a contextual effect is the cognitive outcome of a relevant interaction between a disturbing stimulus produced by an agent and a set of pre-existing suppositions in the addressee’s mind. Schröder and Perna (2006:4) say that “an input is relevant to an individual when it connects with some background information available that will enable worthwhile conclusions to be derived, i.e., when this individual’s representation of the world is altered”. In accordance with Ibaños (2005), contextual effects may be attained in three different ways:

- 1- By addition (when the interaction of new bits of information with preexisting ones generates a newer contextual implication, that is supposedly concluded to be right);
- 2- By strengthening (when new pieces of information supply a higher degree of evidence about pre-existing ones);
- 3- By elimination (when new data supply contrary evidence against the old ones).

In order to amplify (add), strengthen or eliminate contextual assumptions, one makes use of their encyclopedic knowledge (entries for events), lexical knowledge (entries for words, their meanings, and their syntactical and phonological features) and logical knowledge

(entries for deductive rules), which are stored at and retrieved from both their long-term memory as well as their working memory.

Escandell-Vidal (2004) states that while long-term memory is the type of memory whose task consists on building up and updating a database of the set of representations that are kept in memory store, working memory is the on-line memory responsible for accessing internalized assumptions available at a given moment, imposing adjustments to the input/output conditions of the inferential system. In accordance with Wikipedia (2008), long-term memory (LTM) is capable of holding meaningful chunks of information ranging from thirty seconds to as long as decades. On the other hand, Wikipedia (2008) predicates that working memory encompasses structures and processes used for temporarily storing and manipulating information that is prone to be transferred and/or incorporated to long-term memory.

Since it is a human cognitive tendency to pay attention to what seems to be most relevant in a given piece of information (cognitive principle of relevance), and process these bits of relevant data in a way to attain positive cognitive effects, communicators attempt to maximize their intentions by producing stimuli which will draw their addressee's attention, incite the retrieval of some contextual assumptions, and lead them towards an expected conclusion. Such a way of communicating is referred to as 'Ostensive-Inferential' and it constitutes the communicative principle of relevance stated by S&W (1995:158): "every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance".

RT also claims that such an ostensive-inferential model of communication presupposes two levels of intention: the informative intention (aiming at informing an audience of something) and the communicative intention (aiming at informing the audience of one's informative intention). Therefore, understanding is just attainable when the communicative intention is fulfilled, once the audience is aware of the communicator's informative intention.

S&W (1995) say that communication may be achieved in two supplementary manners:

1. Coding and decoding (the code model)
2. Supplying evidence for an intended inference deductible from the probable informative intention of a given speaker (the inferential model)

In the decoding phase, a linguistic encoded form is contextually enriched, and used as inferential input to build up a hypothesis about the communicator's informative intention. In the inferential phase, pieces of information obtained from linguistic decoding are combined with other contextual assumptions to yield new information. Therefore, inference is a processing device that operates on mental representations taken from linguistic and extra linguistic sources, accounting for the phenomenon that linguistic structure and background knowledge do actually interact with the purpose of promoting comprehension.

For this reason, it may be asserted that interpretation is an inferential process deductible from both the processing of linguistic decoded inputs and contextual assumptions, which in turn, will generate possible new interpretive outputs, and such a cognitive process implies that the more listeners/readers predict and relate, the more recovery of a speaker/writer's intentions there is, and the more positive cognitive effects.

Macagnan (2000) points out that RT account claims the pragmatic-cognitive processes to be of capital significance in the interpretation of communicative acts and their cognitive effects, for they help to reconstruct implicit propositional content, retrieve illocutionary force, and unravel problems of figurative interpretations and ambiguity among others. Such cognitive effects are highly context dependent, since different contextual assumptions might yield a diversified range of pragmatic interpretations.

Grounded on these indications, a relevance-guided axiom proposed by S&W (2004) is proposed:

- A. Pursue the course of least effort in establishing an utterance interpretation (especially in determining ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, in surpassing conventional linguistic meaning, in supplying contextual assumptions, figuring out implicatures, et cetera);
- B. Stop when your anticipations of relevance have been appeased.

The follow-up of this course predicts that an ostensive stimulus will be optimally relevant iff (if and only if) such a stimulus is relevant enough to incite the audience to process it, and if such a stimulus is the most relevant one, out of a set of given input, in conformity with the communicator's preferences and abilities.

Therefore, such a relevance-guided axiom submitted to the communicative principle of relevance, and the assumed conception of optimal relevance propose that the listener/reader should take the linguistically encoded sentence meaning and, by following a path of least effort, they should enrich it at the explicit level as well as complementing it at the implicit level until their expectation of relevance is suitably met.

There are some haphazard subtasks a hearer/reader must perform to recover the speaker/writer's intended meaning: the linguistic decoding of logical forms, the development of these logical forms by inferential processes of a pragmatic nature (explicature), and the construction of implicit premises and conclusions, which will lead to the generation of assumptions about the communicator's intentions (implicature).

According to Silveira and Feltes (1997), decoding is the construction of an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content making use of one's deductive rules of linguistic forms. Consider the example underneath.

(A) Whose funeral is it?

(B) Juanita stabbed Esteban badly and burned his house.

Decoding of logical forms:

Juanita (subject = noun)

Stabbed (base form verb stab + inflectional suffix 'ed' – denoting past tense)

Esteban (direct object = noun)

Badly (adverb of manner formed by adjective bad + derivational suffix 'ly')

And (logical connector)

Burned (base form verb burn + inflectional suffix 'ed' – denoting past tense)

His (possessive adjective preceding noun)

House (direct object = noun)

By linguistic decoding one unconsciously observes that the utterance ‘Juanita stabbed Esteban badly and burned this house’ is equivalent to the logical form expressed in linguistic terms $-[[NP, VP] ; [VP]]$, or in logical language $P \wedge Q$.

Explicature is the development of a logical form by decoding and inferential processes of a pragmatic nature such as disambiguation and reference indeterminacy, leading to the understanding of the explicit content of an utterance proposition. Silveira and Feltes (1997) place it between linguistic decoding and contextual implication. Consider the previous example.

(A) Whose funeral is it?

(B) Juanita stabbed Esteban badly and burned his house.

Explicature:

(A woman called) Juanita stabbed (pierced or wound with a pointed weapon) Esteban (a name which refers to a man) badly (to a great degree) and (then – denoting a sequential event in a particular order) burned (set fire on) his (Esteban’s) house (an indoor place surrounded by walls, where one lives).

In accordance with S&W (1995:182), an implicature is “a proposition communicated by an utterance, but not explicitly”. Schröder and Perna (2006) state that the construction of hypotheses about the implicit content of an utterance unfolds into implicated premises (appropriate hypotheses about the intended contextual assumptions, being likely to be recovered by logical, encyclopedic and lexical entries) and implicated conclusions (appropriate hypotheses about the intended contextual implications). The previous example demonstrates a plethora of possible implicatures, according to the listeners’ expectation of relevance.

(A) Whose funeral is it?

(B) Juanita stabbed Esteban badly and burned his house.

Some possible implicatures:

1. Esteban is dead

2. Juanita is responsible for it.
3. Esteban's body is carbonized.
4. Esteban's house is badly damaged.
5. Juanita hated Esteban.
6. Juanita must have acted in a fit of rage.
7. Juanita is mentally deranged.
8. Juanita is an arsonist.
9. Esteban must have done something terrible to Juanita.
10. Juanita will be arrested.
11. Esteban either died from the wounds or from the fire; perhaps a combination of both.
12. There may be witnesses who may actually prove that Juanita killed Esteban.
13. Juanita is a terribly emotional woman.

Hence, in searching for the best positive cognitive effects, listeners/readers retrieve determinate contextual assumptions, which will guide them to conclusions that satisfy their expectation of relevance and give rise to a new set of representations (the deductible interpretive outcome), which at a certain time, might be a novel source of input to be retrieved and inferentially processed for figuring out newer suppositions.

It seems primordial to stress out that comprehension is an ad hoc process, and that hypotheses about explicatures as well as implicated premises and conclusions are developed in parallel against a background of anticipatory hypotheses, being susceptible to revision or further construction as the utterance unfolds.

Therefore, since utterances and texts may provide a wide range of possible interpretations, it is paramount to emphasize as well that comprehension is a non-

demonstrative inferential process, and that communication may fail even under the most auspicious conditions.

Silveira and Feltes (1997) express that the effort that hearers/readers engage themselves in searching for the optimal relevance of an utterance proposition may vary considerably: while one might need to search further, other might be pleased sooner. Therefore, it appears significant to point out that although this 'least effort strategy' represents a reliable means of reaching a speaker/writer's proposed meaning, it is by no means foolproof. A more elucidative proposal to take into account is that this least effort trail listeners/readers choose to undertake may generate a diversified scope of reasonably similar meanings to what was originally intended by the speaker/writer to convey. In this sense, there is no guarantee of forestalling where exactly the developing of logical encoded meanings intended by a speaker/writer will lead listeners/readers to, and how similar, dissimilar or identical the thoughts and assumptions derived may be, but the more encyclopedic, lexical and deductive entries are called forth, i.e., the more listeners/readers can predict and relate in a particular contextual situation, the larger the number of positive cognitive effects and the more accessible and relevant the interpretative outcome will apparently seem to be.

3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

There is fairly an amount of studies aiming at verifying the efficiency of Grice's Theory of Implicatures as well as S&W's Relevance Theory, for approaching indeterminacies of meaning. For the present study, two of such studies carried out at PUCRS, served as general guidelines for utilizing a model of inferential architecture that is going to be proposed as one of the suggested architectural designs for the analysis of the underlying meaning present in Woody Allen's *Match Point*. The first of those studies is a 1984-master's treatise (reviewed and updated in 2004) carried out by Jorge Campos da Costa, and the second one, a 1999-master's treatise brought off by Beatriz Viégas-Faria. Whereas both papers attempt to promote an in-depth analysis of highly complex problems involving the phenomenon of signification in natural language, in Costa's, an amplified model of Grice's classical model is proposed to illustrate the Theory of Implicatures by means of political slogans, and in Faria's, the amplified model proposed by Costa is applied to William Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, for purposes of translation potential. In the referred papers, the analysis of meaning is rendered by means of non-trivial logical inferential calculations, i.e., the type of inference that is not exclusively derived by formal logics, taking into account relevance (in a different acceptance from S&W) as a super maxim within the Gricean approach.

By utilizing the amplified model proposed by Costa, the current study (along with the previously mentioned ones) initially strives to delineate a systematic approach to meaning in natural language, where the interface between a Frege/Russelian semantics and a Gricean pragmatics appears to be the central cornerstone upon which such a systematic approach may safely stand on. Secondly, by cognitively approaching meaningful content comprised in some of the film excerpts, as a combination of code/decoding and non demonstrative inferential processes, as proposed by S&W, it also engages in providing a qualitative analysis of relevance in terms of effort/cost, so that the cognitive effects derived from such inferential calculations may be perceived and attended to.

For attaining the aforementioned objectives, ten advanced² EFL subjects (five male and five female), aged between 28 and 42 years old, were submitted to watching a DVD session of *Match Point* and answering oral comprehension questions that attempted to evince

² Advanced in this case is a denomination applicable to those subjects that have been exposed to the formal learning of English as a foreign language (EFL) for at least five years.

their inferential calculations as well as the cost/benefit relation in computing implicatures. Out of the ten mentioned subjects, three of them are mechanical engineers, two lawyers, two administrators, one orthopedist, one gynecologist, and one chemical engineer, and all of them had never been exposed to the movie before. The subjects were divided³ into three groups of respectively three, three and four people. Each session took place in this author's living room in Caxias do Sul – RS along the month of September-2007, taking approximately three and half hours each and encompassing a total of forty implicatures to be derived. The subjects watched the film in English (both audio and subtitles), turning to Portuguese just when the general meaning was not understood, or when the subjects' mother tongue was thought to help promoting further understanding. In each of the sessions, the movie was paused after previously selected scenes and the subjects were instructed to provide explanatory answers (in English) about the sort of conclusions they arrived at as well as how they got to such conclusions. Their explanations were recorded on tape, serving as input database for the analysis that is going to be carried out along chapter 4 of the present paper. It is worth mentioning as well that all of the 10 subjects have willingly and freely participated on this project, being entirely aware that their answers would be used for academic purposes.

3.1 INFERENCE ARCHITECTURE – GRICE'S CLASSICAL MODEL

According to Grice (1989), a listener is thought to follow a series of steps in order to understand the additional meaning comprised within a conversational implicature. Such sort of deductible reasoning is called inferential calculation, and in accordance with Grice's classical model, it comprises the seven steps that follow underneath.

- (1) Speaker (A) said p.
- (2) There is no reason to believe that (A) is not abiding by the maxims of conversation or, at least, the cooperative principle.
- (3) (A) would not say p unless he meant q.

³ The group division was meant to better accommodate the subjects and to lower down the possibility of one's inferences being influenced by the inferences of the other subjects. It is worth mentioning as well that all the three groups were submitted to exactly the same inferential procedure along the film session.

- (4) Speaker (A) knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can understand that his meaning *q* is a necessary supposition.
- (5) (A) has done nothing to prevent me from thinking *q*.
- (6) (A) wants me to think *q* or, at least, is willing to let me think *q*.
- (7) Therefore, (A) implied *q*.

From the aforementioned classical model of inferential calculation, an example taken from *Match Point* is described to illustrate it as a form of mental architecture.

Chloe – Don't worry, the traffic was awful.

Tom – It's my fault. I dragged Nola to the classic car show at ExCel.

Chloe – Really?

*Tom – It was unbelievable. I swear, **my trousers have barely dried.***

Chloe – Oh, God. Shut up.

Inferential Calculation:

Comprised within the maxim of manner, avoid ambiguity is a sub maxim that also adds up to the main notion of being clear. When a speaker is ambiguous, the listener proceeds to the following reasoning: along the conversational exchange, why would speakers engage themselves in the effort of producing an ambiguous utterance?

Following this vein, Chloe understands that Tom's utterance '***my trousers have barely dried***' is ambiguous and, therefore, she starts to make a mental reckoning to figure out what the additional meaning intended by Tom is.

Tom's utterance hints there is a connection between the classic car show and the idea he wet his trousers. By saying the show was unbelievable and that his trousers have barely dried, one is likely to assume that he was so thrilled with excitement at the show, that he wet his pants, a logical entailment. The trick here seems to be derived from the implicit idea carried by the notion of getting excited, as becoming sexually aroused. When men are sexually excited, their membrum virilis erects, and if such excitement goes on and on, a climactic moment is achieved and sperm spouts out of their penis, a phenomenon known as ejaculation, causing to wet their pants, in case they have not previously taken them off.

Therefore, Tom's intentional ambiguity may be figured out by Chloe, by means of the inferential calculation that follows:

- (1) Tom said the car show was so unbelievable that his trousers have barely dried.
- (2) There is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims or, at least, the cooperative principle.
- (3) Tom would not be respecting the maxim of manner – avoid ambiguity – unless he meant the analogy that the show was so sexually exciting that he ejaculated, causing to wet his pants.
- (4) Tom knows (and he knows that I (Chloe) know that he knows) that I understand that it is necessary to suppose that he intends to convey the idea of ejaculation.
- (5) He has not done anything to prevent me from having such ejaculatory idea in mind.
- (6) Tom wants me to imagine or, at least, he is willing to let me imagine that he ejaculated on his pants for getting so aroused at the car show.
- (7) Therefore, he implied the additional and metaphorical idea of ejaculating for being so turned on at the car show.

The conversational context in which the exchange took place corroborates the idea that Chloe followed this line of reasoning to figure out Tom's additional meaning. By uttering "*Oh, God. Shut up.*", Chloe expresses her indignation about the obscene implicit notion that was additionally conveyed by Tom's utterance, demanding him to stop. The particular context of the movie also corroborates this idea through a series of sexual innuendos that Tom uttered, or will utter in other excerpts found along this cinematic text.

3.2 INFERENTIAL ARCHITECTURE – GRICE'S AMPLIFIED MODEL

As mentioned before, the current study will also take into account the amplified model of Grice, as proposed by Costa (1984, 2004).

Costa (1984, 2004) claims that his proposal for amplifying the classical model suggested by Grice resides on indications offered by Gazdar (1979), Karttunen and Peters (1979), S&W (1982), Levinson (1983) and Sadock (1978). From such indications, Costa proceeds to the reformulation of the classical model, evincing that relevance should be treated

as a super maxim. In accordance with Costa (1984, 2004), the communicative game comprises several distinct functions that establish five possible relationships:

- 1) The relation between what is said and the speech act (it would be utterly irrelevant if what is said by (A) did not imply q);
- 2) The relation between what is said and the main topic of conversation (if (B)'s reply has no semantic connection to (A)'s question);
- 3) The relation between what is said and the cooperative principle (if what is said by (A) and (B) actually share the same topic);
- 4) The internal relationship among the parts that compose the utterance;
- 5) The relation between the mode of expression and the meaningful content of what is said.

In Costa's point of view, implicatures come into this foreground to regulate the above stated set of relations that are present in a communicative game. He also adds that whenever floutings of one or more of the conversation maxims generate implicatures, such implicatures will manifest the pragmatic relevance of what is said.

Costa, in strict accordance with Dascal (1982), asserts that in communicating relevance is the primordial maxim that promotes the articulation among the several layers comprised within the cooperative enterprise. For inferring implicatures, one must take into account degrees of relevance between the parts of the utterance, between what is said and the topic, what is said and the implied meaning, the implied meaning and the topic as well as between what is said and the referring speech act. From these assertions, Costa proposes the reformulation of the classical model in a way that 'relevance' may be singly accountable for the decisive pragmatic role in natural language analysis. In such amplification of the classical model, the category of relation also undergoes modification, and starts to advertise the motto 'be adequate' as the maxim responsible for fostering the relationship between what is said and the utterance itself. The unceremonious scheme that follows underneath demonstrates what Costa conceived as 'Grice's Amplified Model'.

Cooperative Principle

General Rules of Conversation

Super Maxim – "Be as relevant as possible"

Maxims of Conversation

I- Category of Quantity

1st Maxim – Make your contribution as informative as it is required by the purpose of conversation

2nd Maxim – Do not make your contribution more informative than required

II- Category of Quality

Super Maxim – Just say what you really know

1st Maxim – Do not say what you believe to be false

2nd Maxim – Do not say that for which you lack appropriate evidence

III- Category of Adequacy

Maxim – Just say what is adequate as to the topic of conversation

IV- Category of Manner

Super Maxim – Be clear

1st Maxim – Avoid obscurity

2nd Maxim – Avoid ambiguity

3rd Maxim – Be concise (avoid unnecessary prolixity)

4th Maxim – Be orderly

As to the typology of implicatures, Costa (1984, 2004) introduces the ensuing synthesized version:

Types of implicatures:

As to the pragmatic nature

1- Conventional – relation between what is said and the lexicon

2- Conversational – relation between what is said – context – cooperative principle

As to the generating factor

1- Standard – when maxims are observed

2- By flouting – when maxim(s) is (are) violated

As to the sort of context

1- Generalized – general context (linguistic rules)

2- Particularized – particular context (communicational rules)

Before introducing Grice's Amplified Model, it appears noteworthy to point out as well the definition of context as envisaged by Costa (1984, 2004). For him, context constitutes an undetermined set of sentences mutually known by both the speaker and the addressee.

Among such a vast range of sentences, only those that are relevant, necessary and determinable will partake in the inferential calculation required for computing implicatures, so that in departing from what is uttered, the listener may derive the intended implied meaning. Costa professes that such a notion of context is fundamental for a systemic approach to pragmatics, aiming at successfully resolving problems of semantic indeterminacies in natural language. The model proposed by Costa is formatted underneath.

(A) Addressee

(S) Speaker

(C) Context – (set of potential propositions mutually known by (S) and (A), or that may be at least accepted as non-controversial)

(U) Utterance

(Q) Implicatures (Gricean pragmatic inferences)

According to this model, inferential calculations observe the following steps:

- 1- (S) said (U)
- 2- (S) did not offer an explicit account of the information required by what he/she said
- 3- still, (S) must be cooperating
- 4- (S) knows that (A) knows C {C1, C2....Cn}
- 5- (S) will be relevant by saying (U) if he/she intends (A) to think (Q)
- 6- (S) said (U) and implied (Q)

Costa (1984,2004) also introduces what he denominates “implicaturas encadeadas” (concatenated implicatures), within the scope of his amplified model. The ensuing excerpt taken from one of the scenes comprised in *Match Point* illustrates the model and helps to elucidate the concept of ‘concatenated implicatures’.

Alec Hewett – How did your audition go?

Nola – Oh, It was pretty awful, I’m afraid.

Tom – It’s her own fault, bless her. She just tightens up.

Alec Hewett – Well, I’m sure something worthwhile will come along.

Nola – Unfortunately, there’s just not anything right now that I’m that great for.

Eleanor Hewett – So, how long do you keep it up?

Nola – How long?

Eleanor Hewett – Well, if time passes and nothing significant materializes, how long do you keep on going before you decide that...to try something else?

From the above-transcribed excerpt as well as the previous movie context, a good deal of relevant propositions mutually known by the participants of the conversation is extracted, establishing a subset of potential sentences to be used as input for inferential calculation:

- (C) = C1 – Nola is an actress
 C2 – Nola has not been successful so far in that career
 C3 – Nola is Eleanor's and Alec's future daughter-in-law and Tom's fiancée
 C4 – Eleanor and Nola mutually dislike one another
 C5 – Eleanor does not believe Nola has got what it takes to be an actress
 C6 – Eleanor thinks Nola is wasting her time being an actress
 (Q1) – Go after a different career (standard particularized conversational implicature)

Inferential calculation:

- 1- (S) = Eleanor said (U) = 'How long do you keep on going before you decide to try something else?'
- 2- (S) = Eleanor is cooperating
- 3- (S) = Eleanor knows that (A) = Nola knows C {C1, C2, C6}
- 4- (S) = Eleanor will be relevant by saying (U) if she intends (A) = Nola to think (Q1)
- 5- (S) = Eleanor said (U) and implied (Q1) = go after a different career

The conversation goes on, and one more potential proposition is added up to the context, generating another standard particularized conversational implicature.

- C7 – Beautiful young women stand better chances at the film industry
 (Q2) = Give it up while you are still an attractive young woman.

Tom – I don't think Nola's reached that point, mother.

Eleanor Hewett – I'm not saying that. All I'm saying is you give acting a try for a time, and if you keep being disappointed you have to ask yourself the question, is this really what I want in my life? Is this what I want?

Nola – Well, I do ask myself that.

Eleanor Hewett – See? It's only logical, Tom, especially for a woman. It's a particularly cruel business for a woman, and as you get older and time passes, if nothing happens, it gets harder and harder.

Alec Hewett – Eleanor, Nola isn't exactly over the hill.

Inferential calculation:

- 1- (S) = Eleanor said (U) = 'A movie career is a particular cruel business for a woman, and as time passes, if nothing happens, it gets harder and harder'
- 2- (S) = Eleanor is cooperating
- 3- (S) = Eleanor knows that (A) = Nola knows C {C1, C2, C6, C7, Q1}
- 4- (S) = Eleanor will be relevant by saying (U) if she intends (A) = Nola to think (Q2)
- 5- (S) = Eleanor said (U) and implied (Q2) = give it up while you are still an attractive young woman

(Q2) enables (Q1) to be more relevant, as it can be attested in natural language:

'Give up while you are a young and beautiful woman' increases the relevance of 'going after a different career'.

The additional meaning conveyed by Eleanor is clearly understood by all the participants of the verbal exchange. An evidence of that is when Alec says 'Nola is not exactly over the hill' that entails 'Nola is not finished, in the sense of being old and unattractive'.

The dialogue continues.

Eleanor Hewett – I'm not saying now. But I'm a great one for facing up to realities.

Tom – You take on these realities – is your opinion and nothing else, and frankly, not everybody else is interested in hearing about it.

Alec Hewett – Tom, don't raise your voice to your mother, please.

Tom – I'm not raising my voice. And I'm sorry, papa, but she's always on Nola's case, continually discouraging her via... innuendos.

Tom's utterances also corroborate that everyone involved in the exchange understood (Q1) and (Q2).

As the dialogue unfolds, another propositions (previously known from the film context) are reinforced within that particular conversational context, namely (C8) - Nola has left America and moved to London aiming at making good as an actress and (C9) – Nola wants the people from Boulder, Colorado to think she has made good.

Eleanor Hewett – All I'm saying is acting's so will-o'-the-wisp. Those that have it, know it right off. To pursue it because you don't want to admit defeat to friends back home is, frankly, unrealistic. I'm sorry, but that's the way I feel.

Nola – Excuse me (she stands up and starts to walk out of the room)

Alec Hewett – Nola.

Nola – It's OK. I'd like to be alone, thanks (she leaves the room)

Tom – Well, thank you very much, and I'm sorry if I'm raising my voice now, but you know that's her Achilles heel, emotionally.

Alec Hewett – He's right, Eleanor. I think you've had one too many G and Ts.

By saying 'I think you have had one too many G and Ts (Gin and Tonic)', Alec produces a particularized conversational implicature, one derived from violating the maxim of adequacy, i.e., by saying something that is not adequate as to the topic of conversation. Thus, Eleanor is led to infer (Q3) = 'when you are not sober you lose your sense of propriety'.

Inferential Calculation:

- 1- (S) = Alec said (U) = I think you have had one too many G and Ts
- 2- (S) = Alec was not as adequate as it was required in the verbal exchange
- 3- Still (S) = Alec must be cooperating
- 4- (S) = Alec knows that (A) = Eleanor knows C {C3, C4, C9, Q1, Q2}
- 5- (S) = Alec is being relevant as long as he intends (A) = Eleanor to think (Q3)
- 6- (S) = Alec said (U) and implied (Q3)

According to this model, 'concatenated implicatures' are those that depend upon mutually known (necessary and sufficient) propositions extracted from the context and previously inferred implicatures, so that a degree of pragmatic relevance may be scaled to each one of the related implicatures. Therefore, one may conclude that by implying Q3, both Q2 and Q1 are more relevantly determined.

In Farias's work (1999), the author utilizes Costa's Amplified Model and introduces what she conceives of as "implicaturas concomitantes" (concomitant implicatures). A concomitant implicature takes place when what is said by a speaker (S) yields a q + z

additional meaning for one of the addressees (A1) and a mere q additional meaning to the other addressee(s) (A2...An). Due to the fact that such an example of concomitant implicature is present only once along the proposed cinematic text, it is going to be illustrated in the ensuing chapter, when the analysis of *Match Point* takes its course.

3.3 INFERENCE ARCHITECTURE – RT ACCOUNT

According to Carston (1998), an essential claim of the relevance theoretic account is that the human cognitive system is steered towards the maximization of relevance; id est, the various subsystems of the human brain connive to achieve the highest number of cognitive effects with a minimum of processing effort. Thus, it is widely accepted that perceptual input systems tend to respond mechanically to stimuli that are very likely to produce cognitive effects, converting them into the type of representational formats that are adequate to the conceptual inferential systems, so that these latter systems may integrate them as productively as possible with some accessible subset of existing representations, aiming at yielding as many cognitive effects as potentially conceivable.

In interpreting, human beings are thought to attribute beliefs, desires and intentions to each other's behavior all the time. By interpreting, therefore, one is expected to predict and recognize people's intentions. Such an interpretive function operates as a sort of mind-reading device. That is the way Grice envisages overt communication; his rational reconstruction of how conversational implicatures are deducted involve the application of reasoning devices to premises based on explicit hypotheses about the relationship between behavior and mental states.

S&W (1986) predicate that utterances and other kinds of ostensive behaviors may be explained by the intentness comprised in the acts of the agents who produced them. Hence, a pragmatic inferential activity is allegedly an automatic response listeners/readers undergo when exposed to ostensive stimuli. Such a cognitive activity is consequently carried out in order to interpret human behavior, so that the mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) that are thought to govern it may be best attended to under the prism of how relevant or cost/effective their processing is.

From such a standpoint, the communicative principle of relevance (every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance) delineates a regularity specific

to the communicative domain that serves as a general guideline for a special-purpose inferential comprehension procedure (“follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects, or in other words, test interpretative hypotheses in order of accessibility; stop when your expectations of relevance have been met”). By following this experimental pattern, hypotheses about the speaker’s meaning are automatically computed on the basis of linguistic and non-linguistic indications. Thereof, one may perfectly claim that such an inferential procedure, as proposed by S&W, is pragmatic in nature, since the relationship between mental states and behavior cannot be expressed as explicit premises, but as merely tacit underpinnings that regulate the manner by which the system works.

From this line of reasoning, the theoretic account underlying RT predicts that mutual knowledge is not a precondition to inferential processes of interpretation, for the contextual scope is not given but chosen. As a matter of fact, S&W (1986) assert that comprehension is a global process; one which involves free access to every single bit of conceptual data stored in memory. That is the bottom argument the authors bestow as justification for asserting that comprehension is a non-demonstrative process.

For characterizing comprehension as an inferential process, one should bear in mind that the concepts making up the encoded logical forms present three distinct types of entries:

- A – Logical entries - a set of formal operations constitutive of deductive rules
- B- Lexical entries – representational linguistic forms derived from the combination of morphological and phonological features that lead to the formation of a syntactic category
- C- Encyclopedic entries – a set of logically encoded propositions that comprise data about the extent of concepts

Actually, the combination of the aforementioned entries is what enables semantic representations to be derived.

According to Silveira and Feltes (1997), perceptual processes extract data from experience in compatible representational formats, so that such data may be stored in memory and used in thought. Concurrently, inferential processes execute computations that are sensitive to one’s global system of beliefs. In the latter process, information accessibility is virtually unlimited, interconnecting data in a non-demonstrative inferential manner, so that problem-solving tasks or the settlement of beliefs may take place. This way, several input systems retrieve information that is combined with the data stored in memory to derive hypotheses about the way the world appears to be.

Wilson and Sperber (1993) declare that utterances interpretation is a two-fold process: first, there is the decoding phase, which provides input to the inferential phase, and then, the inferential phase itself, where a linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and exploited for building up a hypothesis about the speaker's informative intention.

The excerpt underneath, taken from *Match Point*, illustrates the sort of inferential calculation comprised in RT.

The scene:

Chris Wilton, an Irish tennis instructor has started dating Chloe Hewett, an upper class British girl. They have made arrangements to go out for dinner with Chloe's brother Tom and his girlfriend Nola Rice, a struggling American actress. The scene takes place at a restaurant in London, when the four people have just gotten a table for four.

Excerpt:

Chloe – Should we order 'cause he's waiting (looking at the waiter)?

Tom – Oh, frightfully sorry. I'll have the baked potatoes with truffles. That'll be lovely. Yummy.

Nola – I'd like the same, please.

Waiter – Nothing to start?

Tom – Oh, I think the wine list.

Chloe – I'll have the caviar blinis, please.

Chris – Roast chicken.

Chloe – God, boring! Honestly, they have the greatest caviar blinis here. You should try them.

Chris – That's OK.

Chloe – No, do you like caviar?

Chris – So-so.

Chloe – So-so (teasingly). He's been brought up as a good boy, to always order modestly. I'm very sorry.

Tom – (Looking at the waiter) He'll have the blinis.

From the above dialogue, one is able to assume the following hypotheses based on observation:

(S) = Supposition – a relevant implicated premise that one arrives at from ostensive stimuli comprised in the context as well as by inferential processes of pragmatic nature.

(S1) – The restaurant is an expensive one

Such an implicated premise is derived from the following ostensive stimuli comprised within the context:

A- Truffles are notoriously expensive

B- Caviar is expensive

C- Tom and Chloe are known to be wealthy people

By combining (S1) with other contextual indications such as

D- Wilton does not have much money (a contextual clue mutually known by all the participants of the exchange as well as the viewers)

E – Roast chicken is cheaper than caviar or truffles

one is likely to conclude (Q) = implicated conclusion derived from implicated premises (implicature). Therefore,

(Q1) – Chris has ordered roast chicken because it is cheaper.

As the dialogue unfolds, such a conclusion is corroborated when Chloe states that Chris has been brought up as a good boy to always order modestly. Thus, there is a positive cognitive effect (by strengthening) that enables (S1) to be more relevantly determinable.

When Tom utters that Wilton will have the blinis, more cognitive effects are attainable. One may assume the following implicated premises about Tom's behavior:

(S2) – Tom has understood (Q1)

(S3) – Tom wants Wilton to enjoy his meal as much as the others

From such premises, one derives the following implicated conclusion.

(Q2) – Wilton will have the blinis because Tom is paying for his meal.

Such a conclusion is corroborated by the fact that, as the scene unfolds, there are no indications that Wilton has objected to having the blinis, constituting a positive cognitive effect by addition. Such a cognitive effect also establishes (S2) = (Q1) as relevant; i.e., a low cost effort yielding a highly effective cognitive effect.

Let's consider now a path of greater effort to yield positive cognitive effects, such as the one below.

(S1) – There is a connection between *Match Point* and Fiodor Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*

(S2) - Blinis (a sort of Russian pancake) is mentioned more than once in the book.

(S3) - Dostoevsky is allegedly said to have stated that blinis was his favorite food.

(S4) - Russian caviar is famous throughout the world

(S5) - Truffle is a rare commodity in the world

(S6) – Siberia's soil is propitious for finding truffles

(S7) - Siberia is comprised within the Russian territory

From such implicated premises, one may derive (Q3) and (Q4)

(Q3) Woody Allen is paying tribute to Dostoevsky by introducing blinis in his cinematic text

(Q4) The restaurant described in the previous scene is likely to be a Russian one

Such implicated conclusions are not as relevant as (Q1) and (Q2), for the path chosen to get to those conclusions requires a greater processing effort, not to mention the fact that the generated positive cognitive effects are unlikely to be corroborated.

3.4 INFERENCE GENERATION IN CINEMATIC TEXTS

Since the dawn of movies, as an art form, a little over a hundred years ago, they have been capable of captivating their target audiences. According to McGinn (2005), movies carry some kind of psychic charge that is virtually unmatched by any other art form.

The power of films is overtly manifested in two forms: demographically and individually. Movies offer a far-reaching mass appeal than any other artistic medium. At the

individual level, their main qualitative feature is the sheer intensity of the movie-watching experience. One's brain appears to step into another sphere of engagement as the images on the screen flood into their receptive consciousness. From the aforementioned assertions, one may question how films are capable of promoting such enthralling level of involvement. For McGinn (2005:7), "movies engage our mind, not by simulating reality, but by offering us fiction". As a matter of fact, people tend to love stories by and large, and films tell us stories in visual images and words. Therefore, one may infer that what moves people to watch a film is the 'power of imagination'.

Mast (1982) professes that film scholars divide film works into four distinct categories for both practical and pedagogical purposes:

- A- Narrative films, in the sense of being equated with fictional storytelling;
- B- Documentary films, being also referred to as non-fiction films;
- C- Experimental films, a broad category that also receives a diversified range of denominations such as avant-garde, underground, abstract, among others. This category tends to be regarded as psychologically or visually strange as well as formally innovative;
- D- Animation, where drawn pictures or digitally computerized images are utilized instead of photographs.

Although some films are prone to fall into more than one category, most of them are determined by intentional rather than formal criteria.

In accordance with Mast (1982), films just like texts are capable of persuading, informing or moving, for they equally comprise a meaningful system that attempts to make them comprehensible to their target audience. Both texts and narrative films may be defined as communicative structures that ignite constructive and cognitive processes on the readers/viewers' minds, striving at recovering a writer/director's intended conveyed meaning.

One of the main features of cinematic texts is that they usually handle communicative meaning by especially focusing the viewers' attention on the filmed image itself. Mast (1982:298) claims that "film is spoken only formally and by a few to the many, whose activity consists not in making new utterances but in making sense of the utterances that have been previously constructed".

In films, the smallest unit of cinematic meaning is the 'shot' that is far more significant than a word. Metz (1974) states that a shot is at least comparable to a sentence, if not an entire paragraph, for it comprises a series of possible different elements such as

physical setting, music, spoken words, patterns of light and shadows, visual arts, among other components. Except for written or spoken words that allow both denotative (specific or literal) and connotative (figurative or implicit) meanings, the other codes encompassed in a movie shot can only express connotative meaning, making it really hard to account for the innumerable mental activities that enable viewers to make sense out of the profusion of imagery and sound perceptions included within a cinematic text.

Andrew (1989) declares that the combination of codes used in cinema does not warrant a primary or single usage for them, due to the fact that viewers cannot interact verbally with images; i.e., people do not communicate with moving or still images. For him, cinema is a fragile communicative system in which what is expressed by the several conceivable codes may promote a poetic or inventive use, or even the most ordinarily prosaic utilization, as envisaged by the film director and screenwriter.

Silveira (2005) mentions that one of the advantages of a text composed by images is its universality, since it may overcome the language barrier, being able to be understood by viewers of distinct cultures, whom may speak a myriad of different languages. Another vantage of images, if compared to written texts, is that they are far more attractive because they speed up the conveyance of meaning, not to mention that the more an onlooker is exposed to image texts, the more developed and intensified their sense of observation may be.

Narrative films, just like literary texts, may convey not only a well structured, absorbing tale but also,

a probing of the depth of the characters' souls, the author's offering perceptive social and psychological insight, manipulating a literary style both lucidly communicative and richly evocative, and, finally, creating a complex vision of human experience that we infer from the work as a whole.
(MAST, 1982:283)

Persson (1998) states that “although verbal and visual comprehension overlap to a considerable degree, an empirical investigation into cinematic comprehension has to be sensitive to the specificity of text and background knowledge”.

According to Persson (1998), the most important sources of input influencing inference generation in narrative text comprehension are:

- A- Text: phonological and morphological rules, semantic meaning, syntactical relationships;
- B- Specific background knowledge such as memory, particular experiences from other texts, and of previous excerpts within the same text;

C- Generic background knowledge including schemata (pre-existing knowledge structures in memory depicting the usual expected patterns of things. For example, an apartment schema comprises a kitchen, a living room, one or more bedrooms, a bathroom, et cetera), cultural models (e.g. it is widely recognized that in many European countries women do not bother about shaving their armpits), scripts (pre-existing knowledge structures for interpreting sequences of specific events such as going to the bank to cash a check) and stereotypes (notions that many people have about a thing, a person or a group and that may often be untrue or only partially true. For instance, the idea that blond women are dumb);

D- Pragmatic context including the author, setting, the purpose of the verbal exchange.

In cinematic texts, all these elements are crucial as well, although their nature may be somewhat dissimilar. The text may also involve a greater deal of extra linguistic elements such as colors, contrasts, objects and soundtrack. Background knowledge in both verbal and visual comprehension varies considerably, including not merely everyday knowledge but also knowledge associated with the medium and narrative conventions. For instance, there appears to be some sort of expected schema involved in understanding and appreciating genre films such as thrillers and detective stories. In motion pictures, the pragmatic context may guide and constrain inferential processes if the viewers are exposed to the reasons why a given director chose to make a certain film (perhaps by means of movie previews and interviews).

Other factors that may be responsible for generating inferences in both narrative texts and cinematic ones are: the goals and purposes of the readers/viewers, coherence, discourse analysis which permits the construction of mental representations (though in movies, processes of perceptual psychology may be of crucial relevance for inferring the facial expression of a character and spatial relations between objects within the frame), and situational models manifesting characters' mental states such as perceptions, desires, emotions, thoughts, and reactions (in spite of the fact that in cinema, the ability for inferring bodily clues and gestures may be greatly desirable).

Despite the distinct factors predicating the generation of inferential processes in both narrative texts and narrative films, it may be deduced that the similarities found between texts and films are far greater, thus accounting for the phenomenon that narrative films may genuinely be considered and attended to as literary texts.

4 INFERENCE ARCHITECTURE - MEANING IN *MATCH POINT*

4.1 MODELING THE CONTEXT

This section will include a broad magnitude of contextual elements that will add up to the informational database utilized in the analysis of Woody Allen's *Match Point*. The majority of information comprised here accounts for specific background knowledge that is not usually accessible to the movie viewers; i.e., the sort of knowledge that is not assumed to be mutually known by those unadvised viewers who are neither very acquainted with Woody Allen, as an author and philosopher, nor with his views about the story underlying *Match Point*. Such range of knowledge is indisputably susceptible to questioning, since it involves one's particular interpretive skills in conveying what they believe to be the potential intentions behind the Allenesque modus operandi in developing the storyline of this film. Concurrently, some of the data that is going to be handled along this section will also constitute shared content, that viewers are likely to grasp as the movie goes on and its context builds up.

Independently of how sustained or obscure the informational content appears to be, such data will provide the means for partially modeling the context in which the process of inference generation will depart from, being able to be contrasted with the inferences reproduced by the ten subjects who partook in the current study (not having been exposed to what is introduced hither).

4.1.1 The Author

Woody Allen (real name Allan Steward Konigsberg) was born in 1935 in Brooklyn, New York. His middle class parents descended from Austro-Jewish (father) and Russo-Jewish (mother) immigrants.

A comedian, musician, filmmaker and playwright who is considered one of the most prolific American directors of his generation, having written, directed and more often than not starred in a film just about every year since 1969.

Among his most renowned films, one must cite *Take the Money and Run* (1969), *Love and Death* (1975), *Annie Hall* (1977), *Manhattan* (1979), *Zelig* (1983), *The Purple Rose of Cairo* (1985), *Hannah and Her Sisters* (1986), *Crimes and Misdemeanors* (1989), *Mighty Aphrodite* (1995), *Deconstructing Harry* (1997), and *Match Point* (2005).

In accordance with my own account, Allen's body of cinematographic work might be chronologically divided into three distinct phases for most American film critics:

- 1- From 1969 to 1976 – ‘the early funny comedies’ – characterized by witty humor and irony, that launched him to fame.
- 2- From 1977 (*Annie Hall*) to 1989 (*Crimes and Misdemeanors*) – ‘the notorious films’ – being most of them hailed as masterpieces, in terms of innovative form and creative artistic achievement.
- 3- From the early 1990's to present time – ‘the unchallenging films’ (despite some rare exceptions) - leading the American and Latin American paying audience as well as the film industry to fall out of love with Allen's art, if not his person.

According to Allen's interview for TCM – Turner Classic Movies (2002), the films characterized in his early comedies were intended to be entertaining and make people laugh. As a matter of fact, Allen claims that was the period the American audience best remembers him by and the one in which his cinematic persona (funny short neurotic New Yorker) found the grounds to establish itself in the imagination of the movie-going audience.

In the same interview (2002), Allen professes that, from *Annie Hall* (1977) to *Crimes and Misdemeanors* (1989), film critics and the intellectual echelon of the American society began to recognize him as an accredited director and screenwriter due to the innovative narrative form and philosophical themes that were comprised within his films. A good example of such an innovative narrative convention can be spotted along one of the scenes from *Annie Hall* (1977), when the characters portrayed by Allen and Diane Keaton start to have a conversation and their thoughts are manifested by means of subtitles, so that the audience may take a full grasp on the characters' real motivations. As for Allen's philosophical themes, it seems worth mentioning the transitory character of love, blind morality, godlessness, the dangers of hedonism, tragic realism, the comic side of tragedy and vice versa, among others. One example of those philosophical themes may be evinced in *The Purple Rose of Cairo* (1985), where the character portrayed by Mia Farrow has to choose between perfect fantasy and imperfect reality. She chooses reality and is doomed to live

unhappily ever after, thus leading the viewers to wonder about how rough existence appears to be.

From the 1990's on, it apparently seems that the American audience simply started getting more and more dissatisfied with the sort of highly intellectual cinematic texts presented by Allen. Although some film critics made excellent reviews about films such as *Bullets Over Broadway* (1994), *Mighty Aphrodite* (1995) and *Deconstructing Harry* (1997), most criticism was negative and, on the commercial standpoint, it was even worse; Allen's films were being labeled box office poison, making producers lose their money or, at the best scenario, leading their investors to earn small-time profits. Facing such adverse circumstances, Woody Allen was unable to find a movie studio interested enough in financing his new film entitled *Match Point*. Thereupon, Allen decided to look for sponsors elsewhere. BBC studios from England agreed with Allen's demands and gathered the necessary resources for carrying out his project. Their single request was that the movie should be shot in England, featuring a predominantly British cast.

As it may be envisaged, the American movie business is mainly devoted into moneymaking films, whereas in Europe, films as an art form still have an assured market share. Following this vein, one may see how relevant it was the statement uttered by Allen in his TCM interview (2002): "For some good reasons I'm more appreciated in France than I am back home. The subtitles must be incredibly good".

Another feature that must be stressed about his films is that Woody Allen is largely known to parallel his work with others. Such parallelism may be related with literary works such as Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* and Dreiser's *An American Tragedy*, or with the work of actors such as Groucho Marx, Bob Hope and Humphrey Bogart, or with the films of appraised movie directors such as Ingmar Bergman, François Truffaut and Ernst Lubitsch, or even with Allen's previously talked about themes, developed in his earlier movies. Some evidences to corroborate the abovementioned statements may include:

- 1- *Take the Money and Run* (1969), where the narrative convention used reminded the viewers of a documentary. The same narrative structure was used in Allen's *Zelig* (1983).
- 2- *Crimes and Misdemeanors* (1989) and *Match Point* (2005) share the same theme found along Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* (1866).
- 3- The character portrayed by Allen in *Sleeper* (1973) remits the work of Charlie Chaplin and Buster Keaton.

- 4- *Shadows and Fog* (1992) pays homage to German expressionist filmmakers such as Fritz Lang, Murnau and Von Sternberg.
- 5- *Interiors* (1978) is Allen's tribute to Ingmar Bergman.
- 6- *A Midsummer Night's Sex Comedy* (1982) is an allusion to William Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.
- 7- *Curse of the Jade Scorpion* (2001) is a tribute to film noir.
- 8- *Play It Again, Sam* (1972) alludes to Michael Curtiz's *Casablanca* (1942), not to mention that the character played by Allen tries to emulate Humphrey Bogart's persona.
- 9- *Annie Hall* (1977), *Manhattan* (1979), *Stardust Memories* (1980), *Hannah and Her Sisters* (1986), *Alice* (1990), *Husbands and Wives* (1992), *Mighty Aphrodite* (1995), among others, deal with the theme of failing love relationships.
- 10- *Oedipus Wrecks* (1989), *Mighty Aphrodite* (1995) and *Scoop* (2006) offer allusions to Greek mythology, not to mention that the first two are also related with psychoanalytic theory.
- 11- *Stardust Memories* (1980) rewards viewers with surreal touches, alluding to Federico Fellini.

4.1.2 The Film

According to Fuller (2006), *Match Point* is "Woody Allen's most formally rigorous and emotionally involving film for years, predicated as a fable about luck".

The story traces the ascension of a poor Irish man and former tennis pro (Chris Wilton) into a life of privilege in the bosom of a wealthy upper-crust English family (the Hewetts), and the consequences of his forbidden desires for a struggling and unstable American actress (Nola Rice).

The story is intertwined with the soundtrack of opera arias, mostly sang by Enrico Caruso. As a matter of fact, Wikipedia (2006) and Fuller (2006) are in agreement that such an unusual soundtrack for a Woody Allen's film offers to opera connoisseurs ironic commentaries on the actions of the characters, or many times the foretelling about how the movie narrative is going to unfold. Some examples to illustrate the aforementioned view could be attested by the aria *Una Furtiva Lagrima*, from the opera *L'elisir d'amore* by

Gaetano Donizette, that is a mournful warbling retelling tale of desire, jealousy and instant wealth by socializing bright young things, or the aria *Desdemona* from Giuseppe Verdi's opera *Otello*, that is heard along one scene coming to a crescendo (precisely when Chris Wilton is about to murder his so-called victims), and expressing the Italian words 'atroce, atroce' (atrocious, atrocious) as Otello is about to kill Desdemona.

Tennis is also a mark in *Match Point*. It is constantly depicted throughout the storyline serving two purposes: showing it merely as a sports practice or using it metaphorically for depicting luck or even sex. An example of the latter can be illustrated along the movie when Chloe Hewett says to Chris Wilton that he has a powerful 'serve'⁴, literally denoting his excellent ability to throw up the ball at a tennis match, but alluding indirectly to his fine capacity for introducing his penis into her vagina.

In accordance with Fuller (2006), 'bourgeois platitudes' are the prevailing language in the movie. The Hewetts indulge themselves in a life of parties, first-rate restaurants, art exhibitions, and all sorts of refined activities that money can offer. On the other hand, Chris Wilton and Nola Rice are enthralled with this world as well as with the advantageous idea of finding themselves a definite place in such a lavish environment.

Wikipedia (2006) mentions that *Match Point* was nominated for four Golden Globe Awards (film, original screenplay, direction and best actress in a drama) and one Oscar nomination for best original screenplay. It also states it was entirely shot in London and its surroundings, including locations such as Tate Modern, the Royal Opera House, Blackfriars Bridge, The Royal Court Theatre and Cambridge Circus. The story takes place at present times, running through a period not longer than three years. It is interesting to point out that the passing of time is not clearly demarcated. Whereas there are subsequent scenes evincing that it is wintertime and then springtime, most of them are sequenced without providing the viewers with a compatible time frame that allows them to precise the amount of time that has elapsed. However, it is worth noting as well that such an obscure notion about the chronological procession of time neither prevents the viewer from following the story, nor generates confusion about the way events unwind.

Allen (apud Wikipedia, 2006) has affirmed that *Match Point* is "arguably maybe the best film that I've made". It surely makes sense: the movie has broken a long streak of box offices flops, with a world wide gross revenue of \$ 78,265,575 up to March, 2006 when its domestic run came to an end.

⁴ It is interesting to point out that the Portuguese subtitles express 'você tem muita energia' completely disrupting the original tennis analogy promoted by Allen.

4.1.3 Theme

In his interview at TCM (2002), Woody Allen stated that he really believes in luck, adding that such a belief is constantly shown in many of his movies. He also stated that, in accordance with his standpoint, luck guides our lives far more than we care to admit; i.e., it is a fundamental component accounting for most of what is out of one's control. Such a statement endorses the view that the role of luck in people's lives accounts for the main theme in *Match Point*.

According to Fuller (2006), the theme of godlessness and nihilism underlies this cinematic text. By insinuating nihilism, Woody Allen suggests that the system of values and beliefs commonly attributed to the western civilization is unfounded and that existence is senseless as well as useless. Such an ideology rooted in rational egoism is the same one envisaged by Dostoevsky and profoundly ascribed to his main character *Raskolnikov* in *Crime and Punishment*, as a moral threat to 1860's Czarist Russia.

For Lawler (2004:33), "Woody Allen directly confronts the problem of meaning in a world in which the eyes of justice have apparently been blinded". Immanuel Kant (apud Lawler, 2004) stated that the highest goal of morality consists in creating a fair world where happiness is the result of it. Kant, as a philosopher, conceived of what he denominated the "highest good" or, in other words, an existence that rewards those who are morally upright by being happy while it punishes those who flout moral duty. Based on that, one may conceive that if there is no intrinsic moral structure to existence, preserving or destroying life is equally insignificant.

Abrams (2004) says that present-day civilization is under the spell of a skeptical attitude toward ethical truth. From this assertion, it may derive that humanity cannot be improved since the sense of morality is quickly fading away. Such a philosophical view stems from Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and his worldview that god has always been dead. If god does not exist, being moral is just as good as being immoral. Following this line of reasoning, Abrams (2004:102) also states that "in an age of doubt, beliefs in god are no longer so reasonable, just as beliefs in any eternal moral law, or any deepest core of humanity, are also ruled out of hand, leaving man unguided". Such a point of view endorses the idea that our present civilization has fallen into a vortex of nihilism, ethical fragmentation and cultural chaos.

4.1.4 The Characters

All the characters portrayed along this cinematic text are ‘flat characters’, i.e., they do not undergo psychological, intellectual or moral alterations as the story develops. The most developed character is undoubtedly Chris Wilton, who becomes a murderer and is supposedly believed to endure guilt and remorse as a consequence of his foul deeds.

Chris Wilton (Jonathan Rhys Meyers)

He is the main character; Irish born, a former tennis professional; ambitious; he does not come from a family of means; his father lost both of his legs but found Jesus; his father was austere; Chris does not believe he could have been a top tennis player; he is relatively well-educated (appears reading Dostoevsky and Strindberg and quotes Sophocles); he becomes a tennis instructor and then takes on a junior position at his father-in-law’s company; he is selfish and self-centered; he marries Chloe Hewett; he lusts after Nola Rice and seduces her; he aspires to be just like Tom Hewett (buying the same sort of sweater Tom has and drinking Puligny-Montrachet – a wine Tom orders at a restaurant); he loves opera (especially the tragic ones); he is a firm believer in luck; he is rationally governed though, sometimes, moves according to his instincts; he feels claustrophobic about his job as well as with his life with Chloe; he betrays his wife with Nola; he is a liar; he strongly enjoys the Hewett’s lifestyle; he takes a business course to improve his professional abilities; he is secretive (except with his friend Henry (Rupert Penry-Jones) – a struggling tennis pro); he impregnates Nola but not his wife; he ascends fast in his father-in-law’s company; he apparently seems to lose money in his investments; he always accepts the financial support of the Hewetts (Tom, Chloe and Alec); he appreciates art; he gets fed up with Nola Rice; he plots to murder Nola Rice and Betty Eastby; he kills them; he finally impregnates his wife Chloe; he is immoral; he tries to get away clean from his crimes; he apparently feels lost.

Nola Rice (Scarlett Johansson)

She is the female protagonist; she is a struggling American actress; she is sexy and she is aware of that; she is Tom Hewett’s fiancée; she does not get along well with her future mother-in-law; she comes from a poor family from Bolder, Colorado; she is attracted to the Hewett’s lifestyle; her father has abandoned her family; her mother is an alcoholic who is

unable to hold a job; her sister is addicted to drugs; she was previously married; she wants to make good as an actress but she does not manage to break in at the theater or at the movies (actually she just manages a TV commercial); she hates the idea of not succeeding and having to face her friends back home; she allows Chris Wilton to seduce her; she is ambitious; Tom Hewett walks out on her; she goes back to America; she comes back to London; she gets a job at a boutique; she starts an affair with Chris Wilton; she has had two abortions; she gets pregnant from Chris Wilton; she supposedly wants revenge on the Hewetts; she demands Wilton to leave his wife; she is sort of temperamental; she gets killed by Chris Wilton.

Tom Hewett (Matthew Goode)

He is wealthy; he loves cars; he likes opera; he plays tennis; he is a bon vivant; there are no clear evidences that he works (supposedly he does at his father's company); he falls in love with Nola Rice; he feels uneasy about the fact that his mother and his fiancée do not get along; he impregnates Nola Rice and makes her have an abortion; he is easygoing; he is carefree (though not enough clues suggest that he is irresponsible); he breaks up with Nola Rice; he falls in love with Heather (Miranda Raison) and marries her; he becomes a father and a little later his wife gets pregnant again.

Chloe Hewett (Emily Mortimer)

She is wealthy; she claims to enjoy life (though she seems to live it unimaginatively); she loves art; she falls in love with Chris Wilton; she instigates her father to get Wilton a better job; she is a little spoiled; she is sweet (but supposedly boring); she got a previous boyfriend whom falls out of her family's approval; she marries Chris Wilton; she wants to have kids; she starts a series of fertility treatments to get pregnant (even trying some unorthodox methods); she supposedly knows that Chris Wilton does not love her as much as she loves him; she suspects Chris Wilton of being unfaithful; she is passive; she loves opera and musicals; her father sponsors her own art gallery; she is extremely supportive; she gets an STI (sexually transmitted infection) from her husband; she finally gets pregnant; she gives birth to a baby boy.

Eleanor Hewett (Penelope Wilton)

She is married to Alec Hewett; she is the mother of Tom and Chloe; she wants her son and daughter to marry well; she says what she thinks (especially when she drinks a little too much).

Alec Wilton (Brian Cox)

He is extremely wealthy; he has a lavish country home; he is extremely supportive and careful about the well-being of his family; he is successful; he supports the arts; he gets along well with everybody; though he is rich, he is not snobbish.

4.1.5 Intertextuality

Match Point and the texts (both literary and cinematic) that follow underneath present correlated themes and/or storylines.

Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* (1866)

Chris Wilton is greatly modeled after Raskolnikov (the main character in *Crime and Punishment*). Raskolnikov is a poor Russian student living in Saint Petersburg, who does not believe in god. He intentionally kills Aliena Ivanovna and accidentally murders her innocent sister Lisavietta. Several excerpts from Dostoevsky's novel are replicated by Allen in his film, including the one in which Chris Wilton, after having killed Mrs. Eastby, stands by the door while someone knocks at it insistently. Unlike Raskolnikov, who after his crime is taken by remorse and ends up confessing what he did, Chris Wilton goes on with his life as if such idiosyncratic behavior on his part had never taken place. At the end, Raskolnikov is punished, being sentenced to prison in Siberia, and is finally redeemed by love.

Woody Allen's *Crimes and Misdemeanors* (1989)

Besides sharing the same theme (the absence of god, leading to a world devoid of moral values), both stories focus on atrocious crimes. In *Crimes and Misdemeanors*, Judah Rosenthal (Martin Landau), a successful ophthalmologist, family man and a true pillar of the community has his lover Dolores (Angelica Huston) murdered and gets away with it. In the end of the story, he is not punished and his life goes completely back to normal, within the sheltering sphere of wealth and privilege that he is used to. It is worth mentioning that Dolores resembles Nola Rice in many respects: both are somewhat unstable and keep on threatening their soon to be murderers to abandon their wives.

George Stevens' *A Place in the Sun* (1951)

Based on Dreisser's *An American Tragedy*, young George Eastman (Montgomery Clift), who comes from poor upbringing, falls in love with rich and pampered Angela Vickers (Elizabeth Taylor), who also loves him and wants him to ascend into a life of glamour and prosperity, but he is forced to change his plans when a poor factory girl called Alice Tripp (Shelley Winters) gets pregnant by him. He plans to murder Alice an evening when they go on a boat ride, but when the moment materializes he does not have the necessary guts for it. Accidentally she drowns herself and he takes the blame, being sentenced to death. Unlike Chris Wilton, George Eastman undergoes punishment for a crime he did not commit but that he feels guilty for in his heart. A further connection between these stories is that while Wilton supposedly had a frenzied religious father, Eastman had a wildly devout mother.

Anthony Minghella's *The Talented Mr. Ripley* (2000)

Based on Patricia Highsmith's homonymic novel, and telling the story of Tom Ripley (Matt Damon), a poor American who gets the chance to make money by going to Italy to convince wealthy Dickie Greenleaf (Jude Law) to go back home. He ends up killing Greenleaf and taking over his life and identity. Just like Tom Ripley wants to be the way Dickie Greenleaf is, Chris Wilton wishes to be like Tom Hewett. While Ripley emulates Dickie's signature and lifestyle, Wilton goes on copying Tom's way of dressing as well as the frills of life that Tom is accustomed to. A further similarity is the fact that both characters do not believe much in their own potentialities and that, despite their alleged remorse, they

would rather go on living a life of deceit, and false morality than returning to an existence of righteousness and modest earnings.

4.2 THE ANALYSIS OF *MATCH POINT*

For attaining the objective of analyzing the process of inference generation mediated by *Match Point*, a synthesized version of the cinematic text is going to be reported in accordance with the chapter division comprised in its DVD form, attempting to describe all the necessary elements that account for the original pragmatic context proposed by the author. Concurrently, as the context is being built up, suppositions (S) are going to be made and relevant sentences are going to be literally transcribed and scrutinized into two distinct manners: the higher the number of contextual indications that are mutually known by the participants of the communicative game (speaker/listener/viewer), the sort of calculation suggested by Costa (1984, 2004) in his Amplified Model of Grice is going to constitute the means by which inferential calculation is attained; however if the participants of the communicative exchange are unable to share content because contextual indications are chosen instead of given, the theoretic framework of RT is going to come to the foreground, as the selected analytical tool, to furnish the means by which inferences are figured out. Concomitantly with the sort of calculations described, an empirical investigation of how implicit meaning surfaces is going to be reported in accordance with the data provided by ten subjects who were submitted to watching the film. Such a database was built up as the subjects were watching *Match Point*. It is worth mentioning as well that all the subjects involved in the present study had never watched the movie before and that they were fully aware of the fact the data they provided would be used for academic purposes.

The combination of these approaches aims at demonstrating their efficiency as logical deductible systems to approach meaning, so that the implicit content of implicatures may be more thoroughly perceived and attended to, aiming at recovering the possible intended meaning conveyed by Woody Allen.

By the end of the analysis of this cinematic text, a further goal must also be achieved, namely, a contrastive analysis between the types of calculations involved, evincing their frequency of use as well as their pros and cons.

Chapter I

The film opens with the shot of a tennis court where a ball bounces back and forward over the net. Suddenly, the voice of the main character Chris Wilton (Jonathan Rhys Meyers) is heard uttering

(U) The man who said, I'd rather be lucky than good saw deeply into life. People are afraid to face how great a part of life is dependent on luck. It's scary to think so much is out of one's control. There are moments in a match when the ball hits the top of the net, and for a split second it can either go forward or fall back. With a little luck, it goes forward and you win. Or maybe it doesn't and you lose.

The linguistic decoding of such an utterance may affect the viewers' cognitive environment as to the intentness comprised in it. The fact that luck was the selected topic of the utterance, allied with the setting of a tennis match, may yield on the viewer the ensuing contextual effects: (S1) viewers are likely to presuppose the theme of the cinematic text revolves around the role of luck in people's lives; (S2) the title *Match Point* as well as what had just been uttered along the movie shot may predispose the viewers to assume the cinematic text is going to be focused around tennis as a sports practice, or at least involve tennis players; (S3) the expressed desire of being lucky rather than being good may allow the viewers to assume that the movie is going to deal with moral issues concerning either ethical or most likely unethical behavior.

Next scene shows Chris Wilton attending a job interview at an exclusive club in London, England. He has applied for the position of tennis instructor. The interviewer seems to be pleased with the applicant's qualifications and professional expertise. Viewers are able to learn that the character was a professional tennis player, partaking in important tournaments and playing against grand names such as Rusedski and Agassi. By this point, when questioned about whether he misses playing professionally, Wilton replies saying that he hated the constant traveling and that he would never have been as grand as one of those top seeds. Then he utters:

(U) You have to really want it. Not that I have their talent.

Such an utterance may just as well be paraphrased by (U1) *If I had had their (Rusedeski's and Agassi's) talent, I would have really desired to be great* – an entailment (something that logically follows from what is asserted). From the ostensive stimulus subsumed in this counterfactual, viewers are led to expand their cognitive environments and suppose that either Chris Wilton lacked the talent required to have been a top tennis player (S4), or that he suffers from low self-esteem, not believing in his potentiality for ever standing the chance of achieving a top position in the sports (S5).

The interview goes very well and Wilton is asked to start that weekend.

The ensuing scenes show Wilton renting a modest flat in West Kensington and reading Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* as well as *The Cambridge Companion to Dostoevsky*. Then, he is already shown working as an instructor at the exclusive club and being introduced to one of his trainees – Tom Hewett (Matthew Goode). After a short while, they are having a drink and Tom asks Wilton if he wants a ride. Wilton says he is looking for a CD store with a decent opera section. Then, the following conversation takes place:

Tom – Music around here? I think there's one on the Fulham Road.

Chris – And they'll have a decent opera section?

Tom – Opera? You like opera, really?

Chris – I love opera.

Tom – Papa gives loads to the Royal in Covent Garden. I know this is gonna sound a bit weird but, would you like to go to the opera tomorrow night?

Chris – To the opera?

Tom – Yeah. We've got a box and someone's not coming. It's La bloody Traviata.

Chris – My god, I'd love to. Are you sure it's not an imposition? Can I at least pay for my seat?

Tom – It's not an imposition, it'd be an absolute pleasure. I just like the fact that we both share a love for opera. Brilliant!

At this point, the DVD player was paused and the subjects submitted to this cinematic text were encouraged to answer what they understood by Tom's utterance 'I know this is going to sound a bit weird but, would you like to go the opera' – that is, they were supposed to say what exactly could be considered weird about Tom's invitation. Out of the ten subjects, six (four male, two female) concluded (Q) Tom is gay and he is making a move at Wilton. The inferential calculation (RT account) below evinces their reasoning.

(S1) – Tom and Wilton have barely known each other.

(S2) – Tom talks and gesticulates in an effeminate manner.

(S3) – It is unusual for a man to invite another one (he barely knows) to go out (especially to the opera).

(S4) – Tom’s reasons for inviting Wilton have not been very convincing.

(Q1) – Tom is gay and he is making a pass at Wilton. (S1 + S2 + S3 + S4)

Such a cognitive effect was originated by addition, and was soon to be ruled out when the subjects got to know more about Tom, turning their abovementioned suppositions into irrelevant ones as far as the storyline of this feature is concerned.

It is noteworthy pointing out that by saying ‘this is going to sound a bit weird’, Tom is probably admonishing Wilton not to infer that he is gay. As to the effeminate way of talking and gestures the subjects attributed Tom with, one should bear in mind that Tom is a member of England’s upper-class, and that since Victorian times (1837-1901) the elite and the commoners have developed behavioral as well as linguistic attitudes that imposed a certain degree of distancing between them. As a consequence, the lower class, as attested by Spears (1982), started to ascribe pejorative qualities such as effeminate to male members of the higher-up echelon who were far more educated and spoke in a distinct form. Such an explanation does not intend to convey the idea that the subjects involved in this study belong to the lower-crust of society, but it attempts to demonstrate that the sort of English they are commonly exposed to is not the one expressed by Tom.

From the aforementioned dialogue there are also no evidences that may suggest that Chris Wilton assumed Tom to be homosexual. Actually, he accepted Tom’s invitation right then and there, without behaving in any manner that could promote the understanding of him being gay as well such as responding to Tom’s remarks in a flirtatious fashion.

Next scene takes place at the Royal Opera House in Covent Garden, where Wilton is introduced to Tom’s father Alec (Brian Cox), his wife Eleanor (Penelope Wilton) and his sister Chloe (Emily Mortimer). While at the opera, Chloe Hewett takes two furtive glances at Wilton and it is crystal clear that she feels instantly attracted to him.

A little later, Wilton is invited to spend the weekend at the Hewett’s country home.

Chapter II

The chapter begins at 'Headley' – The Hewett's magnificent estate, packed with gardens, tennis courts and other amenities. There, the viewers get to know that Wilton managed to escape a poor existence by catching the eye of a good tennis coach. When asked by Chloe if he is happy being a tennis instructor, Wilton replies negatively adding that he would really enjoy making a contribution to the world. Later on, while wandering around the corridors of Headley, Chris is attracted by the sound of people playing table tennis. He follows the sound and gets to a room where a sensual woman called Nola Rice (Scarlett Johansson) has just beaten down her opponent, who leaves the room, thus leaving the two of them alone. The following exchange takes place:

Nola – (Confidently) So who's my next victim? You?

Chris – I haven't played table tennis in quite a while.

Nola – Would you like to play for a thousand pounds a game?

Chris – What did I walk into?

(The match starts and Wilton's strong backhand sends the ball flying off the table)

Nola – What did I walk into?

Chris – It's like this (approaching her). May I?

Nola – Please.

Chris – (He embraces her with his left arm while with his right arm he holds her racket) You have to lean it, and hit through the ball.

Nola – I was doing just fine until you showed up.

Chris – (Teasingly) Oh, the story of my life. So, tell me, what's a beautiful, young American Ping-Pong player doing mingling amongst the British upper class?

Nola – (Lighting a cigarette) Did anyone ever tell you, you play a very aggressive game?

Chris – Did anyone ever tell you have very sensual lips?

Nola – Extremely aggressive!

Chris – I'm naturally competitive. Is it off-putting?

Nola – I'll have to think about that for a while.

Out of the ten subjects, all of them concluded (Q1) – Wilton was hitting on Nola and (Q2) – Nola is apparently enjoying it. Their inferential calculation (as well as the ones from potential viewers) may be expressed in this way:

(S1) Wilton established close contact with his target.

(S2) He flattered Nola by saying she was beautiful and young.

(S3) He said she has very sensual lips.

(Q1) Nola said metaphorically he played a very aggressive game, implying that he was making a pass at her. (S1 + S2 + S3) – Particularized Conversational Implicature by flouting the maxim of manner – avoid ambiguity. (Grice's Amplified Model)

By saying she will have to think about that when Wilton asks her if his aggressive game is off-putting, the subjects got to the ensuing hypothesis:

(S5) Nola does not do anything to prevent Wilton from making such insidious advances on her.

(Q2) She is probably enjoying that seduction game. (Q1 + S5) – Particularized Conversational Implicature by flouting the maxim of manner – avoid obscurity.

Therefore, by inferring (Q2) the former inference (Q1) becomes even more relevant.

Suddenly Tom enters the room and the dialogue goes on like this:

Tom – Ah, there you are. (Looking at Nola) I wanted to introduce you to Chris Wilton.

(Looking at Wilton) Chris Wilton, this is Nola Rice, my fiancée.

Nola – Aha, so, you're the tennis pro.

Chris – (Holding out her hand) My pleasure.

Nola – (Looking at Wilton but addressing Tom) He was trying to have his way with me over the table.

Tom – Oh, really? You'd better watch out for this one. He's made a living out of hustling.

Nola – (Looking at Chris) I'll be ready for you next time (and kisses Tom before leaving the room).

By initially emphasizing to the subjects that the sentence uttered by Nola – 'He was trying to have his way with me over the table' - is normally understood as comprising sexual content, being easily paraphrased as (U1) – He was trying to get me into the sack or more explicit (yet less socially acceptable) versions such as (U2) – He was trying to fuck me over

the table – and then asking them to provide conclusions about the meaning inferred by both Tom and Wilton, the following implicit indications about such a sentence were attained:

Tom understands it in a metaphorical sense because

(S1) Wilton is a professional player

(S2) Wilton is better than Nola at table tennis

Therefore,

(Q1) Nola is alluding to sex to say that Wilton was trying to beat her at the match.

By being exposed to the seductive mood of the previous conversation that took place before Tom had arrived, the subjects got to the conclusion that Wilton has got a far-reaching understanding. The inferential calculus underneath evinces that (Grice's Amplified Model).

(S3) Tom does not know that Wilton made a pass at Nola.

(S4) Tom understood (Q1) because (S1 + S2)

(S5) Nola knows that Wilton knows that Tom understood (Q1)

(S6) Nola purposefully used figurative speech to reprehend Wilton's actions.

Therefore, Wilton understands that Nola alluded to what had really happened just before (Q2)

(Q2) Wilton was trying to seduce Nola. (S3 + S4 + S5 + S6)

Such inferences may be corroborated by clues provided by Tom when he uttered 'you had better (an advice) watch out (be careful) because he has made a living out of hustling (prostitution)'. Actually, it may be virtually evinced that Tom's funny way to proceed with this line of sexual allusions fosters his understanding of (Q1). If Tom had understood (Q2) he would probably have uttered something different such as a reprimand on Wilton's behavior.

Both (Q1) and (Q2) are particularized conversational implicatures, stemming from flouting the maxim of manner – avoid ambiguity – and, the fact that Tom understood (Q1) and Wilton concluded (Q1) and (Q2) may characterize what Faria (1999) denominates 'concomitant implicatures'.

Before the chapter gets to a closure, viewers get to know that Nola and Eleanor do not get along well and that Eleanor does not think she is a good match for her son. Right after that, Wilton and Chloe start dating and a while later she is asking her father to try to find a better job position for her boyfriend.

Chapter III

This chapter starts at a restaurant (possibly Russian) where Chris Wilton tells Chloe that one of her father's business associates has offered him a position. Tom and Nola arrive and the four of them are placed at a table. Then there is that previously talked about conversation where Tom says that the car exhibition he took Nola to was so exciting that his pants have barely dried.

Interestingly, out of the ten subjects exposed to the film, none of them were able to figure out its possible intended meaning. Two of them got to the conclusion that Tom's pants had gotten wet probably because it had been raining, while the others stated that the sentence did not make much sense, simply preferring to ignore it. Out of these indications, one may suppose that the ostensive stimulus comprised in Tom's sentence was not strong enough to incite the audience to draw inferences about it, thus leading them to regard it as undeserving of receiving their attention.

While at the table Wilton discloses that his father was a sort of austere religious fanatic who held on to god after losing his legs. He also insinuates the idea that faith is the path of least resistance, possibly leading the viewers to assume it as a warning not only of Wilton's feeling of godlessness but also of his nihilism. In accordance with Fuller (2006:16), Chris Wilton descends "from the same bloodline of upwardly mobile, self-anointed Nietzschean supermen as not only Raskolnikov but also *An American Tragedy's* Clyde Griffiths".

Still at the restaurant, viewers also get to know that Nola is a struggling actress that is trying to break in at the movies, but who has only managed a TV commercial so far. When Nola professes that her career is not going as planned, and that she cannot bear the thought of people in her Colorado hometown to think that she has failed, Wilton states his belief that it is important to be lucky in anything. By then he utters something that may endorse this view a little further and lead the viewers to reinforce the assumption that the theme of this cinematic text has a lot to do with the role of luck in people's lives.

Chris – Hard work is mandatory, but I think everybody is afraid to admit what a big part luck plays, it seems that scientists are confirming more and more that all existence is here by blind chance. No purpose, no design.

By this time, the DVD player was paused once again and the subjects were asked to say what this cinematic text was about; i.e., what sort of theme might be comprised within it. All of them agreed that the role that luck plays in the lives of people should probably be its primary theme. Such a result may not be very conclusive since by pausing the film exactly at this moment, the subjects involved were sort of strongly induced to answer this way due to the great number of ostensive stimuli contained in the excerpt they had just been exposed to.

The chapter proceeds and viewers are able to learn that Wilton got a junior position at one of Alec Hewett's companies. Then Chloe pops up at Wilton's flat to celebrate his new job. By then, the following exchange (a little shortened) takes place.

Chloe – Tom and Nola invited us to go and see a film with them tonight, but I told them we're busy.

Chris – Oh, but we have no plans. Well, no special plans.

Chloe – I thought we said we'd stay in?

Chris – Yeah, but it wasn't written in stone. We could've joined them.

Chloe – We still can, if you'd prefer it.

Chris – Sure, unless you'd rather not.

Chloe – Well... It might be more fun just the two of us.

Chris – Absolutely (after a while) I just figured we can stay in any night, and they're free and suggested a film.

Chloe – If you'd prefer it.

*Chris – I am in the mood for a film. (And they go to the cinema to watch Walter Salles' *The Motorcycle Diaries*).*

After being exposed to this scene, all the subjects agreed that Wilton is not in love with Chloe (Q1), and that Chloe is passive (Q2). Their inferential calculation (RT account) follows underneath.

(S1) Chloe wants to stay in, alone with the man she loves. (Mutually known)

(S2) Wilton pretends to agree on her, but clearly he would rather go out. (Known)

(S3) Wilton probably wants to see Nola. (Assumed)

(S4) Chloe does everything Wilton wants. (Assumed)

Therefore,

(Q1) Wilton is not in love with Chloe (S2 + S3)

(Q2) Chloe is passive (S1 + S4)

(Q1) may later be corroborated (by reinforcement) when Wilton and Chloe get to the cinema and just Tom shows up, saying that Nola is at home with a migraine. By taking a look at Wilton's face when he realizes that Nola is not coming, all the subjects got to the conclusion that he was extremely disappointed (Q3).

Such a conclusion (Q3) makes (Q1) more relevantly determined and it also increases the degree of relevance comprised in (S3) – Wilton wants to see Nola.

The chapter concludes with Chloe telling Wilton that her father has gotten excellent feedback on his work and that Chris is a very intelligent man, corroborating the previous assumption about Wilton's low self-assurance about his own potentialities.

Chapter IV

The chapter commences at a Ralph Lauren store in Sloane Square where Wilton goes to buy a vicuna sweater just like the one Tom has. When he leaves the store, he bumps into Nola who is about to face an audition at the Royal Court Theatre. He prompts into accompanying her for moral support. The audition goes badly and Wilton takes Nola for a drink at a pub nearby. There, viewers get to know that Nola's family is quite problematic and that she had already been married, corroborating Eleanor's view that she is not right for Tom. As Nola starts to drink, the conversation assumes a more casual, intimate tone. By then, the characters utter (synthesized form):

Chris – Was it love at first sight for you and Tom?

Nola – I thought he was very handsome. And I was just overwhelmed with attention. So, what about you and Chloe?

Chris – She's very sweet.

Nola – She's very sweet and she wants to marry you. You're gonna do very well for yourself, (hesitantly) unless you blow it.

Chris – And how am I going to blow it?

Nola – By making a pass at me?

Chris – And what makes you think that's gonna happen?

Nola – Men always seem to wonder. They think I'd be something very special.

Chris – And are you?

Nola – Well, no one has ever asked for their money back!

Chris – (Laughs) Where was all this confidence when you needed it in the audition?

The above conversation has incited ten of the subjects to conclude (Q1) – Nola neither loves Tom nor Wilton loves Chloe; nine to derive (Q2) – Wilton and Nola are likely to have an affair, and eight of them to arrive at (Q3) – They have similar objectives. The steps that were used for getting to these implicated conclusions follow underneath.

(S1) Nola likes money, attention and beauty – that is, superficial values. (Shared)

(S2) Wilton thinks Chloe is sweet in the sense of being either pleasant or sympathetic (Shared).

Therefore, (Q1) - (S1 + S2) - Particularized Conversational Implicature by flouting the maxim of manner – avoid ambiguity

(S3) Nola senses Wilton wants her. (Shared)

(S4) Nola advises him that his desires may lead him away from his objectives. (Shared)

(S5) They want to ascend both socially and financially. (Shared)

Therefore,

(Q2) – Standard Particularized Conversational Implicature (Q1 + S3 + S4)

(Q3) – Standard Particularized Conversational Implicature (Q1 + S5)

Such an inferential calculation also exemplifies what Costa (1984,2004) refers to as ‘concatenated implicatures’. It is also worth noticing that Q2 as well as Q3 turn Q1 into a more relevantly determined implicature.

The chapter continues at Headley, where all of them go shooting disk targets, among several other activities. Over there, viewers have access to the fact that Alec Hewett encourages Chris Wilton to take a business course (paid by the company), so that he may ascend to a finer position, subtly insinuating that he is doing that because it obviously seems to him that his daughter Chloe and Wilton are becoming more and more closely connected (anticipating a possible assumption about their marriage).

The chapter gets to its closure with that previously mentioned scene where Eleanor Hewett overtly tells Nola that she is wasting her life away in the movie business, and warns her to pursue a different alternative before it gets too late.

Chapter V

After being told that she should seriously consider doing something other than acting, Nola felt really badly and decided to get away from everybody. Outside rain is falling, but even so, Nola goes out for a walk in the surrounding fields and gardens. Meanwhile, Wilton has been searching for his Strindberg⁵ book that has apparently vanished into thin air. All of a sudden, he looks out of the window and sees Nola walking away. He decides to follow her.

At this moment, the DVD player is paused once more and the ten subjects are introduced to a distinct topic. They are told to keep their thoughts away from the movie for a while and focus their entire attention on the notoriously famous painting entitled *Crows on a Wheatfield* (1890), painted by Vincent Van Gogh that they are about to be exposed to. After looking closely and attentively at the copy (1967), the subjects are asked a series of questions about the painting that may lead them to draw assumptions about what the painter intended to convey in his work of art. Therefore, when questioned about the presence or absence of movement in the painting, ten out of ten subjects answered (S1) that movement is clearly depicted and that it could be evinced in the motion of wheat as well as the frantic flight of the crows; when asked about the sort of sky represented in the picture, seven out of ten replied (S2) that the color of the sky, an intense dark blue, foretells an overwhelming storm that is about to happen; when asked about the effects of such a storm assumed by (S2), ten out of ten retorted (S3) that chaos and/or destruction will follow; when they were inquired about the probable idea comprised within it, six out of ten answered that (S4) the idea is that life is about to end, and two out of ten replied that (S5) nature will take its revenge, while the other two subjects (mechanical engineers) said (S6) that only Van Gogh could provide an accurate answer for such a question.

After having analyzed the painting, the subjects were asked to connect their assumptions about Van Gogh's painting with the scene they were about to watch. The validity of such an unorthodox method may evidently come into dispute, for the simple reason it is inductive, leading the subjects to derive conclusions that are non-authorized. In spite of this, the present author insisted on proceeding with this approach in order to demonstrate that some people may supposedly not follow a path of least effort while searching for further positive cognitive effects.

⁵ August Strindberg (1849-1912) – a Swedish playwright whose main themes range from failing marital relationships, loneliness and enfeeblement of spiritual faith.

The movie goes on. Wilton meets Nola on a path by a wheat field and, soon enough, they voraciously consummate their passion, lying amidst the wheat plantation as rain keeps coming down. Fuller (2006) states that this is the most passionate sequence Allen has ever filmed.

After watching this scene, the subjects were asked to report the sort of inferences they got to as well as if connections could be established between Van Gogh's painting and the aforementioned movie shot. The data that follows underneath reports the assumptions and conclusion that most subjects got to.

(S1) There is a connection between the painting and the scene.

(S2) Wilton and Nola are likely to be caught.

(S3) Their respective relationships with Chloe and Tom will end.

(Q1) Chaos and/or destruction will be the outcome of this forbidden meeting (S1 + S2 + S3)

Therefore, the subjects might already have been predicting that this story would unfold tragically (a non-authorized deduction).

As to the alleged connectivity between the cinematic text and Van Gogh's painting, it is obviously hard to corroborate and/or validate it. But it seems relevant to mention that Van Gogh as an alluded topic of conversation, not his work, has already been referred to at least twice in Allen's work: *Manhattan* (1979) and *Manhattan Murder Mystery* (1993).

The film advances and then there is a scene where Wilton is coming out of a Cartier store when he suddenly spots his friend Henry (Rupert Penry-Jones), a struggling tennis pro who used to compete with Wilton in those bygone times. The following exchange occurs:

Henry – Looks like you're doing all right for yourself, aren't you?

Chris – You're still in the tennis tour?

Henry – Yeah, I love it. Look at this car.

Chris – Don't worry, it's not mine. It's the company's.

Henry – Yeah, I know you found a bit of a grind, didn't you? But I'm still circling the globe, deluding myself.

Chris – I just couldn't stand it.

By being asked to concentrate on the aforementioned excerpt, all of the subjects reported that it looks like the characters are simultaneously talking about two different topics:

first evidence is that Wilton's reply to Henry's initial question is a non-related question, and second, when Wilton says the car belongs to the company, Henry says something that has nothing to do with that. In spite of that, the subjects said that the conversation apparently made sense and that both the participants were able to understand and follow the reasoning and intentions of one another.

By following Costa's Amplified Model of Grice (1984, 2004) the ensuing derivations may be achieved:

- 1- Henry commented that Wilton apparently seems to be making good
- 2- Wilton replied asking Henry if he was still doing the tennis tour
- 3- Wilton did not provide the information requested by Henry
- 4- Even so, Wilton must be cooperating
- 5- Wilton is probably being relevant if he intends to convey (Q1) – that he is not much interested in talking about his professional life
- 6- Therefore, Wilton changed the subject to imply (Q1) - A Particularized Conversational Implicature by flouting the maxim of adequacy (say something appropriate for the purpose of conversation)

Following the same reasoning, one gets to:

- 1- Wilton said the car belongs to the company
- 2- Henry stated that he knew Wilton considered it a little hard (a bit of a grind) and added that he is still traveling round the world (circling the globe) and deluding himself (about being successful)
- 3- By what is implicitly comprised within Henry's aforementioned utterance one may understand that he is talking about his tennis career (corroborated by the decoding of 'circling the globe' as well as its pragmatic enrichment, that connects such linguistic data with a professional tennis career, and by enriching pragmatic processes applicable to 'deluding himself', that lead one to the disambiguation and referential indeterminacy of it, deriving that Henry is referring to the misled notion that he will be a top player one day)
- 4- Henry's reply is not adequate as to the purpose of conversation
- 5- Henry must be cooperating anyway
- 6- Henry is being relevant if, by saying that he wants to emphasize that he understood (Q1), he is implying (Q2) - it is OK to talk about their professional tennis careers

7- Therefore, Henry changed the subject once again and implied (Q2) – A Particularized Conversational Implicature by flouting the maxim of adequacy

The dialogue proceeds:

Henry – I heard you went into business.

Chris – I'm a wheel in an office if you can believe it.

Henry – A big wheel.

Chris – It's who you know, Henry. I got involved with a woman. Very nice. Family's got nothing but money. Big estate, servants, polo ponies. All quite lovely.

Henry – Hey, I understand. It beats getting your heart broken all the time by the top seeds.

By violating the maxim of adequacy one more time, Henry is implying (Q3) – he understands that Wilton felt disappointed and mediocre in comparison to the great tennis professionals, and he also understands the reasons that led him to venture into different grounds (a business career and a life of luxury on the account of his girlfriend's family).

By inferring (Q3), general viewers may also corroborate the assumption that Wilton does not love Chloe and that he is probably not enjoying his new life.

The dialogue gets to its end.

Chris – Isn't it amazing how much of life turns on whether the ball goes over the net or comes right back at you?

Henry – I always admired your game though, you know?

Chris – Thanks!

Henry – You were very steady, cool over pressure, but creative. You could be a poet with the racket like Laver was.

Chris – I lost to you as much as I beat you.

Henry – No. When I played you, you never beat yourself. I'm telling you, a couple of bounces the other way, you might've beaten some of those top seeds.

By following the final part of the aforementioned exchange, viewers may also get to the following assumptions and conclusions:

(S1) Wilton is a firmer believer in luck

(S2) Wilton is not as untalented as he imagines

(Q1) Wilton suffers from low self-esteem (derived from S2)

The chapter unwinds and the viewers get to know that Wilton and Chloe got married and moved to a huge and expensive new flat on the Embankment. Soon after that, Wilton learns that Tom has fallen in love with another woman and that he has walked out on Nola.

Chapter VI

The present chapter starts with Wilton's efforts to find Nola, but it apparently seems that she has disappeared (S1), or at least that she does not want to be found (S2). Meanwhile, Chloe gets more and more obsessed with the idea of becoming a mother, urging Wilton to intensify their lovemaking. Tom marries Heather (Miranda Raison), who has already been expecting his baby. Then there is a scene where Wilton is shown at his office looking kind of miserable. The following exchange takes place between Wilton and his secretary Samantha (Zoe Telford):

Chris – Samantha, can I have two aspirin, please?

Chris – (Reaching out for the aspirin and the water glass) Thanks.

Sam – Are you OK, sir?

Chris – Tell me, Samantha, do you feel claustrophobic in here?

Sam – No, not really.

When questioned about whether Wilton was using the expression 'claustrophobic', as an allusion to his place of work or to his life, all of the subjects replied that the word was used metaphorically in reference with the sort of life that Wilton was living. They also inferred that Samantha had understood it in the literal sense, associating it with their place of work, for not having had access to her boss's private life.

In fact, Fuller (2006:17) asserts that "the post-industrial open-plan office in which Chris Wilton works paradoxically makes him feel claustrophobic, as does the cavernous Thames-side penthouse where he and Chloe begin their married life".

The ensuing scene takes place at Tate Modern where Wilton goes to meet his wife Chloe. Suddenly he sees Nola admiring a huge panel that ostensibly exhibits the imprinted catchwords 'ache day' – perhaps an ominous sign that might guide attentive viewers to infer it

as a hint that something unpleasant is about to happen. Wilton approaches Nola, whom does not apparently feel very happy to see him. He learns that after Tom had left her, she went back to Colorado and that she has moved back to town. After a range of clumsy and vain attempts to get to know more about her whereabouts, she reluctantly agrees to give him her phone number. She utters 02079460996 once only as Wilton leaves to join his wife.

The film is paused and the subjects are inquired to say whether they assume such an extensive number (11 digits) could be memorized so quickly. Six out of ten answered a categorical no, while three of them reported that they did not have the slightest idea. A female subject answered affirmatively, stating that when one is in love, their attention on the object of their love is greatly heightened.

Then the following experiment took its course: the subjects were handed a piece of paper containing four numbers (44, 08, 21, 93) and given 30 seconds to memorize it. Results have shown that nine out of ten were able to successfully memorize it. The other one got one of the numbers wrong. After that, the subjects had access to the fact that the first three digits uttered by Nola correspond to London's area code (020), and that such a code is taken for granted by the city residents (consolidated previous knowledge), who may need it just in case they are dialing outside the city. They were also told that the remaining eight digits can perfectly be memorized if taken two by two, making up four numbers (79, 46, 09, 96) instead of eight, thus validating the hypothesis that Wilton could really have succeeded in memorizing it so fast, though a critique must be adumbrated as to the way in which the film shot was enacted, leading viewers to possibly assume that Wilton's memory skill was exaggerated beyond bounds as to the quickness to process such a frail input.

The scenes that follow show Chloe going after every conceivable fertility treatment that is available, as Wilton begins a double life betraying his wife with Nola as much as possible. In the meantime, viewers also learn that the flat in which Nola dwells is cheap and that it has been burglarized a couple of times, not to mention that her next door neighbor, Mrs. Eastby (Margaret Tyzack), has gotten mice.

As Wilton's affair with Nola intensifies, his relationship with Chloe is cooled down by routine. Such routine may undoubtedly be evinced when Wilton and Chloe are having breakfast one morning. After a brief small talk session, Wilton says he is late for work while Chloe asks him to make love to her. He reluctantly acquiesces to her desire and waits until his wife has finished checking her temperature by sticking a thermometer up to her mouth.

Chapter VII

As this chapter unfolds, viewers get familiar with the notion that Nola is gradually becoming fed up with just being Wilton's lover. Concomitantly, they are exposed to the idea that Wilton is having a hard time balancing his commitments with his job, his wife and the woman he supposedly loves. By then, there is a Christmas supper at Headley and Alec Hewett and Wilton engage in the following conversation:

Alec – There you are, Chris. Chloe tells me you've sustained some personal loss in the market over the past few months.

Chris – Well, I guess I've been a little bit careless, not concentrating. And, of course, I thought I made good decisions, but...

Alec – Well, who could have predicted these (fluctuations in the stock market)?

(According to the context of this conversation, what is in parentheses above is solely derived from inferential processes of pragmatic nature to resolve problems of indeterminacy, leading to the enrichment of the proposition)

Alec – Look, I don't want you and Chloe to worry. You'll always have a safety net.

Chris – You're too generous, sir.

Alec – Oh, no, you've made Chloe happy, and that means a great deal to Eleanor and me.

The previous excerpt has led the subjects to come up with the following assumptions and conclusions about Wilton and Alec:

(S1) – Wilton has been losing money (mutually known)

(S2) – He has been neglecting his work (mutually known)

(Q1) – He is not a reliable worker (S1 + S2) Authorized Standard Conversational Implicature
or

(S3) – Wilton has been spending his money with Nola (presumed)

(S4) – He has been telling Chloe that he is losing money (presumed)

(Q2) – Wilton is a deceitful liar (S2 + S3 + S4) – Non-Authorized Implicature
and

(S5) – Alec offers financial help to Wilton (mutually known)

(S6) – Alec wants his daughter to be happy (mutually known)

(S7) – Alec does not want his daughter to give up her lifestyle (mutually known)

(Q3) – As long as Wilton is married to Chloe, money will never be a problem. (S5 + S6 + S7)
 – Authorized Standard Conversational Implicature

Next scene shows that wintertime has gone by and the next that spring has come. Nola is getting more and more irritable for not being able to have Wilton by her side. The chapter proceeds along dinnertime, during an extended weekend at Headley, when Wilton receives a phone call from Nola in which she tells him that she is pregnant. Wilton has to come up with a reasonable excuse for being able to go and see her the day after. The chapter ends with a close shot of Chloe's sad and suspicious face, leading mindful viewers to probably assume that she conceives the possibility of her husband having been running around.

Chapter VIII

When confronted by Wilton, Nola refuses to have the problem sorted out and viewers are enlightened with the fact that she has already had two abortions, one on Tom's demands.

The ensuing scene shows Wilton and Chloe at their penthouse, where he is prone to tell his wife what has been going on. But when the moment comes up he does not have the guts to do it. The following exchange between the characters takes place (synthesized version):

Chloe – What is it? Is it something to do with those phone calls you kept getting?

Chloe – Because you acted really strangely after each of them. Are you having an affair?

Chris – Am I having an affair?

Chloe – Yeah, that's what I asked.

Chris – No.

Chloe – (Assertively) You are!

Chris – Of course I'm not. Don't be silly.

Chloe – (Sits down heavily and thoughtfully) Do you not love me anymore?

Chris – Of course I love you.

Chloe – Well, what's wrong?

Chris – I just feel like I'm letting you down.

Chloe – Is it because I'm not getting pregnant?

Chris – I just...feel so guilty. So terribly guilty.

(A while later)

Chloe – Let's get off the subject. Having a child should be something that makes us both happy and excited, not a cause of all this tension and anxiety.

After having had access to the abovementioned excerpt, the subjects came up with the following assumptions and conclusions:

- (S1) Those phone calls made Chloe suspect of her husband being unfaithful
- (S2) Wilton was not very convincing when he denied being involved in an extra-marital relation
- (Q1) Chloe's intuition tells her that Wilton is cheating on her (S1 + S2)
Such a conclusion was strengthened when she asked him if he did not love her anymore.
- (S3) Wilton lied when he said that he loves Chloe (highly shared)
- (Q2) Wilton is a coward (derived from S3)
- (Q3) Wilton is afraid of losing the privileges he has got (derived from S3)
- (S4) Chloe understood that Wilton feels guilty for not having impregnated her yet
- (S5) Chloe prefers to understand that (Assumed)
- (Q4) Chloe does not want to lose her husband (S4 + S5)
- (Q5) Chloe really loves him (Q4 + Q1) and
- (Q6) Chloe is extremely passive (Q1 + Q4 + Q5)

As it may be evinced from the subjects' results (Q6) enables (Q1),(Q4) and (Q5) to be more relevantly determined.

The cinematic text advances and Wilton meets Henry once more. Viewers are able to know that Wilton is feeling at a crossroads, not knowing exactly what to do; id est, whether he walks out on Chloe and says goodbye to his life of luxury or if he stays with Nola, damned to live a life of hardship and privation. Although Henry tries to make Wilton see that he has improved his professional expertise and that he is liable to find another position somewhere else in the business world, Wilton tends to believe that he will never get as much as what he has already conquered, leading Henry to conclude that Wilton probably does not love Nola as much as he thinks.

In the meantime, viewers are also aware that Chloe's father has sponsored her own art gallery and that Nola is inciting Wilton harder and harder to take a stand and leave Chloe for good. Viewers can perfectly notice that Nola has become pushier than ever and that her demands on Wilton have grown considerably. By this point, seven of the subjects have

predicted that Wilton will terminate their affair and get as far away from her as he possibly manages.

Subsequently, Wilton tells Nola that he is going to leave Chloe as soon as they return from a tour to the Greek islands that had already been planned long before. Nola simply hates the idea but ends up accepting it. Then, when Chris goes to Chloe's gallery to pick her up for the opera, he learns that the trip has just been cancelled. His initial thought is to call Nola but when he finally makes the call he says nothing and hangs up. It seems pertinent to provide further details as to the way in which the movie shot was enacted.

Chris Wilton wanders around his wife's gallery searching for a discreet spot where he may manage to call Nola without being overheard. As soon as he has dialed the number, his back appears turned against two huge correlated paintings while Wilton is framed exactly in the middle of them. One is neutrally colored depicting a man and his ordinary dark shadow; the other is brightly colored depicting a man whose luminous shadow is simply formed by the clothes he wears. From such a setting one may assume:

- (S1) There is a connection between those two paintings
- (S2) The neutral colors in (1) express simplicity and naturalness
- (S3) The fact that the man's shade is complete in (1) may represent as well that his soul is intact
- (S4) The bright colors in (2) express ostentation
- (S5) The fact that the man's shade in (2) just reveals his clothes may express that his soul has corroded
- (Q1) The neutrally colored painting symbolizes a man who has not succumbed to the temptations of a life of luxuries (S1 + S2 + S3 + S4 + S5)
- (Q2) The brightly colored painting symbolizes a man who has given up his soul for the temptations of material comfort (Q1= S1 + S2 + S3 + S4 + S5)

Therefore, (Q1) and (Q2) may be entitled non-authorized 'convergent implicatures', being equally derived from the same inferential calculation, due to the necessary correlation among the implicated premises. In addition, such 'convergent implicatures' are highly prone to be applicable to natural language analysis, provided a correlated situation is clearly established, and the premises to arrive at one (Q1) are exactly the same ones used for deriving the other (Q2). Needless to say that if the context is mutually known among the participants

engaged in the proposed communicative interaction, such implicatures will also undergo authorization.

Despite the fact that the path undertaken (along that specific shot) to figure out (Q1) and (Q2) may be regarded as tortuous and blurry, due to its higher level of connotative content and subjectivity, if allied with the cinematic text that viewers have been exposed so far, one may derive the following conclusion:

(S1) There is a strong relation between the paintings and the life dilemma that Wilton is facing

(S2) The paintings may express a dichotomy between matter and soul

(S3) Wilton is feeling divided between the privileges of an easy and luxurious life where he has to play by somebody else's rules and the benefits of a simpler harder life where he can be himself

(Q1) The scene evinces that Wilton's material needs go against his true desires (S1 + S2 + S3)
- a non-authorized implicature

Once more it seems that the path for figuring out the abovementioned implicature requires a higher cost for attaining a cognitive effect that is relatively beneficial. Hence, one may assume that the inferential calculation presented along this shot is not very relevantly determined. On the other hand, it seems highly unlikely to suppose that the professional in charge of the set design comprised within this film did not intend to convey some sort of contrastive meaning by inserting the previously mentioned paintings. Consequently, the aforementioned statement may corroborate that relevance, as a cognitive property attributable to inputs, varies greatly from one individual to another.

A final comment is that the subjects involved in this analysis have not been asked to provide their interpretation about the aforementioned scene, since most of them reported not having paid much attention as to the paintings depicted in the background.

The chapter advances and Wilton tells Nola he has gone on holiday for three weeks as planned. Quite by chance she finds out he has not traveled. The chapter ends when she confronts him outside his flat building, behaving hysterically and making a scene.

Chapter IX

After making a tremendous effort, Wilton manages to calm Nola down and then he even suggests that he could help her out financially with the child, to what Nola firmly objects, saying that such arrangements would not suffice. By then, it is conspicuously visible to the viewers that Wilton has not gotten a way out, for she offers him no alternative. Thereupon, he must tell Chloe and walk away from the sumptuous life he has gotten accustomed to.

From then on, what has seemed to be a dramatic cinematic text takes on a new perspective and becomes a thriller. Wilton devises a plan to prevent Nola from wrecking up his life: he is going to kill her.

Aiming at making Nola's death resemble a drug-related crime, he proceeds like this: Surreptitiously, he removes a shotgun and ammunition from his father-in-law's estate, placing the disassembled weapon in his tennis bag. Then he goes home. The day after he leaves work earlier saying that he is going to play tennis. He goes to Nola's building and easily manages to gain entry into Mrs. Eastby's flat, saying something about checking her TV reception. There, while Mrs. Eastby leaves to take her medication, he assembles the gun, goes after the elderly lady and murders her in cold blood. Right after that, he takes her jewelry and medication putting everything inside his bag. As soon as he notices that Nola has arrived (he had previously asked her to be home by that time), he also kills her right on the landing just outside her flat, compelling the police to assume that she had been killed for disturbing the assassin's getaway. A while later, he gets to strengthen his alibi by meeting Chloe at the theater to attend Lloyd Webber's *The Woman in White*.

It seems meaningful to mention as well that while Wilton was involved in carrying out his loathsome plan, viewers may also get the chance of learning a few other things about the characters.

While at home the following exchange took place between Wilton and Chloe:

Chloe – (Disappointedly) I still can't do it with you tonight. I'm not over my little dose of whatever.

Chris – (Painfully) Ouch!

The aforementioned exchange may lead the viewers to get to the following conclusions:

(S1) Chloe's initial sentence is obscure

(S2) The vague clues provided by the expressions 'it' and 'tonight' probably suggest something intimate to be performed between husband and wife

(Q1) She is alluding to making love with her husband (Particularized Conversational Implicature by flouting the maxim of manner)

(S2) She is taking some sort of medication

(S3) The interjection used by Wilton carries the illocutionary force of something painful

(S4) Wilton uses it in reply to what Chloe has just told him

(Q2) Chloe has gotten an STI (sexually transmitted infection) from her husband (Q1 + S2 + S3 + S4) - Particularized Conversational Implicature by flouting the maxim of manner

When questioned about the abovementioned exchange, neither of the subjects got to (Q2), possibly because they are not as pragmatically aware in English as they are in their mother tongue. Therefore, they were exposed to the scene once more, this time with Portuguese subtitles.

Results show that by watching the scene with Portuguese subtitles all of them arrived at (Q2).

Another scene that appears to be worth mentioning is the one in which Wilton is at his office receiving some Japanese customers. Viewers may realize that Wilton is confident (even uttering a few Japanese words) and conclude that he has probably gotten potential. This can be corroborated as soon as one of the British associates tells him: *'I thought you showed some interesting ideas there for developing their capacity'*.

Chapter X

The present chapter begins when the Hewetts get to know the shocking news about Nola. Then, Wilton is back at Headley where he returns the hunting gun and stuffs his pockets with Mrs. Eastby's things. He joins Chloe and her parents afterwards, and Chloe enthusiastically advertises to them that she is finally pregnant. Meanwhile, the telephone rings and Wilton learns that detective Mike Banners wants to speak to him.

Next scene shows Wilton approaching the Thames to hurl in the goods he stole from Mrs. Eastby. On his way to the safety rails, he crosses a graffiti drawing stamped on a wall

depicting a child letting go of a heart-shaped red balloon. For a split second Wilton's body is framed against the drawing, giving the impression that he is letting go of the balloon.

Such a movie frame may incite the viewers to get to the ensuing implicated premises and conclusions:

(S1) A red heart may be envisaged as a symbol of love or a symbol of life

(S2) A child may be envisaged as a symbol of innocence

(S3) The balloon is out of the child's reach

(S4) Wilton has committed two atrocious crimes

(S5) A police detective wants to talk to him

(Q1) Wilton's innocence is gone (S2 + S3 + S4 + S5) Non-Authorized Implicature
and

(Q2) Wilton's life or his destiny is out of his reach (Q1 + S1) Non-Authorized Implicature

The aforementioned conclusions (Q1 and Q2) may lead attentive viewers to suppose that the nihilistic views that have been endorsed so far along this cinematic text may come into dispute, and that Wilton will be punished for his crimes after all, promoting the idea that there is an almighty being in charge of justice and morality.

The previous scene was not submitted to the subjects' interpretation for the mere fact it was assumed to be extremely fast to have called their attention.

The scene advances and Wilton hurls the content of his pockets into the Thames. As he is departing the place, he walks away from the railing and realizes he has not gotten rid of Mrs. Eastby's wedding ring. He throws it into the river, turns his back and leaves. In a very analogous shot, just like the one presented when the film began, the ring hits the railing, bounces at it and falls back onto the embankment, leading viewers to predict that Wilton's luck has finally run out. Such a scene constitutes the denouement of the story.

Next scene viewers are introduced to an Irish detective Mike Banners (James Nesbitt) and a Scot inspector (Ewen Bremner). Viewers also have access to the fact that Nola Rice's neighbor, who had also been murdered, was called Betty Eastby.

As the Shakespearean saying goes - "*What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet*" - the knowledge of Mrs. Eastby's full name may discredit a little bit the bard's quotation. Specific encyclopedic knowledge may lead vigilant viewers to derive further conclusions about Woody Allen's hidden intentions.

- (S1) There is a connection between *Match Point* and *Crime and Punishment*
- (S2) In both pieces (cinematic and literary) the main character murders two female victims
- (S3) In *Crime and Punishment* the innocent bystander who dies was called Lisavietta Ivanovna
- (S4) In *Match Point* the innocent bystander was Betty Eastby
- (S5) *Crime and Punishment* takes place in Saint Petersburg – Russia
- (S6) *Match Point* takes place in London – UK
- (S7) Saint Petersburg is east of London
- (S8) Lisavietta is the Russian equivalent to Betty, derived from Elisabeth
- (S9) In *Scoop* (2006) the character portrayed by Woody Allen affirms that Betty is short for Elizabeth (strengthening S8)
- (S10) In English, names finished by the suffix ‘by’ indicate a Viking origin, as pointed by McCrum and MacNeil (1986)
- (S11) Saint Petersburg was founded by Vikings around 860 A.D., being then called Novgorod, as attested by Haywood (1995)
- Therefore,
- (Q1) – By naming ‘Betty (Lisavietta) Eastby (Vikings from the east)’ the innocent bystander who is murdered in the story, Woody Allen is paying tribute to Dostoevsky. (Positive Cognitive Effect by addition)

Of course such a winding road to get to an implicated conclusion is not cost/effective, thus being not relevantly determinable. However, it is worth pointing out that the more viewers are familiar with Woody Allen’s work and with the intertextuality that his cinematic texts sometimes entail, the more likely they are to predict and make further connections.

The chapter closes at the police station where Wilton is expected. There detective Banners questions him about whether he knew Nola Rice. Wilton goes on saying that she was his brother-in-law’s fiancée and that he last saw her a long time ago at Tate Modern. Out of the blue, the detective comes up with an unexpected diary that Nola used to keep, filled with references to him. Wilton manages to talk his way out by quickly admitting to having had an affair with her and begging them to keep his wife as well as her family away from those sordid details. His story is feasible enough for them to provide him with the benefit of a doubt.

Strangely enough, there is no mention about the fact that Nola was pregnant, what would have significantly increased the motivation for Wilton to kill her. When the subjects

were questioned about that, the following assumptions came up: Three out of ten said that Nola had probably not written anything else in her diary since she discovered she was pregnant (S1); two said that she was probably lying about being pregnant (S2); while the others saw this lack of evidence as a critique to the film director, considering it a grave flaw.

It seems significant to emphasize as well that if the subjects had not been asked to focus their attention on this detail, it would probably have gone unnoticed, since they appeared to be highly absorbed and entertained as to the way the story was about to unfold.

As the analyst in charge of the current study, this author happens to agree with those that said Nola had lied. What may lead one to this conclusion is that:

(S1) It is unlikely that she would not have written on her diary about being pregnant

(S2) In case of murder, a postmortem examination is required by law

(S3) Scotland Yard is allegedly believed to pay minute attention to all the details surrounding an assassination

(S4) Nola felt she was about to lose Wilton

(S5) She would probably have envisaged taking Wilton away from Chloe as a revenge on the Hewetts

(Q1) She was not pregnant (S1+ S2 + S3 + S4 +S5) – Non-Authorized Implicature

Epilogue

This final chapter begins late at night when Wilton has fallen asleep over his laptop. Suddenly he seems to listen to some weird noise. He goes to the kitchen where Nola and Betty Eastby inadvertently appear to him, leading most of the subjects to assume that his mind is filled up with remorse (S1).

Such a scene bears a degree of resemblance with the Shakespearean tragedy of Macbeth. Just Like Macbeth, Wilton's guilty conscience also plays tricks on him enabling him to see and talk to the apparitions of his unlucky preys. When questioned by his victims about his motivations, he holds onto his nihilist vision of existence and tells them that when the time came he was able to pull the trigger, and that now it is just a matter of learning how to push the guilt under the rug and move on with his life.

The mere fact that Wilton has had this conversation with these so-called projections (released from his mind) may signalize that he is incapable of coming to terms with the atrocity of what he has done (S2).

The ensuing scene shows detective Banner waking up from an auspicious dream that has led him to figure out the exact way Wilton executed his crimes. He goes to the police station only to find out that his theory must go down the drain; Mrs. Eastby's gold ring has been found in possession of a drug-addict who was recently murdered in the adjacent neighborhood, corroborating the previous theory of a drug-related felony.

Some months later all the family gets reunited at Wilton and Chloe's penthouse to celebrate the birth of their son, Terence Elliot. Alec mentions his grandson is inevitably destined for greatness while Tom remarks that being lucky is far better than being great. The film ends as Wilton gets detached from the group. The image is focused on his melancholic face then it gradually fades away.

According to Hösle (2007:82-83), "the lack of the feeling of guilt may be worse than the feeling of guilt itself, not only for society, but for the individual who loses with the capacity to suffer also any relation to the moral dimension of life".

The ten subjects have also agreed that guilt and remorse will always accompany Chris Wilton's life.

5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The current research has attempted to evince that the inferential architectures encompassed within Grice's Amplified Model, proposed by Costa (1984, 2004), and the one conceived by S&W (1986, 1995) appear to furnish the primary means for explaining how contextual indications and the encoded meaning of utterances are woven together to yield pragmatic processes that seem to be paramount in the comprehension of communicative acts, namely that both models are anchored on non-trivial logical deduction (comprising mutually known contextual knowledge in the former and non-demonstrative contextual knowledge in the latter).

By taking into account the data provided by the ten subjects submitted to the interpretation of Woody Allen's *Match Point*, it is highly feasible to contemplate (although it is undoubtedly a small sampling universe) that inferential calculation are the means by which one is able to attain signification and recover the writer/director's intentions that may lie overtly manifest, enshrouded or camouflaged along his cinematic text.

While contrasting the aforementioned models and their descriptive and explanatory power to compute the implicatures that the subjects arrived at, it was evinced that both models clearly demonstrate the supremacy of calculability as a general property attributable to implicatures.

The kind of inferential calculation comprised within the Amplified Model appears to provide a richer alternative to describe how implicatures emerge, relating what is uttered with contextual shared knowledge as well as with the tacit (social and conventional) rules of communication. As a consequence, such a model is able to foster a more down to earth explanation of how viewers recover implicit meaning, and far more reliable means to validate the generated conclusions, fostering the notion that the pragmatic theory may actually achieve the highly sought after status of a systematic approach to resolve indeterminacies of meaning. As a matter of fact, out of the 40 implicatures that each one of the ten subjects was expected to derive (not all of them reported in the previous section), an average of 16 implicatures per subject seemed likely to be derived in accordance with the proposed model.

Another advantage presented along this model is that it handles meaning in a more rigorous and scientific manner than the one included in the Relevance theoretic account,

hence being more likely to be allied with formal semantics and utilized with more precision in areas such as AI (artificial intelligence) and forensic analysis of speech.

On the other hand, its main con is paradoxical. Its demand for a context that is mutually known among the participants of the communicative exchange (in spite of being likely to undergo enlargement) warrants its formal character at the same time it neglects an inherent feature about human comprehension: its unique character. Comprehension is dependant on a wide range of constituents, and not all of them can be precisely accounted for, being likely to vary from one individual to the other. Therefore, such a model is unable to deal with these elements that are non-demonstrative in their essence, and that constitute the sort of knowledge that is not shared among those involved in a communicative game.

Contrarily, a cognitive approach to pragmatics, as the one envisaged by S&W (1986, 1995) in their Relevance Theory, claims that comprehension is ultimately a non-demonstrative process, also asserting that mutual knowledge is not an essential pre-requirement to arrive at implicate conclusions (implicatures). For S&W, relevance is a property of inputs connected to free-accessed data in the addressee's mind, so that low cost/higher benefit assumptions may be pragmatically inferred as to the communicator's informative intentions.

The authors suggest that such an inferential paradigm can be described as a data processing mechanism that handles both linguistic and extra linguistic sources. In addition, such a model proposes that inferential calculations are likely to take place whenever ostensive inputs triggered by the communicator are able to capture the addressee's attention, inciting them to make use of least effort strategies in deciding what the probable intended meaning is.

In spite of furnishing a far-reaching explanatory potential of how meaning is inferentially attained, its descriptive power is not as eye-catching as the previously mentioned model. Another disputable attribute, as the analysis of the previous cinematic text has shown, is that every now and then some individuals are susceptible to opting for not taking the path of least effort to attain positive cognitive effects. Actually, depending on how engaged they appear to be in understanding the informative intentions conveyed by a communicator, they are prone to carry out huge efforts to enhance their understanding about the proposed intended meaning. Such cases are clearly evinced in school and work situations where misunderstandings can cost dearly, urging one to make further considerations.

Despite the aforementioned con, the empirical investigation that took place along this cinematic text has indicated that the RT model scored significantly higher with the subjects. Out of 40 implicatures, an average of 24 implicatures per subject were apparently derived by

following the precepts encompassed within this methodology, that is, taking into account contextual elements that were unlikely to have been shared.

In spite of the models pros and cons, and the disputable magnitude of mutual knowledge previously referred to, both of them promote the sort of architectural design that leads one to assume that meaning is in fact automatically inferred.

As to the incipient character of the so-called 'convergent implicatures', it appears to be necessary to carry out further investigations, so that they may be more thoroughly developed and checked as to the feasibility of their application to natural language.

The present study has also targeted an interface between cinema and literature, as to the sort of factors that are responsible for inference generation in both types of texts. Despite the presence of some distinctive elements, it appears to be evident enough that the similarities between these mediums are far greater, corroborating the idea that cinematic texts can and should be considered and attended to just like any literary text. Such an interface boosts that semantic constituents of the text as well as their syntactical relationships, specific and generic background knowledge, and the pragmatic context may indeed be accredited as the most influential factors leading to inferential calculations.

The inferential architecture underlying meaning in Woody Allen's *Match Point* has attempted to illustrate that the ample scope of different stimuli subsumed in the text, the setting and the purpose of the verbal exchanges was submitted as the input database for attaining its optimal relevance. In the process, the sequencing of events depicted along the film as well as the scrutinizing of some of its linguistic and non-linguistic excerpts have led to the generation of a myriad of inferences, that may perhaps account for a logical interpretation of the intended meaning proposed by the author, concurrently demonstrating how dependent the overall dramatic effect is on the appropriate decoding patterns that the viewers are likely to make.

Anyhow, it seems significant to express that the full recovery of Woody Allen's intentions, in writing and directing *Match Point* is out of the scope of the current research. What may be expressed in fact is that the present research has corroborated that the more moviegoers are able to connect new information with previously consolidated data that is already stored at their long-term memory, the smaller their effort to attain comprehension will be and the higher the number of cognitive effects, regardless how identical, similar or dissimilar such interpretations may actually be.

Although *Match Point* has been hailed as one of the best films Woody Allen has ever made, and considered by many as a relatively easy movie to follow, it seems pertinent to

stress out that the movie analysis has suggested that the viewers' interpretative skills may be hindered, or at least curtailed, if they are either unable to make sense out of the subtle indications implied by the specific knowledge of Allen's referential allusions and correlated textualities, or if they are unfamiliar with the director's unusual way of presenting his philosophical views about the role and pursues of man in the world. As a consequence, the effort required from the viewers might be too strenuous or frustrating to yield positive cognitive effects, setting the grounds for a reasonable explanation of why his films have customarily been labeled as box office poison, influencing American and Latin American audiences to appraise them negatively, or even avoid watching the work of this most European of American filmmakers. A good piece of evidence to corroborate this negative view that Allen has commonly been associated with, is the fact that the movie DVD box that has been released in Brazil makes no visible references about it being a film written or directed by him.

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